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1.1 INTRODUCTION 
This thesis is about European Union (EU) policy implementation, or about how EU policies are 
put into practice. One can rightly ask whether enough has been written on this topic. Indeed, 
EU compliance research that has looked at how EU member states implement EU policies 
has been flourishing for years (Angelova et al., 2012; Mastenbroek, 2005; Thomann and Sager, 
2017; Treib, 2014). Yet, some puzzles remain unaddressed. This introduction gives a brief 
overview of these puzzles and shows how this thesis addresses them. In order to do that, I first 
present three examples of implementing a specific EU directive  on the ground: the Ambient 
Air Quality Directive 2008/50/EC (AAQ). These examples illustrate the challenging reality of 
implementing an EU directive. From these examples, three puzzles emerge, which lay the 
groundwork for this thesis. The second through fourth sections give a quick overview of how 
scholarly debate has addressed these three puzzles so far. The fifth section synthesizes the 
research puzzles, research questions and contributions. In the final section of this introduction, 
the research approach of this thesis is broken down into four specific studies that address the 
EU implementation research puzzles.
1.2 THE PRACTICE OF IMPLEMENTING EU AIR QUALITY POLICY: THREE 
PUZZLES
Already since 1980, the governments of the member states of the European Union (EU) 
have experienced pressure from non-governmental organisations and citizens to reduce 
unacceptable levels of air pollution. The United Kingdom (UK) is one of the member states 
that have battled severe air pollution for years (Thorsheim, 2006). Since 2005, environmental 
lawyers ClientEarth and various local governments have pressured the government to adopt 
more and stricter measures against air pollution in the UK in order to comply with the EU 
AAQ directive. Over the years, ClientEarth has successfully challenged the UK government 
in court (Covington et al., 2016; Pedersen, 2016; Scotford and Bowman, 2016). The recent 
judgment of the High Administrative Court, ClientEarth (No3) vs SSEFRA, 2018, again sided with 
environmental lawyers urging the government to take action at last. In addition, the UK local 
governments leading in air quality policy, though taking a less adversarial approach, have 
also systematically called upon the national government to step up its efforts in improving 
air quality (UK100, 2018). These leading local authorities have taken comprehensive measures 
like working locally in partnership to reduce emissions from industry, switching to zero-
emission vehicles, pedestrianising town centres and getting more people out of their cars 
and onto their bikes or their feet (UK100, 2018). Yet, according to these local governments, 
more nationally coordinated action and funding are necessary to achieve the EU air quality 
targets (UK100, 2018).
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 Similarly, the German consumer protection organisation Deutsche Umwelthilfe has 
successfully challenged various German local administrations in state courts for their negligence 
to implement appropriate measures to meet the EU AAQ targets (Deutsche Umwelthilfe, 2018: 
5). Recently, backed by environmental lawyers ClientEarth, Deutsche Umwelthilfe challenged 
local German administrations in the highest Federal Administrative Court to take more and 
more far-reaching measures in German cities in order to ensure compliance with the EU 
air quality directive (Deutsche Umwelthilfe, 2018). The lawyers targeted cities with levels of 
pollution so high that they are unlikely to be brought below AAQ targets without extra policy 
effort from the local authorities (Deutsche Umwelthilfe, 2018). The Federal Administrative 
Court’s ruling was unambiguous: German local authorities have the power and the duty to 
ban diesel cars from the city to comply with EU AAQ targets and up until now their regulatory 
efforts have been insufficient (Bundesverwaltungsgericht (BVerwG), File number 7 C 26.16 and 
7 C 30.17). Therefore, the Federal Administrative Court ruled that prolonging the inadequate 
regulatory practice to combat air pollution would be a breach of the local authorities’ legal 
duty to protect the people of Germany against harmful air pollution.
 In the Netherlands, environmental NGO Milieudefensie and a local civil society 
organisation called Adem Rotterdam challenged the national government in court in 2017 
(Deutsche Umwelthilfe, 2018: 8; Milieudefensie and Adem Rotterdam vs Ministry of Infrastructure 
and Environment, 2017). They argued that not enough measures had been taken in order to 
protect the citizens from the health risks of air pollution. The two plaintiffs called for more 
national and local measures to combat air pollution. More importantly, they stressed the 
importance of going beyond EU AAQ targets and meeting the World Health Organisation 
guidelines, as these are stricter than EU ones. In the first instance, the court ruled that the 
government had not done enough to combat air pollution (Milieudefensie and Adem Rotterdam 
vs Ministry of Infrastructure and Environment, 2017). However, when the matter was taken to the 
Higher Court, Milieudefensie and Adem Rotterdam, this time joined by 57 individual citizens 
from 13 cities, surprisingly lost. The Higher Court argued that the Dutch government together 
with local authorities were doing enough to combat air pollution and meet EU limit targets 
(Milieudefensie, Adem Rotterdam and individual plaintiffs vs the Ministry of Infrastructure and 
Environment, 2017). 
 These three examples of different national experiences with implementing EU AAQ 
policy lay bare at least three puzzles of EU compliance. First of all, the court cases demonstrate 
that while the AAQ directive remains vague on the definition of ‘appropriate’ measures, 
national courts are in the position to assess whether national and local authorities have made 
enough of an effort to combat air pollution. In the German and UK cases, national and local 
measures were not deemed comprehensive enough to combat air pollution. At the same 
time, the Dutch Higher Court ruled that the measures were appropriate. This means that the 
courts do not merely assess whether there is a plan to combat air pollution, in other words 
whether the implementers comply with the key procedural Article 23 of the AAQ directive 
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to have an AAQ management plan in place, but also examine the contents of this plan. Even 
though such an examination seems a self-evident thing to do, it is as yet unclear how we can 
establish which policy implementation plans and measures are more comprehensive than 
others. 
 Secondly, despite the fact that the European Commission holds national governments 
responsible for the effective implementation of EU policies, the national court cases 
demonstrate that to a large extent it is the local governments that determine how EU policies 
are implemented. For example, in May 2018, the European Commission referred the national 
governments of six member states to the Court of Justice of the European Union for failing 
to take appropriate measures to meet AAQ targets. The UK, German, and Dutch court cases 
demonstrate that even though the national governments are held accountable by the EU 
Commission for policy implementation, it is the local governments’ efforts that, taken together, 
constitute implementation performance of a single member state. These legal actions signify 
the importance and urgency of examining local policy efforts to make EU policy work.  
 Finally, the court cases demonstrate that compliance with the EU air quality directive at 
the local level leaves much to be desired and that there is a great variety of implementation 
even within one member state, i.e. at the local level. The EU’s central goals of creating a single 
European market and an equal quality of life across the EU, as well as the reaching of myriad 
policy-specific objectives, are undermined if EU policies do no take effect across the member 
states (Kaeding, 2008; Versluis, 2007). Yet, it is a public secret that “it would be a miracle if all 
member states’ administrations were implementing most EU regulations, let alone directives, 
in even approximately the same way” (Shapiro, 1999: 29). What these court cases add to the 
discussion on the varied implementation of EU directives, is the observation of great intra-
state implementation variety, i.e. different practices at the local level. Some local governments 
managed to comply with the limits while others were taken to court. Those who complied 
display a considerable difference in efforts as well. Thus, the question arises how we can 
understand these puzzling local differences in EU policy implementation. 
 In sum, the analysis of the court cases leaves us with three main puzzles: (1) what 
constitutes comprehensive policy implementation, (2) what do we know of local policy 
efforts to make EU policy work, and (3) how can we understand local differences in EU policy 
implementation. Having presented these puzzles, in the next sections I turn to the academic 
literature in search for guidance.
1.3 THE FIRST PUZZLE: CONCEPTUALISING EU COMPLIANCE
So far, the majority of research on EU compliance, however theoretically and methodologically 
advanced, has examined compliance in a rather one-sided fashion. That is, it primarily focused 
on one particular element of compliance: the timeliness or duration of EU transposition (Treib, 
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2014; Zhelyazkova and Torenvlied, 2011; Zhelyazkova, 2013). In addition to that, complete EU 
compliance also presupposes correct compliance (Börzel, 2003: 60), which has been primarily 
defined as the congruence of implementation with EU legal obligations (Hartlapp and Falkner, 
2009). Hence, the dependent variable of habitual compliance research is understood in terms 
of goal-achievement within the temporal and substantive limits set by the directive. In that 
case, compliance is typically juxtaposed to non-compliance (Zhelyazkova, 2013; Zhelyazkova 
and Torenvlied, 2011; Winter, 2006). This dichotomous understanding of correct compliance 
is problematic as it is too narrow to capture the differences in practical implementation of EU 
directives (Bondarouk and Mastenbroek, 2018). 
 First of all, the problem of using compliance and non-compliance “[in terms of ] goal-
achievement as the dependent variable of implementation research is that such goals can 
be difficult to operationalize” (Winter, 2006: 159). EU directives do not always contain a clear 
substantive target value against which implementation can be evaluated (Bondarouk and 
Mastenbroek, 2018; Dimitrova and Steunenberg, 2000: 215). This ambiguity in goals is not 
unique to EU directives. Winter (2006:159) points out that “much has already been written 
in the implementation and evaluation literatures about the vagueness and ambiguity of 
policy goals and the difference between official and latent goals”. Hence, a categorisation into 
compliant or non-compliant implementation is difficult. 
 Second, a dichotomous understanding of the concept of correct compliance masks the 
possible variance in policy responses in the many cases that EU directives leave discretion 
to the member states (Bondarouk and Mastenbroek, 2018; Bondarouk and Liefferink, 2017; 
Hartlapp and Falkner, 2009; Thomann and Sager, 2017). In many cases the implementation of 
an EU directive can be seen as ‘customisation’ of domestic policies to the regulatory boundaries 
provided by the directive (Thomann, 2015). Therefore, a dichotomous understanding of 
compliance does not do justice to the broad spectrum of different implementation practices 
in response to legislation (Hupe, 2014; Hupe et al., 2014; Winter, 2006, 2012).
 This variance in practical implementation is especially pertinent to grasp and analyse 
considering the increasing usage of procedural provisions in EU directives (Börzel, 2003; 
Knill and Lenschow, 2004; Scott, 2000). In contrast to substantive provisions, which are 
used to directly affect the production, distribution and consumption of goods and services, 
procedural provisions are designed to indirectly affect the desired policy outcome through 
the manipulation of policy processes (Howlett, 2000, 2011). However, a mere examination of 
whether a plan has been implemented, like in the case of AAQ action plans, masks potentially 
great variance in policy responses between several implementing authorities. Even more so, 
the court cases in air quality policy in different member states demonstrate that courts have 
not only paid attention to whether an action plan is in place, but also to the content of this plan. 
Hence, while there is an empirical necessity to understand this variation in implementation, 
the conceptualisation of the dependent variable of compliance in EU compliance research 
does not offer tools to do that. 
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 Summing up, the rather dichotomous understanding of correct compliance used in EU 
compliance research so far does not provide enough guidance on how to capture variance in 
practical implementation in the member states, and therefore impedes deeper understanding 
of EU compliance and examination of “to what extent do member states make EU policies 
work” (Haverland and Romeijn, 2007). Therefore, the first puzzle of how we can establish the 
comprehensiveness of policy implementation is yet to be addressed in the literature. 
1.4 THE SECOND PUZZLE: EU COMPLIANCE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENTS
The next puzzle that emerges from the national court case examples is what do we actually 
know of local policy efforts to make EU policy work. So far, the academic literature on EU 
implementation has mostly focused on member states’ implementation of directives (Treib, 
2014; Thomann and Sager, 2017). Scholars have shown that implementation of directives 
goes through different stages. The first stage in implementation, transposition, refers to 
‘legal or formal implementation’ (Versluis, 2007), where the EU directive has to be anchored 
in the national law. Transposition is considered to be a decisive phase in the process of EU 
implementation, as most directives leave certain discretion to the national policy makers 
(Haverland and Romeijn, 2007; Treib, 2014). This stage, so far, is also regarded as a key stage for 
determining whether member states deviate from the EU policies (Haverland and Romeijn, 
2007). It has therefore been the primary focus of research into EU compliance (for literature 
reviews see Angelova et al., 2012; Treib, 2014). 
 The subsequent stage of EU implementation is application or ‘practical implementation’ 
(Versluis, 2007). The application phase involves different administrative levels and actors 
when compared to the transposition phase: not only ministries and parliament, but also, 
for instance, sub-national authorities (SNAs) and a wide range of societal actors. SNAs are 
often responsible for operationalizing the national policy for practical purposes, especially in 
the case of environmental policy (cf. Borghetto and Franchino, 2010; Fleurke and Willemse, 
2006). This happens by translating the policy into tangible tasks and assigning these tasks to 
specific implementers. Further elaborations have to be made and interpretations specified in 
the process of developing policy guidelines and implementation plans, before the SNAs can 
apply and enforce the actual policy. 
 However, more often than not, scholars have limited the analysis of EU implementation 
to the first stage and thus to national authorities’ efforts in complying with EU directives 
(Mastenbroek, 2005; Thomann and Sager, 2017; Toshkov, 2011; Treib, 2014). EU implementation 
research often treats transposition as an end result in the compliance process, while in reality 
compliance is a continuous process which does not halt after directives have been transposed 
into national law (Breeman and Zwaan, 2009; Liefferink et al., 2011). Moreover, transposition is 
not a necessary condition for compliance: Bondarouk and Liefferink (2017) showed that some 
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local governments commenced making AAQ plans before the transposition deadline of the 
AAQ directive that obliges them to do so. Versluis (2007: 50-51) argued that just as in the case 
of national policy implementation, there is a difference between the transposed “law in the 
books” and the “law in action”. Hence, the analysis of the transposition phase of EU directives 
should be accompanied with an analysis of their practical implementation. 
 Zooming in on the actors that put “law in action”, local governments hold a unique 
position in the EU multi-level implementation structure. While tasked with EU policy 
implementation, local governments have limited opportunities to directly shape EU policies 
in Brussels (Goldsmith, 2005: 240; Ladrech, 2010; Panara, 2015; Van Bever et al., 2011:19). 
Yet, almost sixty percent of the decisions taken by local governments are influenced by EU 
legislation (CEMR, 2016). Consequently, local governments often find themselves ‘sandwiched’ 
between the pressure of higher authority to implement EU legislation dutifully (Goldsmith, 
2005: 240), and accountability to local constituencies, whose local preferences do not always 
align with EU objectives (Bondarouk et al., 2019). 
 Accommodating different interests in the implementation process is not the only 
challenge local governments face when dealing with EU policies. In contrast to policy-
specific implementing agencies (see Versluis 2007; Versluis and Tarr, 2013), local governments 
have to coherently implement a great variety of policies at the same time. This means that 
a local policy has to be compliant with for example sustainability policy, but also state-aid 
policy, and public procurement rules. In a recent public consultation organized by the EU 
Commission (2015), subnational governments indicated that while EU objectives on paper 
are often complementary, in practice many EU level initiatives are mutually incompatible and 
fragmented. As there is no EU guidance on how to deal with these policy incompatibilities, 
local governments are presented with a challenge. They have to decide which policies take 
precedence while keeping an eye on possible infringement proceedings if one of the policies 
is not implemented correctly. Hence, local governments are an important link in determining 
how EU policies look like on the ground, and deserve closer scholarly attention. 
 The EU implementation literature, in sum, provides signals that a mere focus on the 
level of the national authorities is not sufficient for determining to what extent member 
states make EU policies work (cf Thomann and Sager, 2017). Local governments emerge 
as political arenas where EU policies are being shaped on the ground. Yet, there has been 
very little attention to these local actors in EU compliance research (Loefgren, 2015). Hence, 
while the UK, German, and Dutch court cases illustrate the importance of focusing on local 
government implementation of EU policy, EU compliance research is yet to take a closer look 
at local governments. 
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1.5 THE THIRD PUZZLE: EXPLAINING DIFFERENCES IN IMPLEMENTATION
The final puzzle that emerged from the national court case examples is how we can explain 
variance in implementation performance between local implementers. This should be 
distinguished from the question why member states differ in their compliance with EU 
directives, which is the core question of EU compliance research (Treib, 2014). National 
differences in EU compliance have been examined in different policy sectors, using different 
methodologies and testing various theoretical assumptions (for literature reviews see 
Angelova et al., 2012; Mastenbroek, 2005; Treib, 2014). A single look at the literature on EU 
environmental leaders and laggards in EU policy implementation already reveals a vast 
knowledge acquired in studying national differences as a response to EU policy (e.g. Börzel, 
2000; Bursens, 2002; Liefferink et al., 2009; Liefferink et al., 2011; Liefferink and Wurzel, 2017). 
 Yet, this systematic scholarly attention to differences between member states does not 
encompass studying differences in EU practical implementation (Treib, 2014). As a reason for 
this lack of research interest, Hartlapp and Falkner (2009) point to the challenges of acquiring 
data on practical implementation of EU policies. Hence, it is also not surprising that research 
into reasons for differences at local implementation of EU policies is limited. Nevertheless, an 
analysis of these local differences is highly overdue. In the EU Commission’s public consultation 
(2015), subnational governments expressed the urgency of understanding why some local 
authorities excel in implementing EU policies while others do a bare minimum. This need for 
understanding what facilitates best practices in EU policy implementation comes from an 
urge to understand how local governments can best tackle global problems that EU policies 
set out to solve. 
 In search of causes for the way policy is implemented, implementation research has 
come up “with three hundred critical variables” (Hupe, 2014: 167; see also O’Toole, 2017: 
377). Additionally, implementation research has been infamous for its highly descriptive 
studies and ad-hoc explanations (Hupe, 2014: 167; Hupe and Saetren, 2015; O’Toole, 2017: 
377; Saetren, 2005; Smith and Larimer, 2009: 16). In his review of implementation research 
O’Toole (1986: 189) argued that “there has been very little conscious efforts to develop 
and test systematically the insights generated in previous work, and thus to separate the 
promising from the merely plausible but unproductive”. Instead implementation scholars 
have been focussing on constructing the ‘holy grail’ of a general implementation theory by 
adding yet another critical explanation to the long list of critical variables (Hupe and Saetren, 
2015; O’Toole, 2017; Saetren, 2005, 2014; Toshkov, 2011; Winter 2006, 2012). Thus, while the 
implementation research field is vast, its “highly fragmented nature is not very conducive to 
implementation theory accumulation” (Hupe, 2014: 167; see also Saetren, 2005; Winter, 2006: 
164), which impedes theoretical and empirical progress in the field.
 This unsatisfactory situation triggered a plea for a new generation of implementation 
research, the so called third-generation implementation research, premised on the notion 
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“that more rigorous scientific research designs were the crucial step towards further 
theoretical progress” (Hupe and Saetren, 2015: 95; see also Hupe, 2014: 167; Saetren, 2014). 
Winter (2012: 264) specifies this notion further by suggesting that implementation research 
can be improved by “(1) accepting theoretical diversity rather than looking for one common 
theoretical framework, and (2) developing and testing partial theories and hypotheses rather 
than trying to reach for utopia in constructing a general implementation theory”. In this way, 
knowledge can be accumulated, and implementation research strengthened (Saetren, 2014; 
Smith and Larimer, 2009; Winter, 2006, 2012).  
 In a recent systematic review of implementation research Saetren (2014) points out 
that, so far, policy implementation studies are yet to meet the guidelines of third-generation 
implementation research. He specifically points to the lack of theory-driven studies in current 
implementation research and urges more studies to test the insights generated in previous 
work systematically (Saetren, 2014). For theoretical progress of implementation field, it is 
essential to analyse whether theories derived and tested for one particular context also hold 
in other contexts (Smith and Larimer, 2009: 16). In this light, it is important to examine whether 
explanations derived for national differences in EU implementation also can account for local 
differences. 
 In explaining national differences with EU compliance, scholars have identified two 
schools of thought: politics and management (Tallberg, 2002). EU compliance research has 
shown that national differences in compliance at transposition level can be largely explained by 
domestic politics and preference constellations (Mastenbroek and Kaeding, 2006; Treib, 2014). 
Alternatively, the management approach in EU compliance research views implementation 
as a matter of managerial capacity and the way policy implementation is organized (Walker 
and Andrews, 2013). 
 While both explanatory approaches have their merits, it is important to understand 
which of the two approaches drives different local responses to EU policy (Bondarouk et 
al., 2019). Crucially, if political explanations outweigh managerial ones, the remedy for non-
implementation is fundamentally different. Where the political approach assumes that strict 
enforcement mechanisms can remedy non-implementation, the management approach 
advocates for capacity-building strategies (see Tallberg, 2002). If one sets to improve local 
implementation of EU directives, therefore, we first need to understand which of the two 
approaches drives different local responses to EU policy. However, whether the politicisation 
of EU policies or managerial explanations can account for differences in local implementation 
is yet to be determined (Treib, 2014). 
 Summing up, despite the vast scholarly field of implementation research, the final puzzle 
of explaining variance in EU implementation performance between local implementers is yet 
to be systematically addressed in the literature.
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1.6 RESEARCH QUESTIONS AND CONTRIBUTIONS
As set out above, the national court case examples demonstrate the struggle to identify what 
constitutes comprehensive EU policy implementation on the ground. EU compliance research, 
however, has provided little guidance on the question of how to systematically capture the 
rich reality of practical implementation performance. Secondly, local governments play an 
important role in the EU implementation. Yet, the scholarly community of EU compliance 
research has paid little attention to these local actors. Finally, the court cases demonstrate 
that local policy responses to EU legislation may differ. Whether these differences in EU local 
implementation can be explained by using the same explanations used for transposition is 
yet to be determined. 
 In order to address these puzzles, this thesis zooms in on the local implementation of the 
AAQ directive in the Netherlands. First of all, in light of many infringement proceedings against 
various member states, the Netherlands presents an interesting case. In the early 2000s, the 
AAQ directive gave rise to implementation problems in a lot of Dutch municipalities (Busscher 
et al., 2014). While large differences still exist in the way Dutch municipalities implement the 
directive, almost all municipalities managed to implement action plans to reduce air pollution. 
At the same time, the implementation of the AAQ directive in the Netherlands follows a typical 
path of implementation: just like in almost all other EU member states, the task of devising air 
quality management plans has been decentralized in the Netherlands (Busscher et al., 2014). 
In contrast to municipalities of big member states, however, Dutch municipalities are very 
comparable in terms of geography and sources of air pollution. Therefore, faced with largely 
similar physical conditions, Dutch municipalities could potentially take similar measures 
(Busch et al., 2012; Busscher et al., 2014). 
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 Having outlined the challenges of implementing the EU AAQ directive at the local level 
and the limited guidance that the scholarly community has provided so far in addressing 
them, the central research question of this thesis is:
How can we explain why Dutch municipalities differ in their implementation performance of the 
EU Ambient Air Quality directive?
This central research question is broken down into three sub-questions which correspond to 
the research puzzles identified earlier:
 (1)   How can implementation performance be conceptualised in order to go beyond the 
dichotomous understanding of correct compliance and to capture variation in policy 
implementation?
 (2)   What are the differences between Dutch municipalities in the implementation of the key 
procedural Article 23 of the EU Ambient Air Quality directive 2008/50/EC?
 (3)   To what extent can differences in Dutch local implementation of the EU Ambient Air 
Quality directive 2008/50/EC be attributed to political or managerial considerations?
By answering these research questions, this thesis seeks to make both an empirical and a 
theoretical contribution to the EU implementation literature. The empirical contribution 
is three-fold. First, by putting local government at the centre of this research this thesis 
addresses an empirical gap in the EU compliance literature (Thomann and Sager, 2017; Treib, 
2014). Second, compared to the Water Framework Directive, the AAQ directive has received 
less scholarly attention (Angelova et al., 2012; Bondarouk and Mastenbroek, 2018). The AAQ 
directive is a typical EU environmental directive containing both substantive and procedural 
provisions1 (Bondarouk and Liefferink, 2017). Hence, the analysis of implementation of 
this directive will yield generalizable insights to at least other EU environmental directives’ 
implementation. Finally, implementation research often assesses one point in time (Hupe and 
Saetren, 2015; Saetren, 2014). This thesis builds upon empirical data of over ten years of policy 
implementation in Dutch municipalities. In this way, this thesis also responds to the research 
call of the current ‘third-generation implementation research’ to conduct more longitudinal 
studies, i.e. studies with a research time frame of at least 5 to 10 years (Hupe and Saetren, 2015; 
Saetren, 2014).
1  The substantive provisions establish air quality objectives, such as standards for the concentrations of specific air pollutants. The 
procedural provisions call for the assessment, monitoring, improvement, and sustainment of air quality through rigorous air 
quality plans.
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 The theoretical contribution is also three-fold. First of all, this thesis offers a ‘systematized 
concept’ (Adcock and Collier, 2001) of implementation performance to enable the systematic 
analysis of differences in practical implementation performance across implementers, while 
going beyond a dichotomous understanding of compliance. By offering a tool to compare 
implementation performance across implementers, this thesis contributes to knowledge 
accumulation (cf Winter, 2006: 159). Second, by examining whether the explanatory variables 
of political and managerial approaches (Tallberg, 2002) identified in EU compliance research 
also hold in the local context, this thesis examines the strength of implementation theory 
(see Saetren, 2014: 86; Winter, 2012: 264). For both political and managerial approaches, 
variables were selected that have been repeatedly identified in different literature reviews 
to correlate with comprehensive implementation performance. Such focused partial theory 
testing approach addresses the call of the ‘third-generation implementation research’ for more 
deductive research designs in order to strengthen the research field (Hupe and Saetren, 2015; 
Saetren, 2014; Winter, 2006, 2012). Finally, so far both managerial and political explanations have 
been analysed mainly for the timeliness of EU transposition (Zhelyazkova 2013; Zhelyazkova 
and Torenvlied, 2011). Instead, this thesis focuses on the content of policy implementation, 
i.e. the policy measures that local governments took in light of the AAQ directive. Hence this 
thesis adds to our understanding of the explanatory power of explanations derived in EU 
transposition research.
1.7 RESEARCH APPROACH: FOUR STUDIES
To address the research questions, I have carried out four studies, each with a different 
methodology, data, and specific contribution to EU compliance research. Table 1.1 presents 
how the studies build on each other. 
 The first study (Chapter 2) deals with the first sub-question of the thesis and the first 
puzzle of EU compliance research. It proposes a conceptual framework for analysing EU 
implementation performance. The goal of this study is to develop and test a general 
“systematized concept” (Adcock and Collier, 2001: 532) of implementation performance 
(Hupe, 2011: 66; Winter, 2006: 159) that goes beyond the details of specific directives, and 
captures variation in implementation. In contrast to the conventional dichotomous top-
down conceptualisation of EU compliance, the three-dimensional conceptual framework 
allows for a full-fledged conceptualisation of implementation performance (Bondarouk and 
Mastenbroek, 2018). In order to see whether the framework is able to capture the rich diversity 
of EU implementation, this study checks whether the framework is exhaustive, and whether 
the proposed dimensions are mutually exclusive. In order to do so, it compares the conceptual 
framework with the rich descriptive insights from the literature on the practical implementation 
of EU environmental policies. Using the conceptual framework, 70 recent studies on practical 
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implementation in the field of environmental policy, covering 18 directives, are analysed. This 
study argues that the framework is instrumental to capturing and nuancing the full diversity 
of EU implementation often missed by a dichotomous conceptualisation of compliance 
characteristic to state-centric compliance approaches. At the same time, it also shows which 
dimensions of implementation performance have been examined in the literature and which 
deserve more attention. Hence, I also reflect on the current understanding of the concept of 
implementation performance in the environmental policy research. 
 In the second study (Chapter 3), this three-dimensional conceptual framework is used to 
systematically map the differences in local implementation performance of the AAQ directive. 
This study deals with the second sub-question and the second puzzle of EU compliance 
research. It presents a systematic evaluation of the implementation of a core procedural 
provision, the obligation to design air quality policy plans (Article 23 of the EU Ambient Air 
Quality Directive 2008/50/EC). 13 Dutch municipalities and their policy efforts over a 10-year 
period are subjected to this evaluation. 237 policy documents and 18 interviews informed the 
analysis. The findings illustrate great differences in the implementation performance between 
Dutch municipalities (Bondarouk and Liefferink, 2017). This study adds to EU compliance 
research by showing that differences in EU implementation cannot only be observed at the 
member state level, but also within member states. In contrast to previous research, a more 
nuanced picture is presented when it comes to the concepts of ‘compliance’, ‘non-compliance’, 
and ‘over-compliance’ (Bondarouk and Liefferink, 2017). 
 The third study (Chapter 4) builds on the data presented in the second study (Chapter 
3) and focuses on the third sub-question addressing the explanations for differences in EU 
local implementation performance. It therefore deals with the third puzzle of EU compliance 
research. This study draws on the insights from EU compliance research to explain differences in 
EU local implementation performance Angelova et al., 2012; Spendzharova and Versluis, 2013; 
Toshkov, 2011; Thomann 2015; Treib, 2014). The study assesses whether hypotheses developed 
in state-centric EU compliance research also hold when applied to the local government 
level (Bondarouk et al., 2019). It contrasts a managerial approach with a political approach 
(Mastenbroek and Kaeding, 2006, Tallberg, 2002; Treib, 2014) to evaluate the explanatory 
power of each, when applied to the local level. Understanding which of the two approaches 
drives different local responses to EU policy bears consequences for the appropriate remedy 
for low implementation performance (Bondarouk et al., 2019). The four municipalities that 
scored the highest/lowest in the second study (Chapter 3) are selected for an in-depth analysis. 
Additional empirical data was gathered for this study. Interviews with 37 respondents who 
were involved in AAQ policy over the period of 10 years informed the analysis. The findings 
of a comparative within-case analysis demonstrate how political explanations outweigh 
managerial explanations in accounting for variation in implementation performance. The 
contribution of this study to EU compliance research is theoretical: by applying explanations 
derived from state-centric EU compliance research, this study contributes to the bigger 
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question of how strong the implementation theory is (cf Hupe and Saetren, 2015; Hupe, 2014; 
Saetren, 2005, 2014; Smith and Larimer, 2009; Winter, 2006, 2012). 
 The fourth and final study (Chapter 5) places the findings of the explanatory third study 
(Chapter 4) in a larger perspective and sets out a research agenda for EU local implementation 
more broadly, going beyond the field of environmental policy (Bondarouk, 2017). This study 
also deals with the third research puzzle. The third study (Chapter 4) focused on one specific 
EU directive and compared local governments within one member state. Hence it is important 
to examine whether the explanations given in this specific setting resonate in other studies. 
In order to assess how the findings of this thesis relate to other studies, the final study of this 
thesis pulls the highly fragmented and descriptive EU local implementation research together 
(Dossi, 2012; Loefgren, 2015; Saetren, 2005, 2014; Treib, 2014; Winter, 2006). It also specifies 
further what other research avenues in EU local implementation research are still uncharted. 
 While this study puts the findings of the third study in perspective, it also contributes to 
EU compliance research in its own right. The majority of local EU implementation studies is 
often criticised for being too descriptive, based on a single-case study design, and not adding 
up to a comprehensive and general understanding of what is happening and why (Dossi, 
2012; Treib, 2014: 19)2. These local studies are scattered across many different policy specific 
journals, which makes it difficult to oversee the scientific progress in the field (Saetren, 2005, 
2014; O’Toole, 2017; Treib, 2014; Winter, 2006). As a result, there seems to be little knowledge 
accumulation, which hampers advancing the research field (Dossi, 2012; Loefgren, 2015). This 
final study of this thesis addresses this shortcoming by offering a systematic review of 85 
studies of local government implementation of EU policies. It reveals evidence on local non-
compliance with EU policies, national and policy patterns of non-compliance, and provides a 
synthesis of explanations for policy implementation. Following, a seven-point future research 
agenda is proposed in order to advance our understanding of how local governments make 
EU policies work.
2   The same criticism is also applicable to general implementation research (Hupe, 2014: 167; O’Toole, 2017: 377; Saetren, 2005; 
Smith and Larimer, 2009: 16).
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Table 1.1: Schematic representation of the thesis
Empirical and theoretical 
puzzle
Sub-question in short Chapter Research Design
Introduction 11. Conceptualisation 
of EU compliance 
beyond a dichotomous 
understanding
How to conceptualise 
compliance?
2 Conceptual analysis: 
Corroborating the systematised 
concept of ‘implementation 
performance’ through the systematic 
literature review of 70 recent studies 
on practical implementation in 
the field of environmental policy, 
covering 18 environmental 
directives.2. Description of local 
government policy efforts 
to make EU policy work
What are the differences in 
local implementation? 
3 Empirical analysis:
Mapping of differences in EU 
AAQ local implementation in 13 
Dutch cities over 10 years by using 
the conceptual framework of 
‘implementation performance’.3. Understanding of local 
differences in EU policy 
implementation
How can differences 
in implementation be 
explained?
4 Empirical analysis:
Theory-driven comparative within-
case study of differences in EU AAQ 
local implementation in 4 Dutch 
cities over 10 years.
What are the remaining 
research gaps?
5 Research agenda analysis:
Systematic literature review of 85 
studies on EU local government 
implementation (no time frame or 
policy restriction).
Conclusion 6
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2.
Reconsidering EU Compliance: 
Implementation performance 
in the fi eld of environmental policy
This chapter is published as:
Bondarouk, E. and Mastenbroek, E. (2018). Reconsidering EU Compliance: Implementation 
performance in the fi eld of environmental policy. Environmental Policy and Governance, 28(1): 
15-27. DOI: 10.1002/eet.1761
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ABSTRACT 
European Union (EU) environmental policy can only work in practice when it is implemented 
by and within the member states. Yet, despite its importance, we still lack a solid and cumulative 
understanding of the practical implementation of EU environmental policies, mainly because 
of the dominance of case-specific empirical insights and the dichotomous conceptualisation 
of compliant implementation. This paper proposes a conceptual framework for analysing 
implementation performance, which is built around three dimensions: substance, scope and 
effort. The framework’s relevance and analytical quality are substantiated by a systematic 
review of empirical studies on practical implementation of 18 EU environmental directives. 
We find evidence of three types of knowledge deficits: there is neglect of the ‘scope’ and 
‘effort’ dimensions of implementation; disproportionate attention to the Water Framework 
Directive, and the Northern and Western European member states. The proposed conceptual 
framework aims to inform future research on EU environmental implementation
 29 
2
CONCEPTUALIZING EU COMPLIANCE
2.1 INTRODUCTION
A key issue in environmental governance lies in ensuring that ambitious policies in books 
are translated into policies in action (Leventon and Antypas, 2012). This is no different for the 
European Union (EU), which is an active producer of environmental policies. The EU’s central 
environmental goals of greening the EU economy, protecting nature and safeguarding health 
and quality of life across the EU (Knill and Lenschow, 2000) are clearly undermined if EU 
policies are not complied with by the member states.  
 Consequently, a number of scholars of EU environmental governance have studied 
compliance with EU environmental policy, i.e. the national implementation of EU 
environmental policy (e.g. Bennett, 1993; Börzel, 2000; Börzel and Risse, 2000; Bugdahn, 2005; 
Haverland, 2003; Jans et al., 2009; Knill and Lenschow, 1998, 2000; Laffan and O’Mahony, 2008; 
Liefferink et al., 2011; Morris, 2011). This area of research has closely examined to what extent 
and how the EU’s member states have implemented the policy requirements laid down in 
various directives. 
 However, the literature on EU environmental policies has not produced a complete 
picture of the state of EU environmental implementation (Tosun, 2012). The reasons for this 
lack of overall insight are twofold. First, most existing studies are highly case-specific, deriving 
their operationalisation of implementation conformity from the provisions of particular 
directives (Treib, 2014). This approach leads to the drawing of idiosyncratic findings, which do 
not reach a broader audience and hinder the accumulation of knowledge and the drawing 
of general conclusions (Engeli and Allison, 2014; Schaffrin et al., 2015: 257; Töller, 2010; Tosun, 
2012; Treib, 2014). 
 Second, environmental implementation studies often evaluate implementation in 
dichotomous fashion – compliant or non-compliant implementation (e.g. Bauer et al., 2007; 
Börzel, 2000; Morris, 2011; see Treib, 2014 for more examples). This conceptualisation of 
responses to EU policies is of restricted use in the field of EU environmental policy, given the 
growing use of procedural provisions and open norms (Börzel, 2003; Hartlapp and Falkner, 
2009; Knill and Lenschow, 2004; Liefferink et al., 2011; Scott, 2000). The mere fact that a member 
state or local implementer lives up to a procedural obligation does not have any bearing on 
the extent to which the implementer really makes ‘EU policy work’ (Haverland and Romeijn, 
2007). Accordingly, variation in implementation practices is not systematically assessed. 
 As a result, we are still in the dark about the extent to which and ways in which member 
states take EU environmental policy seriously (see Voermans, 2015). Answering this question 
requires a full-fledged conceptualisation of the various aspects of implementation practices 
in response to EU legislation (Hupe, 2014; Lange, 1999; Thomann, 2015; Winter, 2006, 2012). 
To this end, the first goal of this paper is to develop and test a general “systematized concept” 
(Adcock and Collier, 2001: 532) of implementation performance (Hill and Hupe, 2003: 475; 
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Hupe, 2011: 66; Winter, 2006: 159) that goes beyond the details of specific directives, and 
captures variation in implementation. 
 This article uses a two-step deductive approach to construct the conceptualisation. The 
first step is to derive aspects of implementation performance from the literatures on national 
policy implementation, analysis, design, evaluation and change. The second step is to compare 
the conceptual framework thus obtained with the insights from the literature on the practical 
implementation of EU environmental policies. We conduct a systematic literature review of 
case studies on practical implementation in the field of environmental policy published in 
the years 2010–2014, covering 18 different environmental directives. We check whether the 
framework is complete, and whether the categories are mutually exclusive. This second step 
also facilitates a second goal of this article: the isolation of knowledge gaps in the current 
research on practical implementation of environmental policies.   
 Finally, this study conveys lessons for the broader field of EU compliance (Treib, 2014). 
While the literature has repeatedly called for more research on the practical implementation 
of EU directives (e.g. Mastenbroek, 2005; Treib, 2014; Versluis, 2007), it has found itself in need 
of a useful concept for doing so systematically (Tosun, 2012; Treib, 2014). By developing and 
corroborating such a concept, this paper may step up compliance research in other policy 
sectors. We aim to pave the way for more systematic assessment of EU implementation 
performance in the field of environmental policy thus facilitating knowledge accumulation 
(Saetren, 2014; Sager et al., 2014; Thomann, 2015; Tosun, 2012). Ultimately, the paper is 
expected to allow for fuller diagnosis and understanding of the implementation deficit that 
has been claimed to haunt the EU (Hupe, 2014: 170; Treib, 2014; Voermans, 2015: 365).
2.2 SETTING THE SCENE: DEFINING IMPLEMENTATION PERFORMANCE
Before systematically conceptualising implementation performance, we need to define 
the concept’s core components: implementation and performance. Starting with the 
former, implementation refers to the stage between the transposition of EU directives 
and the enforcement of these directives by European or national actors. To differentiate it 
from transposition or legal transposition, this stage is also called practical implementation 
(Mastenbroek, 2005; Treib, 2014). 
 We argue that practical implementation consists of two distinct substages, the first of 
which we refer to as final policy formation on the ground. Hupe and Hill (2016: 106-7) argue 
that even at the stage of practical implementation there is a lot of decision making yet to 
be done. Any attempt to implement a policy always brings new issues on the agenda and 
thus implementation and decision-making overlap (Hill and Hupe, 2016: 106; Lindblom 
and Woodhouse, 1993: 11). Even though generally overlooked in the EU implementation 
literature, this stage should be regarded as an important step in practical implementation, as 
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it involves the local authority’s efforts to operationalise national policy for practical purposes 
(Hill and Hupe, 2003: 479; Leventon and Antypas, 2012: 256; Spicker, 2006: 44; Steunenberg 
and Dimitrova, 2014: 7; Versluis, 2007; Winter, 2006: 159). During this substage, complex 
national policy – or transposed EU legislation, for that matter – is broken down into a series 
of tangible implementation tasks (Spicker, 2006: 43; Winter, 2006: 159). Furthermore, the 
responsible authority is assigned, a timescale within which the task is to be completed is 
established, and evaluation parameters are set (Spicker, 2006: 43; Winter, 2006: 159).  If policy 
formation is completed, policy delivery (Treib, 2014; Versluis, 2007; Winter, 2012) commences. 
This second implementation stage is characterised by the actual putting in practice of the 
policy instruments. In environmental policy, typical examples are the enactment of physical 
measures or the provision of permits. 
 Having defined implementation, we move on to the definition of performance. The 
literature on policy analysis and implementation distinguishes two interpretations of 
performance. One focuses on policy outputs, e.g. the actions taken in response to law (Hill and 
Hupe, 2003: 475; Howlett et al., 2009: 183; Hupe, 2011: 66; Vedung, 1997; Winter, 2006: 159). 
The second interpretation focuses on policy outcomes, impacts or effects, i.e. the question 
of whether a policy indeed resolved the problem it set out to solve (Barrett and Fudge 1981; 
Berke et al., 2006; Mastop and Faludi 1997; Tosun, 2012: 440; Vedung, 1997; Winter, 2006: 159). 
 This study understands performance in the first way, i.e. in terms of outputs. It does so 
for a methodological reason, as an evaluation of EU policy impact is extremely challenging, 
due to the fact that an isolation of the EU effect is practically impossible (Bauer and Knill, 
2014; Haverland, 2006; Tosun, 2012). Any assessment of policy outputs presupposes a firm 
understanding of policy instruments: the techniques by which authorities attempt to change 
or maintain the policy status quo (Howlett et al., 2009; May, 2003: 225; Schaffrin et al., 2015). 
Being the building blocks of any policy (May, 2003: 225), policy instruments are the core of any 
policy output (Bauer and Knill, 2014; Schaffrin et al., 2015: 260).  
 We propose to compare implementation performance both in a vertical and a horizontal 
manner. Where the EU standards are provided a vertical comparison is necessary, i.e. a 
comparison of implementation performance with the objectives set out in the superior EU 
law. Horizontal comparison, in turn, concerns the differences in implementation performance 
among implementers at the same administrative layer, e.g. municipalities, using the same 
policy instruments (Hupe, 2011; Winter, 2006). 
 This horizontal evaluation is especially relevant in cases when EU legislation leaves 
discretion to implementers or in case of procedural provisions. The discretion may result in 
great variance in implementation, which is still within the boundaries left by EU directives 
(Hartlapp and Falkner, 2009; Sager et al., 2014; Thomann, 2015; Treib, 2014). EU environmental 
law increasingly contains procedural provisions (Börzel, 2003; Héritier, 2002; Knill and 
Lenschow, 2004; Liefferink et al., 2011; Scott, 2000). These are designed to indirectly affect the 
desired policy outcome through the manipulation of policy processes (Howlett et al., 2009; 
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Huber and Shipan, 2002). For example, implementers may have to develop an action plan to 
tackle an environmental problem. A mere vertical evaluation of implementation in this case 
would reduce a great variance in policy responses to a dichotomous notion of compliant 
versus non-compliant implementation. A horizontal evaluation in this case would allow for 
more benchmarking and thus also better insight into implementation practices. 
 These horizontal and vertical assessments of policy performance can be made on two 
dimensions: density and intensity (Bauer and Knill, 2014; Knill et al., 2012; Schaffrin et al., 2015). 
Policy density, firstly, refers merely to the number of policy instruments put in place to reach 
the policy objectives, i.e. the breadth and differentiation of legislative activity (Bauer and Knill, 
2014: 33). Policy intensity, secondly, concerns the content of the policy instruments (Knill et 
al., 2012; Schaffrin et al., 2015), i.e. the breadth and differentiation of policy responses (Bauer 
and Knill, 2014: 33). In order to study to what extent local implementers make EU policy 
work, we specifically focus on intensity, as this sheds light on the policy commitment of local 
implementers (cf. Schaffrin et al., 2015: 261). 
 In sum, this article defines implementation performance as the intensity of policy outputs 
undertaken by implementers in response to EU policy instruments – relative to the directive’s 
objectives (vertical aspect) and to other implementers’ outputs (horizontal comparison). Given 
the importance of open norms and procedural requirements in EU environmental law (Knill 
and Lenschow, 1998, 2000; Newig and Fritsch, 2009; Newig and Koontz, 2014; Scott, 2000), the 
concept does not only have a vertical focus, i.e. aimed at comparing implementation with EU 
rules, but also a horizontal focus, i.e. aimed at comparing implementation practices between 
various implementing actors – either member states or units within these member states. 
The next section develops and specifies this concept by proposing three different analytical 
dimensions, together comprising ten specific aspects.
2.3 CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK
In order to capture the concept of policy performance in more depth and detail, this paper 
employs the approach of Adcock and Collier (2001). Accordingly, the concept of interest is 
broken down into different dimensions, so as to specify it in as detailed a fashion as possible.3 
In doing so, we use and integrate the existing literatures on national policy implementation, 
policy analysis, policy design, policy change and policy evaluation (e.g. Baldwin and Cave, 
1999; Bauer and Knill, 2014; Howlett and Cashore, 2014; Howlett et al., 2009; Huber and Shipan, 
2002; Hupe, 2011, 2014; Schaffrin et al., 2015; Spicker, 2006; Tosun, 2012; Winter, 2006, 2012). 
 Synthesising these literatures, three main dimensions of implementation performance 
emerge: substance, scope and effort. As illustrated in Figure 2.1, we propose to divide 
3   The framework does not specify the indicators, as this would bring the policy context into the framework and preclude it from 
travelling across policy sectors and cases.
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these three dimensions each into more refined aspects. The scores for these aspects are to 
be aggregated to form one score per dimension, which can be aggregated to one overall 
score. In case of horizontal comparison, scoring is the result of comparison of the different 
implementers under study, e.g. regions, agencies or municipalities. In this case the scores on 
implementation performance are established relatively (Hupe, 2014: 173). When evaluating 
implementation performance, it is best to present both scores: the scores on different 
dimensions and the total score on implementation performance.
• Staff
• Expertise
• Budget
• Prioritisation
• Monitoring
• Territory
• Duration
• Addressees
• Definitional details
• Objectives
EffortScopeSubstance
Implementation performanceConcept
Aspect
Dimension
Figure 2.1: Conceptual framework
Dimension 1: substance
Substance, the first dimension of implementation performance, relates to the essence of 
what central issue is being regulated by the policy instrument (cf. König and Mäder, 2013; 
Steunenberg, 2007; Zhelyazkova, 2013). The literature suggests two aspects of this dimension: 
definitional details and objectives of the policy instrument. 
 The first aspect of substance relates to the definitional details used during practical 
implementation (cf. Spicker, 2006: 43; Huber and Shipan, 2002: 51). The directive and its 
transposing measures may contain ambiguous elements that will be subjected to interpretation 
at practical implementation (Beijen, 2011: 152). When vertical evaluation of implementation 
performance is impossible, implementation performance will depend on how restrictively 
or comprehensively these elements are defined during practical implementation relative to 
other implementing peers (Howlett et al., 2009). The more specifically the definitional details 
are provided in the local statutes, the more specific and consistent implementation will be (cf. 
Baldwin and Cave, 1999: 43; Bauer and Knill, 2014: 33; Huber and Shipan, 2002: 50–51; Hupe, 
2011: 69; Schaffrin et al., 2015: 264). There are three elements of definitional details that have 
to be defined in the practical implementation.
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 First of all, most directives contain a list of definitions in one of their first articles (Beijen, 
2011). Still, these definitions may be open to interpretation, which may give rise to differences 
in implementation performance on the ground. The definitions of ‘waste’, ‘best available 
techniques’ and ‘discharge’, for instance, have given rise to much case law and literature (Beijen, 
2011: 152). The absence of clear definitions becomes particularly relevant if the literal wording 
of a directive finds its way into national legislation, because local implementers will have to 
refine these concepts themselves to make them operational for practical implementation 
(Beijen, 2011: 152; Spicker, 2006: 43; Scott, 2000: 45–46). Second, a directive often contains a 
provision that an appropriate body should be appointed to implement the policy. The practical 
implementers are often tasked to define the responsibilities of persons or bodies who are 
engaged in the delivery of policy outputs (cf. Scott, 2000: 45–46; Huber and Shipan, 2002: 50–
51; Schaffrin et al., 2015: 264). Lastly, definitional details relate to the exceptions when some 
tasks or actions should not be taken or are exempted from regulation (cf. Scott, 2000: 48). The 
more of such exemptions there are, the less comprehensive the practical implementation. 
 The second aspect of substance concerns the objectives of the policy instruments as 
adopted by the practical implementer. These objectives are ‘specific on-the-ground policy 
requirements’ (Bauer and Knill, 2014: 33; Howlett and Cashore, 2014: 21; Knill et al., 2012; 
Leventon and Antypas, 2012: 256). If objectives are set, the purpose of the policy is made 
transparent to the public and other political actors, and thus the implementers can be 
held responsible for the achievement of these goals (Schaffrin et al., 2015: 263). A directive 
contains two types of policy instruments, i.e. substantive and procedural, that have to be 
operationalised into practical objectives on the ground. 
 Substantive policy instruments include norms, standards or target values (Beijen, 
2011: 154). Practical implementers may impose stricter or more lenient norms or standards 
in their own jurisdictions (Beijen, 2011: 154; Huber and Shipan, 2002: 50–55; Jans et al., 
2009). For example, local governments may aim for higher air quality standards then the EU 
directive prescribes. Procedural policy instruments concern matters like public participation, 
formulation of policy plans/reports, or the designation and protection of areas (Beijen, 2011; 
Knill and Lenschow, 1998, 2000; Newig and Koontz, 2014; Scott, 2000). For example, practical 
implementers are likely to differ in how they set the objectives for public participation. Policy 
performance in this respect may range from mere information provision to full involvement 
with voting procedures installed (cf. Howlett et al., 2009: 117–118; Huber and Shipan, 2002: 
58). In the case of an obligation to formulate plans or reports, practical implementers will again 
set different objectives. These can vary in what types of measures are included in the plans, or 
what type of information is included in the reports (cf. Huber and Shipan, 2002: 58). As another 
example, practical implementers may set the criteria for designation and protection of areas 
in rather different ways (Beijen, 2011: 155).
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Dimension 2: scope
The second dimension of implementation performance concerns the scope of implementation 
(Bauer and Knill, 2014: 33; Beijen, 2011: 153; Thomann, 2015). This refers to the range of the 
policy: where, when and to whom does the policy task apply? If the scope is ambitious, it 
signals that an implementer takes the policy seriously (Schaffrin et al., 2015: 263). The literature 
has suggested three aspects of scope on which practical implementation may differ: territory, 
duration and addressees (Bauer and Knill, 2014: 33; Huber and Shipan, 2002: 49; Jans et al., 
2009; Jenkins-Smith et al., 2014: 189). Depending on whether a directive or national legislation 
specifies these three aspects of scope, implementation performance should be evaluated 
either vertically or horizontally.
 The first aspect of scope is the territory where the policy instrument applies (Bauer and 
Knill, 2014; Jans et al., 2009). Typically, the practical implementers may choose to make the 
policy instrument applicable to a whole region or only specific areas in a city. For example, 
local government may choose to target only a specific area in a city with extra air quality 
measures, while another will target the whole city. The second aspect of scope is temporal in 
nature, and concerns the duration of the policy task (Bauer and Knill, 2014; Huber and Shipan, 
2002; Jans et al., 2009). For example, a specific policy plan may differ in terms of temporal 
span among the implementing authorities. The implementers may apply the environmental 
standards earlier or longer than determined in the national or EU policy instruments. The third 
aspect of scope captures how broad or specific the group of addressees targeted by the policy 
is (Bauer and Knill, 2014; Jans et al., 2009; Jenkins-Smith et al., 2014). Practical implementers 
may reduce or broaden the group targeted by the policy. For example, they may target a 
broader group of companies to perform an environmental impact assessment than the 
national or EU legislation prescribes. In case of procedural policy instruments, this aspect of 
scope relates to, for instance, who is invited to the public consultation.
Dimension 3: effort
The third and final dimension of implementation performance concerns the effort that 
implementers put into accomplishing a policy’s goals (Bauer and Knill, 2014: 34; Howlett et al., 
2009: 186; Winter, 2006: 160). Effort refers to ‘the factors affecting the probability that substantial 
requirements are effectively achieved’ (Bauer and Knill, 2014: 34). The policy instruments that 
are characterised by higher intensity have more effort invested in them (Schaffrin et al., 2015: 
262). Five aspects of the effort dimension emerge from the literature.
 The first three aspects concern the resources that implementers allocate to 
implementation. The first aspect is the number of staff, i.e. organisational resources, designated 
to support the implementation of policy instruments (Bauer and Knill, 2014: 34; Hartlapp, 
2009: 475; Schaffrin et al., 2015: 262; Tosun, 2012: 442). It relates to how many people in the 
organisation are responsible for defining the policy tasks and carrying them out. The second 
aspect concerns the types of expertise, i.e. informational resources, involved to support policy 
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implementation (Bauer and Knill, 2014: 34; Radaelli and De Francesco, 2007; Schaffrin et al., 
2015: 262), which relates to the type of knowledge consulted during policy implementation. 
An example could be whether policy implementers have different backgrounds in order to 
facilitate the synergy of expertise and create a sound and feasible policy. The third aspect 
of effort is the percentage of an implementer’s budget, i.e. the financial resources, allocated 
to the implementation of policy goals (Bauer and Knill, 2014: 34; Schaffrin et al., 2015: 262-
263). Because these resources are typically not specified in national or EU legislation, the 
assessment should be horizontal in nature.
 The fourth aspect of effort concerns the prioritisation of goals and measures within one 
policy (Winter, 2006: 160). Given their limited resources, implementers typically prioritise some 
goals or measures over others within the same policy. For example, a policy task might contain 
measures which the implementers are highly unlikely to implement all. Therefore, one can 
analyse which measures or goals take precedence and receive most attention. The practical 
implementers are likely to vary in terms of what policy norms or measures are prioritised. 
Similarly, to the first three aspects, prioritisation is not specified by national or EU legislation, 
which necessitates horizontal comparison.
 The final aspect of effort is monitoring (Bauer and Knill, 2014: 34; Beijen, 2011: 159; 
Howlett et al., 2009: 185; May and Winter, 1999; Schaffrin et al., 2015: 264; Tosun, 2012: 442). It 
describes how the practical implementer will assess the quality of the delivered task as well as 
the consequences of a failure to act, or how the practical implementers envision controlling 
for policy adherence (cf. Hartlapp, 2009: 475; Vedung, 1998: 31). Huber and Shipan (2002: 
52) refer to it as the ‘quality assurance’ mechanism, which aims at ensuring policy adherence 
(see also May and Winter, 1999). The presence of such an enforcement mechanism signals to 
what extent practical implementers really make a policy work (Howlett et al., 2009; Schaffrin 
et al., 2015: 264). Depending on whether a directive or national legislation prescribes local 
monitoring, implementation performance on these aspects should be evaluated vertically or 
horizontally.
2.4 RESEARCH DESIGN
Having conceptualised implementation performance, several questions present 
themselves. First, is the framework complete when compared to existing empirical studies 
of implementation? Second, are the theoretical aspects proposed mutually exclusive 
within a dimension (Schreier, 2012: 75)? Hence the collective exhaustiveness and mutual 
exclusiveness of the framework’s dimensions must be corroborated (Schreier, 2012: 75). And 
third, how complete is our understanding of implementation performance in the field of EU 
environmental policy?
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 To answer these questions, a deductive qualitative content analysis (Schreier, 2012) 
was conducted, comparing the conceptual framework with existing empirical studies of 
practical implementation of specific environmental directives. This analysis reduces the data 
by classifying the specific and concrete information from the earlier studies under the aspects 
of our conceptual framework (Potter and Levine-Donnerstein, 1999; Schreier, 2012). 
 These existing studies, published in journals, served as data for our analysis. The studies 
were selected using a systematic literature review method in order to avoid any intentional or 
unintentional bias in the selection of the data (Petticrew and Roberts, 2006). Web of Science 
(Thomson), one of the largest scientific databases for the social and environmental sciences, 
was selected for the collection of data. The data were selected in five steps in July 2014.
 First, as this research is interested in implementation and compliance with EU directives, 
a Boolean search was carried out using the keywords ‘(EU OR directive) AND (implement* OR 
compliance)’. Web of Science yielded 7989 documents with these keywords in either the title 
and/or the abstract of the documents. Second, the analysis was limited to academic articles, 
because these enjoy peer review which safeguards quality. The sample was restricted to 
articles written in English and dealing with environmental policy. This selection resulted in 940 
articles. Third, the titles and the abstracts were closely read, so as to include only those articles 
that deal with the practical implementation of EU directives. Articles focusing on policy 
outcomes, cost–benefit analysis of policy implementation, technical calculations or anything 
else but implementation performance were excluded. This selection step yielded 187 articles. 
To validate this sample, we checked whether the articles on practical implementation of EU 
environmental directives identified in more general EU literature reviews (Angelova et al., 
2012; Treib, 2014; Toshkov et al., n.d.) were also included in our sample of 187 articles. This 
was indeed the case. Fourth, aiming to grasp current knowledge, articles were selected if 
published in the previous five years, i.e. 2010–2014. This resulted in a database of 112 articles. 
As a final selection step, we applied the same inclusion and exclusion criteria as in step three 
of the selection process to the full texts of the articles. This led to the final identification of 70 
articles to be subjected to the qualitative content analysis. See Appendix A for the full list. 
 For this analysis we coded these 70 articles based on the conceptual framework. We 
used a standard coding procedure (Schreier, 2012). Following this procedure, a codebook was 
developed, which contained operational definitions of the previously defined ten aspects of 
implementation performance. Analysis of the first two articles yielded typical examples for all 
the aspects, which were added to the codebook. The deductive analysis of the articles was 
performed using NVivo 10 software.
 In order to examine the framework’s quality, i.e. the collective exhaustiveness and 
mutual exclusiveness of the framework’s dimensions, the following three steps were taken. 
First, to corroborate the concept’s exhaustiveness, an additional code was created to keep 
track of any descriptions that would not fit the framework. Such instances were to be coded 
as ‘emerging themes’. Second, in order to examine the mutual exclusiveness of aspects of one 
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dimension, we checked whether the coding units had overlapping aspect-codes assigned to 
them (Schreier, 2012). And third, the coding was subjected to consistency control, i.e. reliability, 
by two additional coders (Kippendorf, 2004: 215; Schreier, 2012: 169). A strong measure of 
reliability and thus also quality assurance of the coding scheme, i.e. the conceptual framework, 
is to examine whether others can interpret the data by coding it in the same manner, or at 
least agree on the interpretation of the data (Kippendorf, 2004: 215; Schreier, 2012: 169). 
 This intercoder reliability examination was established in two ways. The articles were 
divided into two roughly equal and mutually exclusive subsets. The first subset (N=36) was 
divided between the two coders and subjected to independent coding of the result sections 
of the articles. The second subset (N=34) was also divided between these two coders, but 
instead of independent coding the coding of the main coder was checked by these two 
coders. The coders were instructed to keep track of any data that would not fit the framework, 
and code these as ‘emerging themes’. These two different ways of performing intercoder 
reliability assessment are the most common ways of examining the reliability of coding 
(Schreier, 2012: 169). 
 In order to evaluate the completeness and coverage of our understanding of 
implementation performance in the field of EU environmental policy, the following three 
steps were taken. First, by coding 70 articles on the aspects of the conceptual framework we 
reflected on the state-of-the-art knowledge of implementation performance. Such analysis 
allowed us to see which aspects have received most empirical attention so far, and to identify 
any gaps in our understanding of environmental policy implementation. Second, we kept 
track of what directives were examined to see whether some directives have received more 
attention and whether there are systematic differences in how implementation performance 
was evaluated based on the directive at stake. And third, for the same reasons, we also kept 
track of what countries were studied in these articles. 
2.5 ANALYSIS
As depicted in Table 2.1, the sample covers 18 EU environmental directives. 32 articles (46 per 
cent) focus on the Water Framework Directive (WFD). Seven articles cover multiple directives 
in their study. The EU Strategic Environmental Assessment Directive is examined by six articles, 
the Natura 2000 by five articles, and the Environmental Noise Directive and Habitats Directive 
by three articles each. 
 As can be seen in Table 2.2, the sample covers 19 different member states. 17 articles 
(24 per cent) examined two or more countries. The top five most examined countries in the 
sample are United Kingdom, Germany, Ireland, Italy and the Netherlands.
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Table 2.1: EU directives in the sample
EU directive Frequency
Water Framework Directive (60/2000) 32
Multiple directives 7
Strategic Environmental Assessment Directive (2001/42/EC) 6
Natura 2000 (Wild Birds Directive (79/409/EEC) and the Habitats Directive (92/43/EEC)) 5
Environmental Noise Directive (2002/49/EC), Habitats Directive (92/43/EEC) 3
Drinking Water Directive (98/83/EC), Floods Directive (2007/60/EC) 2
EU Biofuels Directive (2003/30/EC), Dangerous Preparations Directive (1999/45/EC), Environmental 
Impact Assessment Directive (85/337/EEC), Waste Framework Directive (Directive 2008/98/EC), 
Integrated Pollution Prevention and Control Directive (2008/1/EC), Landfill Directive (99/31/EC), 
Nitrates Directive (91/676/EEC), Wastewater Treatment Directive (91/271/EEC), Seveso II Directive 
(96/82/EC), Sustainable use of pesticides Directive (2009/128/EC) 
1
Table 2.2: Countries in the sample
Country Frequency
Multiple 17
UK 8
Germany 7
Ireland 5
Italy, The Netherlands 4
Spain, Denmark, Greece, Sweden 3
France, Belgium, Slovenia 2
Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Portugal, Romania 1
 Moving to the quality of the framework, the analysis revealed that the conceptual 
framework captures implementation performance, as defined by the existing directive-specific 
studies, rather well. In the first place, none of the coders assigned the ‘emerging themes’ code, 
implying that all aspects of implementation performance covered by the existing studies 
could be subsumed under one of the headings of our conceptual framework. Accordingly, 
it seems safe to conclude that this forms a complete representation of implementation 
performance. 
 Secondly, in order to assess the mutual exclusiveness of aspects within one dimension, 
we checked whether different framework aspect codes were assigned to the same coding 
unit. No such overlapping coding was found. Third, the two subsets of data displayed high 
intercoder reliability agreement: 75 per cent agreement for the whole framework in the first 
subset (column A, Table 2.3), and 95 per cent agreement in the second subset (column B, 
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Table 2.3)4. It thus seems safe to conclude that others interpret the same data in the same way, 
using this conceptual framework. 
 The next step in the analysis was to evaluate the state of knowledge on implementation 
performance in the field of EU environmental policy. Here, the analysis reveals that our 
knowledge is fragmented in three ways. First of all, we see variant coverage of the ten aspects 
of implementation performance in existing studies. Whereas none of the articles covered all 
the proposed aspects, all reported at least one aspect of the conceptual framework. 19 per cent 
of articles used eight of the aspects to examine implementation performance, another 19 per 
cent used seven aspects, followed by 16 per cent elaborating on five aspects, 13 per cent on six 
aspects, 11 per cent on four aspects, and 9 per cent on nine aspects. More specifically, Table 2.3 
presents the relative frequency scores5 of the conceptual framework aspects. Column C shows 
that the ‘objectives’ aspect received most attention, followed by ‘expertise’, ‘definitional details’, 
and ‘monitoring’. The popularity of the ‘objectives’ aspect is not surprising: it is an intuitive first 
step in implementation research to examine which of the prescribed policy instruments have 
been put in place and applied when studying practical implementation. Much less attention, 
however, has been paid to the ‘scope’ and ‘effort’ dimensions of implementation performance. 
This is surprising, given their theoretical importance for implementation performance. Only 
a few articles paid attention to ‘staff’ and ‘prioritisation’ aspects. In sum, our analysis reveals 
important knowledge gaps in implementation performance in EU environmental policy. 
 Second, as already mentioned, a large proportion of the sample (32 articles) focused 
on the WFD (Table 2.1). Columns D and E of Table 2.3 show that our knowledge on WFD 
implementation performance is much more extensive than the knowledge on other directives, 
especially when it comes to the ‘scope’ and ‘effort’ dimensions. Another large proportion of the 
sample (12 articles) focused on more than one directive, i.e. multiple directives and Natura 
2000 directives. Column F shows that many of these articles covered various aspects of the 
conceptual framework. However, little attention has been paid to the ‘monitoring’, ‘territory’, 
‘staff’ and ‘prioritisation’ aspects of implementation performance.
 Third, the analysis shows that our insights on implementation performance mostly 
stem from case studies on Western member states, which are expected to have a relatively 
smooth practical implementation (Falkner and Treib, 2008). According to Falkner and Treib’s 
(2008) typology of the worlds of compliance, we divided the countries in the sample into 
two groups. Falkner and Treib (2008) argue that practical implementation of EU directives will 
run smoother in the countries of the ‘world of law observance’ and the ‘world of domestic 
politics’6 (column G, Table 2.3) than in countries of the ‘world of dead letters’ and the ‘world
4 This is not surprising as the first type of intercoder reliability test is a more critical reliability assessment (Schreier, 2012). 
5  As most articles paid attention to different aspects at the same time, the relative frequency scores do not add up to 100 per 
cent.
6  In this world of compliance, notwithstanding the fact that practical implementation is smooth, transposition with EU directives 
is contingent on domestic politics (Falkner and Treib, 2008). 
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Table 2.3: Data and intercoder reliability assessment (%)
A B C D E F G H
Agreement (%) All (%) Directive (%)
Worlds of 
compliance (%)
D
im
en
si
on
 A
sp
ec
t
Su
bs
et
 I 
(N
* =
36
)
Su
bs
et
 II
 (N
* =
34
)
A
rt
ic
le
s 
(N
* =
70
)
W
FD
  (
N
* =
32
)
N
on
-W
FD
 (N
* =
38
)
>1
 (N
* =
12
)
G
ro
up
 I*
* 
(N
* =
30
)
G
ro
up
 II
**
* (
N
* =
19
)
Su
bs
ta
nc
e Definitional details 82 94 71 72 71 58 73 84
Objectives 76 98 99 97 100 100 100 100
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Territory 85 94 60 75 47 42 70 53
Duration 71 92 53 66 42 58 60 42
Addressees 68 97 63 69 58 67 70 53
Eff
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t
Staff 92 98 19 19 18 42 13 21
Expertise 78 92 74 78 71 67 80 79
Budget 70 97 50 44 55 67 37 58
Prioritisation 75 100 39 53 29 33 47 37
Monitoring 80 97 64 63 66 42 60 68
Note: the percentages do not add up to 100% in the columns C to H as a single article focuses on different aspects in 
the same study.
* Number of articles in the sample; **World of law observance and world of domestic politics; ***World of dead letters 
and world of transposition neglect.
of transposition neglect’ (column H, Table 2.3). It seems that we know relatively less on the 
‘scope’ dimension of the implementation performance in the countries where practical 
implementation was hypothesised to be more problematic (column H) than in the countries 
where implementation can be expected to be smoother (column G). The opposite seems 
to hold for the ‘effort’ dimension of implementation performance, where we know relatively 
more of this dimension of implementation performance in countries with hypothesised 
problematic implementation. This finding demonstrates the need to study implementation 
performance more systematically in order to draw better conclusions on how ‘problematic’ 
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the implementation of EU directives actually is and how seriously the implementers take EU 
policies. As for now, due to the fragmented nature of our knowledge on the implementation 
performance important information might have been omitted from its evaluation.
2.6 CONCLUSION
This paper has proposed a three-dimensional conceptual framework for studying EU 
implementation performance that allows for systematic analysis of variation in practical 
implementation, while going beyond a conventional dichotomous understanding of 
compliance. The validity of the theoretically deduced conceptual framework was corroborated 
by an extensive qualitative content analysis of previous policy-specific empirical research on 
the implementation of EU environmental directives. 
 Even though environmental policy has been often claimed to be the most extensively 
researched policy field, the systematic literature analysis reported in this paper revealed 
that our knowledge of the practical implementation of EU environmental directives is 
fragmented in three ways. First, so far the various aspects of EU implementation performance 
have been examined neither equally nor systematically. While the ‘substance’ dimension 
has received most attention in the literature, much less attention has been paid to the 
‘scope’ and ‘effort’ dimensions. Second, there is a need for the examination of practical 
implementation of other directives than the WFD, as other environmental directives have 
not been examined as frequently and as systematically as the WFD. When comparing the 
implementation of different directives, it is important to pay attention to ‘monitoring’, 
‘territory’, ‘staff’ and ‘prioritisation’ aspects, as these have received less attention up until 
now. And third, the analysis has revealed the need for more systematic research into 
countries where the practical implementation can be expected to be relatively problematic. 
 If the goal of research into EU environmental policy implementation, but also EU 
compliance, is to understand to what extent the member states really make EU policies 
work, there is a need for a more systematic approach to study implementation performance 
than has been practised up until now. If we continue to argue that there is a compliance 
deficit in the EU, we need to pinpoint exactly where, how and what is lacking in policy 
implementation. This conceptual framework can facilitate such research by offering a full-
fledged conceptualisation of implementation performance. 
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ABSTRACT 
This paper offers an analysis of the implementation performance of the EU Ambient Air Quality 
directive in the Netherlands. It provides a systematic evaluation of the implementation of a 
procedural provision – the obligation to design air quality policy. It draws on original data on 
air quality policy measures that have been collected in 13 medium-sized Dutch municipalities. 
The analysis of differences in the implementation performance was performed using a novel 
three-dimensional conceptual framework. The findings illustrate great differences in the 
implementation performance between the municipalities. The focused comparison allowed 
establishing very precisely where the implementation performance is poor or even lacking, 
and which municipalities take their EU implementation task more seriously than others. Most 
puzzling, environmental problem pressure turned out not to act as a sufficient trigger for 
municipalities to take far-reaching air quality measures. In contrast to previous research, a more 
nuanced picture is painted when it comes to the concepts of ‘compliance’, ‘non-compliance’ 
and ‘over-compliance’. A careful dissection of the implementation performance based on the 
aspects of the conceptual framework produces hands-on recommendations to municipalities 
seeking to improve their air quality policy.
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3.1 INTRODUCTION
Air pollution is one of the major parameters of urban environmental quality. It has profound 
negative impact on human health (Gurjar et al., 2010). The European Ambient Air Quality 
(AAQ) Directive 2008/50/EC establishes air quality objectives to be met by the member states 
in order to prevent and combat air pollution. These objectives entail substantive provisions 
(Howlett, 2011), such as standards for the concentrations of specific pollutants in the air, as 
well as considerable procedural provisions, which are designed to indirectly affect the desired 
policy outcome through the manipulation of policy processes (Howlett, 2011). Thus, the 
directive calls for assessment, monitoring and sustainment of the air quality through rigorous 
air quality plans and obliges the member states to public communication on their air quality 
measures. This type of procedural provisions is increasingly used in EU environmental law 
(Héritier, 2002; Knill and Lenschow, 2004; Liefferink et al., 2011). 
 In spite of their popularity, procedural provisions have received limited systematic 
attention from EU compliance scholars (Bondarouk and Mastenbroek, 2018; Knill and 
Lenschow, 2000). However the examination of such provisions becomes especially relevant in 
light of a recent ruling of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) against the United 
Kingdom and a reasoned opinion from the Commission against Germany, both calling into 
question the ‘appropriateness’ of policy measures to combat air pollution (Article 23 of the AAQ 
directive). Thus, even though procedural provisions characteristically provide flexibility at the 
member state level as to how these obligations are to be implemented (Knill and Lenschow, 
2004), EU institutions apparently pay very close attention to the practical implementation of 
such provisions. 
 Evaluating compliance with procedural provisions is important if one is to examine to 
what extent member states actually ‘make EU policies work’ (Haverland and Romeijn, 2007). 
The traditional view of compliance, where the conformity of the conduct of the regulated 
with legal obligations constitutes the central yardstick (Hartlapp and Falkner, 2009), seems less 
suitable here. According to this view, the mere fact that a member state or a local implementer 
lives up to the procedural obligation by producing reports or plans would already qualify the 
implementer as compliant. This dichotomous approach, by which compliance is juxtaposed to 
non-compliance, masks potentially great variance in responses between authorities and does 
not tell much about the extent of the domestic efforts to implement the policy (Bondarouk 
and Mastenbroek, 2018; Hupe and Hill, 2015). 
 To overcome the problem of shallow conclusions on the implementation of procedural 
provisions, the emphasis should be put on the differences in implementation performance 
between implementers of the same administrative layer, e.g. between municipalities (Hupe, 
2011; Hupe and Hill, 2015; Hupe et al., 2014). Such differences in the local implementation, 
which are still within the boundaries left by EU directives, deserve more scholarly attention (cf. 
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Thomann, 2015; Treib, 2014) in order to understand how shared policy problems are jointly 
resolved in the EU (Bondarouk and Mastenbroek, 2018; Saetren, 2014). 
 This study addresses these gaps in literature. Moving beyond compliance, it elaborates 
on the implementation performance of medium-sized municipalities and depicts how the 
implementation of the AAQ directive results in tailor-made policy solutions on the ground 
within one member state. The objective of this paper is to evaluate the interaction between 
the policy leeway inherent in the AAQ directive’s requirement to devise an air quality plan 
and its local implementation. The research question is therefore: what and how big are the 
differences between municipalities in using the room for discretion provided by the key 
procedural Article 23 of the EU Ambient Air Quality directive 2008/50/EC? A careful analysis 
will not only reveal differences between the municipalities but also shed light on how local 
air quality policy implementation compares to the obligations set out in the AAQ directive. 
The follow-up question of why these differences exist will, for space reasons, be shelved for 
another paper.
 The article expands EU implementation research in four ways. First it covers a relatively 
understudied practical implementation stage of EU compliance at the municipal level (Treib, 
2014). Second, it covers a relatively understudied area of environmental policy – local air quality 
policy implementation (but see Beattie et al., 2004; Carmichael and Lambert, 2011; Dorfman 
et al., 2010; Newig and Fritsch, 2009; Woodfield et al., 2003). Third, this article provides a 
systematic evaluation of the implementation of a procedural type of policy instruments, which 
has become a common ingredient of environmental policy. And fourth, this article provides 
a new way of evaluating implementation performance by using the innovative framework 
developed by Bondarouk and Mastenbroek (2018). The article draws on original data on air 
quality policy measures that have been collected in 13 medium-sized Dutch municipalities. 
Only the policy measures that have actually been carried out, i.e. not just those planned, are 
included in this study. Such analysis reveals how actively the municipalities engage in the 
implementation of EU air quality policy. 
3.2 FRAMEWORK
The theoretically deduced framework introduced by Bondarouk and Mastenbroek (2018) 
was chosen as it enables a systematic analysis of differences in implementation performance 
on policies that leave a lot of leeway to local implementers. This is particularly useful when 
analysing procedural provisions such as air quality plans, i.e. Article 23 of the AAQ directive. 
Viewing the implementation of the AAQ Directive from a traditional perspective, the mere 
fact that there is a plan would already be sufficient to claim that implementers are compliant. 
However, the variety between the implementers who are tasked with the same policy deserves 
a closer look. Following recent literature, it should not be a surprise that local implementers 
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deviate from the policy set out by the national legislators, i.e. that there are ‘vertical’ differences 
between the national policy and its local translation. What remains puzzling, however, is the 
existence of ‘horizontal’ differences between local implementers (Hupe 2011; Hupe et al., 
2014). 
 In order to systematically map such differences, Bondarouk and Mastenbroek (2018) 
proposed a three-dimensional conceptual framework of implementation performance. 
Implementation performance is the intensity of policy outputs undertaken by implementers 
in response to EU policy instruments – relative to the directive’s benchmarks (vertical aspect) 
and to other implementers’ outputs (horizontal comparison). The three dimensions are 
substance, scope, and effort. These dimensions are further refined with the help of a number 
of aspects (Figure 3.1). Municipalities differ on these aspects of implementation performance. 
 Substance, the first dimension of implementation performance, relates to the central 
issue that is to be regulated. The first aspect entails the objectives of the substantive and 
procedural requirements posed by the EU, identifying the specific requirements on-the-
ground (Howlett and Cashore, 2014). Municipalities may for instance impose stricter, less strict 
or additional air quality norms in their own policy measures. In case of procedural provisions 
such as an air quality plan, objectives refer to which type or types of measures were included 
in the plan. The second aspect relates to the operational definitions used during practical 
implementation. When implementing the AAQ Directive, municipalities for instance have 
to define what they mean by ‘appropriate’ or ‘good’ measures, or when exemptions to the 
measures are at place. 
• Staff
• Expertise
• Budget
• Prioritisation
• Monitoring
Effort
Concept
Aspect
Dimension
Source: Bondarouk and Mastenbroek, 2018
• Territory
• Duration
• Addressees
• Definitional details
• Objectives
ScopeSubstance
Implementation performance
Figure 3.1: Conceptual framework 
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 The second dimension of implementation performance concerns the scope of 
implementation: where, when and to whom does the policy task apply. The first aspect is the 
territory to which the policy task applies, e.g. a whole region, an entire municipality or only 
specific areas in a city. The second aspect is the temporal scope, or duration of the policy task, 
i.e. when did the air quality measures come into force and/or to which period do they apply. 
The final aspect of scope examines how broad or specific the group of addressees targeted by 
the policy measures is. 
 The final dimension focuses on the effort implementers put into accomplishing a 
policy’s goals and consists of four aspects. First, the number of designated staff relates to how 
many people in the municipality are responsible for formulating and carrying out the relevant 
policy tasks. Second, the types of expertise involved in policy implementation address the 
type(s) of knowledge consulted during air quality policy task formulation. The third aspect 
of effort is the amount of financial resources, expressed for instance as the percentage of 
an implementer’s budget, allocated to the implementation of air quality policy goals. The 
fourth aspect is the prioritisation7 of goals or measures within one policy, given the limited 
availability of resources. The final aspect refers to the monitoring for ensuring that the policy 
measures are complied with. It stipulates how a municipality will assess the quality of the 
delivered task and how it envisions controlling for policy adherence. 
 It should be noted that the framework by Bondarouk and Mastenbroek (2018) does not 
exclude interdependence between the aspects. For example, a municipal allocated budget 
to implement a policy might affect its ability to come up with monitoring. Such correlations 
are however not a concern for this paper, as it only aims to measure the implementation 
performance and not to explain it.  
3.3 RESEARCH DESIGN 
Case selection
The Netherlands have been chosen for this study as the AAQ directive gave rise to 
implementation problems in a lot of Dutch municipalities (Busscher et al., 2014). The 
implementation problems were associated in particular with the close coupling of air quality 
requirements and spatial planning. All new spatial planning projects had to be assessed with 
a view to their contribution to air pollution, leading in several cases to serious delay or even 
termination of the project (Carmichael and Lambert, 2011). Hence, economic growth in the 
municipalities was threatened by air quality policy. 
At the same time, the Netherlands present a typical case for the investigation of air quality 
policy. As almost all other EU municipalities, Dutch municipalities have a mandate in air 
7   Prioritisation refers to the priority assigned to specific policy goals within one policy. This is not to be confused with the concept 
of ‘saliency’, which reflects the priority dynamics between different policies. 
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policy and were faced with air pollution challenges (Busscher et al., 2014). In contrast to 
municipalities of big member states, however, Dutch municipalities are very comparable in 
terms of geography and sources of air pollution. Thus, Dutch municipalities were faced with 
largely similar conditions, and therefore could potentially take the same measures (Busch et 
al., 2012; Busscher et al., 2014). 
 This study focuses on medium-sized municipalities. First, these municipalities represent 
a large portion of society in the Netherlands as well as elsewhere. Second, these municipalities 
often face air quality problems that are very similar to those of the largest municipalities. While 
the latter received most scholarly attention (Gurjar et al., 2010; Mayer, 1999), medium-sized 
municipalities were largely neglected. And third, they form a large homogeneous group with 
similar air pollution sources, making them an almost ideal sample for horizontal comparison. 
All 13 municipalities in the Netherlands having between 150 thousand and 340 thousand 
inhabitants were selected for this study. 
 The analysis was based upon policy plans on air quality, mobility, parking policy, public 
transport and sensitive destination policies. The evaluations of these plans, annual financial 
reports and 18 interviews with municipal policy officers and local civil society organisations 
informed the analysis. In total 237 documents were covered. The time frame of policy 
implementation was kept rather wide – from 2000-2015, in order to fully account for the air 
quality measures on the ground. In some municipalities, a particular measure might have 
been taken already prior to 2008 AAQ directive, whereas other municipalities only started to 
implement at a much later moment. 
 The information was gathered on 8 out of the 10 aspects introduced above (see 
Figure 3.1). For two aspects – staff and budget – it turned out to be impossible to gather 
comparable and meaningful data because air quality policy measures usually transcend the 
departmental structures of municipalities. The financial department, the environment affairs 
department and the mobility and traffic department were usually involved in the design 
of policy measures. Some of those only invested a few hours per year on the matter, e.g. 
the financial department employees who consulted the environmental department on the 
public procurement rules on the new public transport. Concerning budget, air quality policy 
measures could for instance be paid from the mobility department budget as many of the 
measures were directly related to mobility improvement measures. Trans-departmental made 
it impossible to isolate staff and budget allocated to air quality specifically. It must be noted 
that these problems relate to the strongly cross-sectoral nature of air quality policy. For many 
other EU policies it is likely to be easier to trace data on staff and budget.
Scoring air quality plans and measures
In order to analyse air quality policy implementation performance, the data on the remaining 
8 aspects were collected on two levels: the air quality plan as a whole and 25 individual air 
quality measures. In all instances, scores were assigned from 0 to 3. The scoring allowed for 
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a focused comparison across the 13 municipalities. The division between the individual 
measures and the plan as a whole was necessary to prevent the scores on the 25 individual 
measures from overshadowing the scores on the overall plan. Weighing the scores would 
have been an option, but the weighing factors would inevitably have remained arbitrary for 
four reasons. First, the importance of plans versus actual measures depends on a complex 
amalgam of political, institutional and cultural factors, which are very hard to disentangle. 
Second, there is no academic consensus on which measures prove to be in general the most 
effective (Knill et al., 2012; Van Stigt et al., 2016). Third, the effectiveness of single measures is 
hard to determine as a combination of measures is usually employed to tackle environmental 
problems (Howlett, 2011). Finally, the applicability and effectiveness of any individual air 
quality measure is highly sensitive to the specific geographical context (Vlachokostos et al., 
2011). Therefore, refraining from weighing the scores seemed to be most proper solution. 
 On the plan level, data for the ‘duration’ aspect were collected but not elaborated upon, as 
we are interested in whether the policy measures have actually been taken at all (as opposed 
to when exactly they were planned). The effort aspects of ‘expertise’ and ‘prioritisation’, in 
contrast, were only measured for the plan as a whole and not for the individual measures, as 
these effort aspects could be related to the plan level only.
 Appendix B elaborates on how the scores on the overall policy plan were assigned. 
A long-list of all possible policy practices was developed inductively and differentiated by 
aspect of the implementation performance framework (e.g. objectives, territory etc). A policy 
plan received a higher score per aspect of the framework if more descriptions from the long-
list of policy practices could be ‘ticked’ for the city at stake. The scores were added up to form 
a score per municipality. 
 In order to analyse individual air quality policy measures a long-list of all possible policy 
measures was developed inductively. Twenty-five possible measures were identified, which 
were subdivided into six categories of measures: (1) public transport, (2) prevention of cars 
in the city, (3) bicycle policy, (4) stimulating the demand for alternative transportation, (5) 
information to the public and (6) sensitive destination measures. Such aggregation was done 
to ease the comparison between the municipalities. The categories were cross-checked with 
other reports on the possible types of air quality measures (Fransen, 2012; Van Oort and Van 
Oort, 2012; Van Rij and Brink, 2013). 
 All twenty-five policy measures in all 13 cities were scored individually. Per individual 
policy measure there was again a long-list of all possible policy practices developed inductively 
and differentiated by aspect of the implementation performance framework. As for the plan 
level, a policy measure received a higher score per aspect if more descriptions from the long-
list of all possible policy practices could be ‘ticked’ for the city at stake. This eventually allowed 
for a comparison of the implementation performance on the ground between the 13 cities. 
To produce an aggregate score for one of the six categories of measures, the scores on the 
individual measures of the same category were added up. In a similar vein, an aggregate score 
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per aspect of implementation performance was derived by adding up the scores for that 
particular aspect across all categories. The scores of municipalities could then be compared 
on the categories of air quality measures as well as on specific aspects of implementation 
performance. Also, a total score on all six categories could be drawn up. Appendix C provides 
the extensive codebook that was developed for the measurement. 
3.4 THE DUTCH POLICY CONTEXT FOR MUNICIPAL AIR QUALITY POLICY
Before delving into specifics of the Dutch case and the responsibilities of municipalities and 
national government, a few details about the directive’s Article 23 are at place. Article 23 
stipulates that where limit values are exceeded, member states should make an air quality 
plan containing appropriate measures aimed at keeping the exceedance period as short as 
possible. The plans may additionally include specific measures aiming at the protection of 
sensitive population groups. The plans and the information on their implementation should 
be made publicly available. 
 In the Netherlands, the AAQ directive has been transposed into the Environmental 
Protection Act (EPA), which lays the basis for the National Air Quality Cooperation Programme 
(NAQCP). The NAQCP has been communicated to the Commission as the national policy 
plan to combat air pollution, and served as the ground for the Commission’s decision to 
postpone the deadline for compliance for the Netherlands. This means that the limit values 
for particulate matter 10 had to be reached by mid-2011 (instead of 2005) and those for NO
2
 
by 2015 (instead of 2010). Apart from this derogation, the limit values are the same as in the 
EU directive. Although the directive and the transposition focus on other pollutants as well, 
the NAQCP identifies these two as the only pollutants still being exceeded in the Netherlands. 
 Next to the standards, the NAQCP lists all national and municipal air quality measures. 
The national authorities are responsible for monitoring the air quality through a national 
sampling system, overseeing the progress of local air quality plans’ implementation, and 
communicating the air quality status to the public. Hence, according to the EU directive, 
municipalities are not obliged to monitor air quality and report the policy measures to the 
public, as the national government is already seeing to that. In addition, national authorities 
are responsible for managing the pollution at the national highways, while municipal roads 
are a responsibility of the local authorities. The national authorities have also committed to 
limit the growth of sensitive destinations, i.e. schools, kindergartens, nursing and retirement 
homes, next to national and provincial roads. There is no binding regulation to undertake 
similar measures along municipal roads. The national authorities allocated 372 million Euros 
to local authorities for the air quality measures. 
 The municipal authorities submitted their local air quality action plans to the NAQCP. 
While some municipalities were very specific, others provided only a general outline of the 
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measures to be taken. The municipalities are obliged to implement all the measures they have 
listed under the NAQCP; otherwise, they would have to pay back the funding granted by the 
national authority. At the same time, they are allowed to take extra policy measures besides 
those specified under the NAQCP. According to the NAQCP calculated forecast of 2008, four 
cities in our sample, i.e. Utrecht, Eindhoven, Nijmegen and Arnhem, would still exceed air 
pollution limits by 2015. Strictly speaking, from the sample of 13 cities, these are the only 4 
cities that were obliged to take air quality measures according to the AAQ directive.
 Overall, this means that each municipality is bound to a different list of measures. 
Municipalities, moreover, basically drew up these lists themselves. It can therefore be 
concluded that they enjoy a large discretion in the implementation of the AAQ directive. 
3.5 FINDINGS AND DISCUSSION 
The objective of this paper is to evaluate the interaction between the policy leeway 
inherent in the AAQ directive’s procedural requirement to devise an air quality plan and its 
local implementation, and by doing so to demonstrate what differences exist in the local 
implementation of AAQ directive. This ultimately contributes to our understanding of how 
member states actually ‘make EU policies work’. This section starts out by comparing local 
air quality policy implementation to the obligations set out in the AAQ directive. Afterwards 
the question of differences between the municipal implementation performances is dealt 
with. As a few municipalities were predicted to face continued exceedance of the limit values, 
we specifically pay attention to their implementation performance. In addition, we zoom in 
on the performance of relatively bigger versus relatively smaller cities in our sample. Finally, 
this section reflects on the use of the implementation performance framework, which is first 
employed in this paper. 
Local air quality policy implementation versus the AAQ directive and the Dutch 
transposition 
When it comes to formal compliance with the AAQ directive, all 13 municipalities comply 
with the requirement of having a plan. Also when it comes to meeting the air quality 
standards, the municipalities have almost entirely managed to achieve the deadlines for the 
specific pollutants8. Recalling the Dutch air pollution problems prior to the AAQ directive, 
this achievement is remarkable as such. One possible explanation for this could be the 
way the Netherlands have organised the practical implementation. Both ‘carrots’ and ‘sticks’ 
8   According to 2015 measurements there are single sample points in Utrecht, Eindhoven, Tilburg and Arnhem where limit values 
are exceeded. In each case, this concerns one section of a street where concentrations of nitrogen dioxide exceed the annual 
limit of 40 μg/m3. In 2008, forecast calculations indicated that Utrecht, Eindhoven, Arnhem and Nijmegen would face pollution 
exceedance. While Nijmegen managed to completely eradicate exceedance of the standards, Arnhem, Utrecht and Eindhoven 
were not entirely successful in doing so, but it should be stressed that this exceedance concerns fractions of a single street.
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were provided in the NAQCP: the municipalities had to take action and were not allowed 
to engage in spatial development projects if exceedances were expected, but at the same 
time the municipalities received financial assistance to implement their AAQ measures. The 
fact that the municipalities were involved in the NAQCP design from the beginning could be 
conducive to this compliant behaviour (Howlett, 2011). 
 More interestingly, however, the data show various situations where municipalities seem 
to do more than necessary. We can distinguish over-compliance relative to the EU directive 
and over-compliance relative to its national transposition. In addition to that, there are many 
differences on a horizontal level, suggesting that some municipalities take the implementation 
task of air quality policy more seriously than others without being over-compliant in a strict 
sense of the word. We will discuss these situations in more detail now.
 First, over-compliance relative to the AAQ directive occurs with regard to a substantive 
provision: six municipalities (Nijmegen, Tilburg, Almere, Groningen, Breda and Haarlem) aimed 
for stricter standards on particulate matter 10 and nitrogen dioxide than those stipulated by 
the directive as well as its national transposition. This must be taken as a clear form of over-
compliance in local practice. Furthermore, two municipalities (Nijmegen and Groningen) took 
an extra pollutant into account - soot, which is neither mentioned in the EU directive nor 
in the national transposition. As soot is in fact a sub-particle of particulate matter 10 and as 
such covered by the directive, this can hardly be considered as a substantive local ‘topping’ of 
national or EU rules. It however demonstrates that some municipalities have taken air quality 
concerns a step further by doing their own specific research on the important ingredients of 
particulate matter 10 and addressing it in their policy measures. 
 Second, over-compliance relative to the national transposition of the directive can be 
seen as some municipalities have established their own air quality monitoring system and 
provide information to the broader public on their policy measures, despite the fact that the 
national authorities already take care of this. The Netherlands, in other words, already complied 
with the AAQ directive on these points on the national level. Five municipalities have their 
own air quality assessment system in place. Except Almere all cities engaged in information 
provision. Nijmegen, Amersfoort and Utrecht even scored quite high within this category (see 
Table 3.1). Moreover, without being formally obliged to do so, four cities have taken extra local 
measures to prevent the growth of sensitive population destinations next to busy municipal 
roads (see Table 3.1). This finding again shows that municipalities may be willing and capable 
of going a step further than necessary, indicating that national expectations are not always 
dashed locally (cf. Pressman and Wildavsky, 1984).  
 Third, there are several cases where neither the EU directive nor the national transposition 
of the directive specify exactly which measures are to be taken. Also in those cases, data 
show that municipalities differ in their implementation performance. This for instance 
entails endeavours in the area of bicycle policy, which considerably diverge across cities (see 
Table 3.1). This grey area of discretion is exactly the room the municipalities can use to fit 
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the measures to their local circumstances and to do more than an average municipality. This 
cannot be regarded as over-compliance because the point of reference for deciding whether 
compliance or over-compliance is at stake at all, is missing. The only conclusion to be drawn 
here is that some municipalities take their implementation task more seriously than others. 
 In this context, it should be noted that the Netherlands is a unique case as municipalities 
were invited to develop their own air quality measures, which were then included in the 
NAQCP and subsequently became binding upon the municipality concerned. Nevertheless, 
the comparison of the local measures laid down in the NAQCP and actual local implementation 
is not a good starting point to determine over-compliance, as there is an obvious strategic 
interest of the municipalities not to promise too much in the NAQCP or to use rather vague 
terminology. At the end of the day, the measures taken in practice at the local level have to be 
decisive for determining implementation performance. 
Differences between cities: municipal policy plans and individual policy measures 
The analysis reveals that there are more differences between the municipalities with regard 
to the implementation performance of individual air quality measures than with regard to the 
air quality plan as a whole. 
 The aspects of ‘territory’ and ‘addressees’ of the air quality plan turned out, not totally 
unexpectedly, to be the same for all municipalities in the sample. Without exception, the plans 
were applicable to the whole municipal area and addressed the whole municipal population. 
As all municipalities identified ‘road traffic’ as the source  of pollution, there were no horizontal 
differences on the ‘definitional details’ aspect either9. All cities prioritised circulation measures, 
nitrogen dioxide and particulate matter 10, and local bottlenecks where air quality standards 
were threatened to be exceeded. Moreover, apart from four cities which have taken additional 
sensitive destination measures, all identified the same categories of policy measures to combat 
air pollution (see Table 3.1). This finding suggests that there might be a lot of communication 
and knowledge exchange between the municipalities. Even though the Netherlands have 
a national air quality plan, all municipalities were free to take their own measures. It remains 
to be seen what role the national government and the NAQCP played in stimulating such 
uniform approach.
9  Only Nijmegen identified water transport as an important source of pollution. However, most of the cities in the sample do not 
have a water body with a busy traffic. Therefore, such comparison becomes problematic in view of geographical differences. 
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Table 3.2: Categories of ambient air quality measures
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Utrecht 14 141 31 38 42 17 13 0
Eindhoven 14 151 36 31 35 32 9 8
Tilburg 15 151 28 34 38 31 12 8
Almere 11 123 31 29 33 30 0 0
Groningen 14 143 39 33 45 16 10 0
Breda 14 130 20 34 27 33 8 8
Nijmegen 16 158 33 34 34 36 21 0
Enschede 12 138 37 24 39 26 12 0
Apeldoorn 13 97 20 15 32 24 6 0
Haarlem 14 141 31 32 35 33 10 0
Arnhem 12 126 32 34 24 29 7 0
Amersfoort 12 119 15 15 33 29 18 9
Zaanstad 13 104 27 25 21 18 13 0
Note: the municipalities are listed according to their population size, Utrecht being the largest and Zaanstad being the 
smallest in the sample.
When it comes to individual air quality measures, a high variation between municipalities can 
be observed regarding both different aspects of implementation performance (see Table 3.2), 
and different categories of policy measures (see Table 3.1). The ‘addressees’ aspect accounts 
for the largest inter-municipal difference, with Eindhoven scoring 17 and Apeldoorn only 6 
points, implying that the measures taken in Eindhoven apply to a considerably wider group 
of addressees than measures taken in Apeldoorn. When comparing municipalities on the 
six categories of AAQ measures, Nijmegen took a lot of effort to ensure that the public was 
informed on the air quality measures that were taken and the air quality status in the city (21 
points), while Almere did not do anything in this category of measures (0 points). Although, 
as discussed above, municipalities exhibit considerable similarities regarding the categories 
of measures they take, this finding implies that within these categories municipalities may 
opt for tailor-made strategies to combat air pollution. Even though all are compliant, some 
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municipalities took a step further in reducing air pollution than their local peers. In this context, 
it should be remembered that World Health Organisation recommendations for air quality are 
twice as strict as EU limit values. To what extent this municipal activism could be attributed to, 
for instance, more ambitious environmental policy traditions (cf Lee and Koski, 2012; Wood et 
al., 2014), active interest groups (cf Lee and Koski, 2012; Treib, 2014) or policy entrepreneurs (cf 
Kingdon, 2014; Meijerink and Huitema, 2010) will be examined in future research.
Four municipalities with predicted bigger air pollution
Four cities in our sample had to take extra measures, i.e. Utrecht, Eindhoven, Nijmegen and 
Arnhem, as they were expected to face particularly persistent air quality problems. It seems 
logical to assume that they would do more than other municipalities in the sample that were 
not predicted to have a similar problem pressure. However this is not exactly what the data 
show (see Table 3.1). Nijmegen and Eindhoven have indeed higher scores on the measures, 
indicating that they have done more than other cities. However, there are three cities - Tilburg, 
Groningen and Haarlem - which scored higher than Utrecht (141 points) or the same without 
having the same environmental pressure to do so. Groningen, where limit values had never 
been exceeded, was not even a member of the NAQCP, which means that there was neither an 
obligation to take any measures at all nor any financial support from the NAQCP. At the same 
time Arnhem, having a predicted environmental pressure, ranks no higher than fifth from the 
bottom. This is very surprising as a presence of problem pressure is apparently not enough for 
the municipalities to undertake vigorous air quality measures.  Specific local factors must be 
held responsible for this and will be addressed in further research.
Larger versus smaller municipalities
A pattern emerging from this sample that is less surprising is the notion that smaller 
municipalities tend to score lower on both the individual measures and the air quality plan 
as a whole. This suggests a relationship between the capacity of an implementing actor 
and its implementation performance  (Treib, 2014). However this relation does not seem 
to be fully symmetrical as being a bigger municipality does not suffice to score higher on 
the air quality policy implementation performance (see Tables 3.1 and 3.2). There are two 
deviant cases: Haarlem is the fourth-smallest municipality in our sample but has the same 
score as Utrecht (141 points), which is the biggest among our 13 cities. Almere is the fourth-
largest municipality but has the fourth-lowest score in the sample. These cases are in line 
with EU compliance research, suggesting that capacity does not automatically lead to better 
compliance or performance as the willingness to implement also plays a role (Knill and 
Lenschow, 1998; Treib, 2014).
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Table 3.3: Aspects of implementation performance
Municipality
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Utrecht 14 141 12 51 33 14 36 5
Eindhoven 14 151 15 49 30 17 36 4
Tilburg 15 151 16 49 31 15 36 4
Almere 11 123 10 41 31 12 26 3
Groningen 14 143 12 48 30 12 39 2
Breda 14 130 15 43 25 14 29 4
Nijmegen 16 158 12 58 34 12 39 3
Enschede 12 138 12 42 31 11 39 3
Apeldoorn 13 97 8 32 20 6 28 3
Haarlem 14 141 13 46 29 12 38 3
Arnhem 12 126 12 42 25 13 31 3
Amersfoort 12 119 14 39 20 11 32 3
Zaanstad 13 104 10 35 24 8 24 3
Note: the municipalities are listed according to their population size, Utrecht being the largest and Zaanstad being the 
smallest in the sample.
Reflection on the implementation performance framework 
As this paper first employs the framework for assessing implementation performance 
developed by Bondarouk and Mastenbroek (2018), we reflect on its merits. First, with the help 
of this framework, the analysis paints a more diverse picture of implementation reality than a 
dichotomous notion of compliance could have done. According to the latter, all municipalities 
would have been classified as compliant, without doing justice to the empirical diversity 
which is crucial to understanding how member states make EU policies work. 
 Secondly, this framework allows a more precise identification of the best performing 
implementer. If one were to look only at the number and types of measures taken against 
air pollution (i.e., in terms of this paper, total objectives of individual measures), which has 
been the predominant way of studying implementation (Bondarouk and Mastenbroek, 2018), 
Tilburg would be the best performing municipality with a score of 16 on objectives (see Table 
3.2). When considering the entire range of aspects of implementation performance covered 
by the conceptual framework, Nijmegen appears as the best implementer with a total score 
of 158 points, while its objectives score of 12 points remains behind that of Tilburg. Nijmegen 
has put a lot of effort in substantiating the measures, implementing them on a wider scope 
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and being one of the frontrunners to carry out the measures. Nijmegen also scores highest on 
the total air quality policy plan (see Tables 3.1 and 3.2), due to the stricter norms and by being 
one of the five municipalities having their own assessment system to monitor air quality. 
 Third, a dissection of policy implementation into aspects and categories of measures 
allowed establishing where the implementation performance was lacking vis-à-vis other 
municipalities and gave insights into what potential improvements could look like. For 
example, a municipality that has the highest score on total individual air quality measures 
does not necessarily lead in each distinct category of AAQ measures. Nijmegen being the 
best overall scorer only leads in two out of six categories of air quality policy measures (see 
Table 3.1). In this way, the framework assists in isolating weaker links in the implementation 
performance.  
 And finally, this framework allowed moving beyond commitments on paper to 
systematically digging into the implementation practices of municipalities. When comparing 
the scores on the air quality policy plan with the scores on the total individual measures it 
becomes evident that having a well-scoring policy plan does not always predetermine a high 
score on total individual measures (see Table 3.1). Utrecht, Eindhoven, Groningen, Breda and 
Haarlem have equal scores on the plan as a whole, but have very different scores on the 
individual air quality measures. Almere performed poorer than Apeldoorn on the plan as a 
whole, but much better on individual air quality measures. Enschede is yet another example 
where the municipality scored poorly on the policy plan as a whole but rather well on the 
individual measures. This suggests that considerable differences may exist between plans 
on paper and measures carried out in reality. This framework facilitates looking deeper into 
practical implementation and assessing which local implementers really make EU policy work. 
3.6 CONCLUSION
The analysis of municipal implementation of the EU AAQ directive revealed differences 
even within one member state. Although the 13 medium-sized Dutch municipalities in our 
sample were all technically compliant with the directive, they differed on various aspects of 
implementation performance. The focused comparison allowed establishing the overall top 
and bottom scorers of air quality policy implementation. Dissecting air quality policy into 
different categories of measures, however, another top three emerged for each category of 
measures. Such differentiated approach to implementation performance produces hands-on 
recommendations to the municipalities seeking to improve their air quality or to catch up with 
the other municipalities. It becomes relatively easy to demonstrate where the implementation 
performance is poor or even lacking. 
 This study demonstrates that there are different forms of over-compliance: over-
compliance relative to the EU directive and over-compliance relative to its national 
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transposition. In addition, the sample shows that some municipalities take their 
implementation task more seriously than others. The latter should however not be confused 
with over-compliance as in these cases, there were no specific measurable obligations neither 
in the EU directive nor in the national transposition. What is at stake here is essentially a matter 
of filling in the available room for policy discretion. It is highly likely that such notions of over-
compliance and discretion are present in the implementation of other directives as well. This 
may constitute a puzzle for future research.
 Surprisingly, the municipalities scored equally on ‘definitional details’ and ‘prioritisation’ 
at the level of air quality policy plans as a whole. Another remarkable similarity between 
the municipalities is that, despite of high discretion in the implementation, most undertook 
the same categories of policy measures to combat air pollution. This suggests a basically 
similar coping behaviour by local implementers and trans-municipal information exchange. 
Such convergence could be hypothesised to be present in the implementation of other 
procedural policy instruments as well, as faced with uncertainty about the effect of their 
measures implementers could be expected to bundle their efforts and exchange information 
to effectively combat environmental problems, leading to similar solutions on the ground 
(Joergens et al., 2014; Veenman and Liefferink, 2014). Future research should address how 
differences in discretion may affect policy convergence at the ground level.
 At the same time, a more in-depth evaluation shows a lot of differences. Some particularly 
interesting patterns emerged from the data. First, and most puzzling, environmental problem 
pressure did not act as a sufficient trigger for a municipality to take far-reaching air quality 
measures. Further research could help to understand the conditions for this phenomenon. 
Second, smaller municipalities tend to have a lower score on implementation performance 
than bigger municipalities. This is less surprising, as other research has also shown that 
resources play an important role in implementation performance (Treib, 2014). At the same 
time, there were two outliers that deserve further investigation. And third, balancing the more 
general finding that the categories of measures taken by municipalities tend to be largely 
similar, more fine-grained differences in implementation performance imply that some 
municipalities took a step further in reducing air pollution than their local peers.
 This research did not aim at establishing a link between scores on the implementation 
performance and actual air quality improvement, thus relating policy output to policy 
outcome (see Knill et al., 2012). Which policy measures work best to improve air quality is an 
entirely different question, which should be analysed differently. It remains a highly pertinent 
question though, especially since research has shown that EU air quality standards are in fact 
too low to adequately protect human health (Brunekreef et al., 2012). This is also reflected in 
the fact that WHO recommendations regarding air quality are twice as strict as the current EU 
standards. Therefore even in Nijmegen, which adopted more ambitious air quality policies 
than comparable cities in the Netherlands, air quality might, after all, be insufficient.
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 This paper was the first to empirically apply the framework to measure implementation 
performance developed by Bondarouk and Mastenbroek (2018). A traditional conceptualisation 
of implementation would have only focused on the objectives aspect of implementation 
performance and would have yielded very different results, e.g. regarding the best performer. 
Instead of branding one implementer as the best performer based merely on the fact that 
it took most measures, the present framework took into account how the measures were 
defined as well as where, to whom and since when they applied. This resulted in a considerably 
more nuanced picture of implementation. Employing the framework also enabled studying 
the policy measures that were actually taken in contrast to those committed only on paper. As 
this paper revealed remarkable differences between policies on paper and policies in action, 
we encourage further research into this topic in order to see to what extent member states 
really make EU policies work. 
 In the particular case of air quality, not all aspects of implementation performance 
turned out to be equally fit for analysis. For two aspects, staff and budget, it proved 
problematic to gather meaningful data. This had to do with the departmental structures of 
municipalities in combination with the strongly cross-sectoral nature of air quality policy. This 
interconnectedness enables municipalities to pool resources from different departments to 
implement more policies with the same budget. How this impacts the goals of each related 
policy needs to be addressed in more detail. 
 This paper has painted a more complex, richer and more nuanced picture of 
implementation of EU environmental directive at the lowest administrative layer of 
government. It has offered a considerable number of puzzles for future research. Further 
research, moreover, is needed to examine how Dutch municipal implementation performance 
compares to local implementation in other EU member states. Air quality has been a very 
salient topic in the Netherlands. Municipalities cooperated on the design of NAQCP from 
the beginning and have received funding from the national government. These factors 
might have contributed to municipal mobilisation on this policy issue. How the interrelation 
between the requirements contained in the AAQ directive, national transposition and local 
implementation impacts the implementation performance regarding air quality would be 
most interesting to see.
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4.
Politics or management? 
Analysing diff erences 
in local implementation performance of 
the EU Ambient Air Quality directive
This chapter is published as:
Bondarouk, E., Lieff erink, D. and Mastenbroek, E. (2019). Politics or management? 
Analysing diff erences in local implementation performance of the EU Ambient Air Quality 
directive. Journal of Public Policy. doi:10.1017/S0143814X19000035
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ABSTRACT 
As far as local governments are responsible for the practical implementation of many European 
Union (EU) policies, they co-determine member states’ EU compliance records and the fate of 
EU legislation. Yet, they do so in remarkably different ways, as exemplified by the variegated 
implementation of the Ambient Air Quality Directive 2008/50/EC by Dutch municipalities. 
Taking guidance from the literature on EU compliance, in this article we explain the differences 
in local implementation performance based on the political and managerial approaches. 
Understanding which of the two approaches drives different local responses to EU policy 
bears consequences for the appropriate remedy for non-implementation. Four municipalities 
were purposefully selected along with the two-by-two implementation performance scoring 
matrix in the realm of air quality. A comparative within-case analysis specifies how political 
explanations outweigh managerial explanations in accounting for variation in implementation 
performance and distils ‘policy saliency’ as the driving causal mechanism. 
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4.1 INTRODUCTION
Local governments are responsible for the practical implementation of many European Union 
(EU) policies. Urban Waste Water Treatment Directive (91/271/EEC), Environmental Noise 
Directive (2002/49/EC) and Ambient Air Quality Directive (2008/50/EC) are just a few examples 
of EU policies affecting local governance. While the European Commission initiates this 
legislation it has little enforcement capacity on its own and has to rely on the member states 
and their constitutive levels of government to ensure that this legislation is put to practice. 
This begs a classic question to what extent the Brussel’s expectations are dashed locally (cf 
Pressman and Wildavsky, 1984). Yet, the EU compliance literature has paid little systematic 
attention to the local implementation of EU policies (Treib, 2014; Versluis, 2007). This lack 
of systematic attention is surprising as analysis of local implementation is instrumental to 
understanding how do member states make EU policies work (Thomann and Sager, 2017). 
 Recent studies on the local implementation of the EU Ambient Air Quality Directive 
2008/50/EC (AAQ) in the Netherlands revealed that there is great variation in policy responses 
at local level (Bondarouk and Liefferink, 2017; but also see a description of German local 
implementation variation - Gollata and Newig, 2017). Besides setting minimum procedural 
obligations, like drawing a management plan, monitoring air pollution and informing the 
public on the state of pollution, the directive leaves it up to the implementers how to go 
about it (Bondarouk and Liefferink, 2017; Gollata and Newig, 2017). While faced with the same 
regulatory pressure, some Dutch municipalities took more extensive measures than others 
(Bondarouk and Liefferink, 2017). Accordingly, a pattern of local pioneers and laggards – 
those who do more and those who do less – emerges (Lee and Koski, 2012; Liefferink et al., 
2009; Liefferink and Wurzel, 2016; Urpelainen, 2009). The local differences in air quality policy 
efforts are even more surprising considering that the Dutch national government reserved 
372 million euros for local air quality measures. All municipalities were invited to stake a claim 
to these subsidies. In light of the same regulatory pressure and available financial resources, 
the question arises – how can these differences in local implementation of EU AAQ policy be 
explained?
 EU compliance research has shown that national differences in compliance at 
transposition level – the level where EU legislation is transposed into national law – can be 
largely explained by domestic politics (Mastenbroek and Kaeding, 2006; Treib, 2014). Whether 
this politicisation of EU policies can also account for differences in local implementation is yet 
to be determined (Treib, 2014). Alternatively, the management approach in EU compliance 
research views implementation as a matter of managerial capacity and the way policy 
implementation is organised (Walker and Andrews, 2013). 
 While both explanatory approaches have merit, it is important to understand which 
of the two approaches drives different local responses to EU policy. If political explanations 
outweigh managerial ones, the remedy for non-implementation is fundamentally different. 
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Where the political approach assumes that strict enforcement mechanisms can remedy non-
implementation, the management approach advocates for capacity-building strategies (see 
Tallberg, 2002). If one sets to improve local implementation of EU directives, we first need to 
understand which of the two approaches drives different local responses to EU policy. Hence, 
in this paper we address the following research question: to what extent can differences in Dutch 
local implementation of EU directive be attributed to politicisation or managerial considerations?
 This study offers an empirical and theoretical contribution to the literature. Empirically, 
by putting local government at the centre of this research we address the empirical gap in 
EU compliance literature (Thomann and Sager, 2017; Treib, 2014). Furthermore, compared to 
Water Framework Directive, AAQ directive has received less scholarly attention (for overview 
see Bondarouk and Mastenbroek, 2018). 
 When it comes to theoretical contribution, by examining whether the explanatory 
variables identified for the variation in national compliance with EU policies also hold in the 
local context we explore the strength of implementation theory (see Saetren, 2014: 86; Winter, 
2012: 265). Additionally, so far both managerial and political explanations have been analysed 
mainly for the timeliness of EU national implementation, i.e. whether EU legislation has been 
translated into national law according to EU deadlines (see for an overview Treib, 2014). 
Alternatively, we focus on the content of policy implementation, i.e. the policy measures that 
local government have taken in light of AAQ directive. Thus we enrich our understanding 
of the explanatory variables by examining them in a different conceptual context. By 
employing theory-driven process tracing over a period of ten years of local implementation 
in several Dutch municipalities, we identify the sequence of explanatory variables. We thus 
illustrate how the variables interact and affect implementation performance.
 In analysing the antecedents of EU implementation performance, this study focuses on 
the local implementation of the EU AAQ Directive in the Netherlands. Bondarouk and Liefferink 
(2017) provide a database of Dutch local AAQ policy output. Following distribution-based 
most diverse case selection on the dependent variable (Rohlfing, 2012), we selected two 
highest and two lowest scoring municipalities from the database developed by Bondarouk 
and Liefferink (2017). The selection on the dependent variable is driven by our interest in 
what explains different outcomes on the dependent variable, in this case implementation 
performance. A selection of only medium-sized municipalities offers a focused comparison, 
as they form a rather homogeneous group with similar air pollution sources, i.e. traffic, making 
them an almost ideal sample for horizontal comparison. These Dutch municipalities enjoyed 
equal access to the national subsidies for AAQ measures and experienced the same amount 
of steering from the national government. 
 The next section sets out our conceptualisation of the dependent variable – 
implementation performance. Afterwards, our expectations are outlined with regard to 
political and management explanations. We address the case selection, operationalisation 
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and analysis techniques in full detail in the following section; give short descriptions of the 
four cases before moving on to findings and conclusions. 
4.2 DELVING INTO POLITICAL AND MANAGEMENT THEORETICAL 
APPROACHES 
Before we delve into the differences between political and management approaches, we 
first need to address the conceptualisation of local implementation performance. Local 
implementation of EU policies refers to the stage where local governments put EU law into 
practice – ‘translate policy into action’ (Barrett, 2004: 251). The way local governments perform 
during local implementation can be understood in terms of policy outputs – i.e. the regulatory 
actions taken in response to law – or in terms of policy outcomes or impact - i.e. the question 
of whether a policy indeed resolved the problem it set out to solve (for literature review see 
Bondarouk and Mastenbroek, 2018: 17; Knill et al., 2012; Tosun, 2012). 
 An evaluation of EU policy impact is extremely challenging, due to the fact that an 
isolation of the EU effect is practically impossible (Bauer and Knill, 2014; Haverland, 2006; Tosun, 
2012). Hence one quickly faces ‘construct validity concerns’ when one tries to causally link EU 
policy with actual local state of environmental pollution (Tosun, 2012: 442-444). Instead, a 
growing number of scholars have suggested focusing on policy outputs in order to assess 
more directly what the implementing actors do to mitigate the policy problem (Bondarouk 
and Mastenbroek, 2018; Knill et al., 2012; Liefferink et al., 2009; Tosun, 2012). As in this paper 
we are interested in the differences between local policies in response to an EU directive, we 
follow Bondarouk and Mastenbroek (2018) and conceptualise implementation performance 
in terms of policy outputs. 
 An assessment of policy outputs presupposes a firm understanding of policy measures: 
the techniques by which authorities attempt to change or maintain the policy status quo 
(Howlett et al., 2009; May, 2003: 225; Schaffrin et al., 2015). These measures are then examined 
on the content i.e. the breadth and differentiation of policy responses (Bauer and Knill, 2014: 33; 
Knill et al., 2012). Hence, we define implementation performance as the comprehensiveness 
of policy outputs undertaken by local implementers in response to EU AAQ policy obligation. 
Thus we are interested in explaining why local policy output in one municipality is more 
elaborate than in another. 
 The political and management approaches to explaining implementation performance 
have two different points of departure: respectively the willingness and the ability to implement 
(for an extensive literature review, see Hill and Hupe, 2014). The political approach stresses the 
importance of political will to implement policies. Politics determine the allocation of values 
and the distribution of benefits and costs (Kingdon, 2014: 145). Therefore, implementation 
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performance is seen to reflect a deliberate choice. National policy makers, in response, can 
remedy low implementation performance by strict and coercive enforcement (Tallberg, 2002). 
 The management approach, by contrast, assumes that implementation is not a matter 
of calculated willingness, but of implementers’ capacity to do so (Tallberg, 2002; Treib, 2014; 
O’Toole and Meier, 2010). Sound management has been argued to make a significant 
difference to policy implementation (see for an overview Meier et al., 2007: 369; O’Toole and 
Meier, 2009: 499). Low implementation performance is then attributed to implementers’ 
ability to implement, rather than their willingness to do so. Based on these assumptions, 
implementation can be improved by investing in capacity building (see Tallberg, 2002). 
 In the remainder of this section we present the political and managerial variables to 
account for variance in implementation performance. However, we do not claim to list 
all potential variables - ‘as has been widely recognised dozens of variables are relevant to 
implementation action’ (O’Toole, 2017: 377). We specifically focus on a few variables, which 
we would like to subject to empirical investigation. For both approaches, the variables were 
selected that have been repeatedly identified in different literature reviews to correlate with 
comprehensive implementation performance. Such focused theory testing is embedded in 
the current ‘third-generation implementation research’ (for an overview see Hupe and Saetren, 
2015; Saetren, 2014). Instead of trying to be as complete as possible in theoretical frameworks, 
the third generation implementation scholars call for ‘testing partial theories and hypotheses’ 
that have been repeatedly identified to correlate with comprehensive implementation in 
order to strengthen implementation theory, which for too long has been of explorative or 
descriptive nature (Winter, 2012: 265; see for literature reviews Bondarouk, 2017; Hupe and 
Saetren, 2015; Saetren, 2014). 
 Next to this multiplicity of explanatory variables, implementation research is also 
characterised by equifinality of explanatory variables (eg Toshkov, 2011; Treib, 2014; Winter, 
2012). For this reason, we expect that several explanatory variables together would form a 
potential explanation for the variance in implementation performance. As the literature 
does not provide guidance on the relationship between the variables, we do not a priori 
hypothesise any relationship between different variables. However, the comparative process 
tracing in the analysis allows distilling the causal mechanism, illustrating how different 
variables are interrelated (see Benett and Checkel, 2014). 
The political approach 
The political approach is disentangled into four specific explanations: policy preferences, 
policy saliency, interest group pressure, and policy entrepreneurship (Kingdon, 2014; Lee and 
Koski, 2012; Saetren, 2014: 100; Versluis, 2007). 
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Policy preferences
At the municipal level, local preferences on the air quality policy, i.e. policy positions, of key 
players are assumed to determine policy formulation and implementation (Kingdon 2014; 
Henstra, 2010; May and Winter, 2009). In the Netherlands, key local players are the local council, 
the college of aldermen and the local policy officers, as they are responsible for implementing 
policies. As they all have different policy purviews they are likely to have diverging preferences 
when it comes to AAQ. For instance, a policy officer responsible for the mobility of public and 
private transit might prioritise the speed of the traffic flow over concerns on air pollution. 
There are many possible differences when it comes to actors’ preferences. We argue that there 
are two types of differences in policy preferences that are important for implementation 
performance on AAQ. 
 First, AAQ policy preferences of the implementing officials tasked with implementation 
of environmental policies, including AAQ, might be more or less ambitious than the goals 
set out in the EU policy. The AAQ directive determines minimum levels of air pollution, but 
member states and local governments are allowed to set stricter norms. For instance, the World 
Health Organisation sets stricter norms than the EU policy (Bondarouk and Liefferink, 2017). 
Local governments are also allowed to set a stricter deadline, for example the desired level 
of pollution should be met earlier than the deadline prescribed in the directive. Alternatively, 
local governments could be less ambitious and not adhere to the deadlines or only do a bare 
minimum to meet the obligation of having an AAQ policy plan in place. The reason for this 
could be that the implementing officers give precedence to other objectives, for instance car 
mobility, than AAQ policy objectives. The difference in policy preferences of implementing 
bodies and the prescribed EU objectives is crucial for explaining non-compliance at national 
level (see for a vast literature overview Treib, 2014; Angelova et al., 2012). Following the same 
logic, the difference between what standards local governments prefer and what EU asks for 
may therefore influence how comprehensive implementation performance will be on the 
ground. 
 Second, implementing officials may hold diverging AAQ preferences among themselves 
(Henstra, 2010; Kingdon, 2014: 81; Lee and Koski, 2012; May and Winter, 2009; Robichau and 
Lynn, 2009; Walker and Andrews, 2013). This means that some implementing officials may be 
in favour of prioritising stricter AAQ policy than the EU calls for, while others may be concerned 
with its impact on other policies, like public and private transit policy, and advocate a more 
lenient AAQ policy. Before implementing any measures, the officials will then have to deliberate 
and reach consensus on what AAQ policy goals and measures are appropriate and acceptable 
to everyone. As this consensus building is likely to be difficult and time-consuming, they will 
be able to agree on fewer measures in the case of stark policy preference differences than 
in the case where differences in AAQ policy preferences are absent or easily overcome (see 
Andrews et al., 2012: 81). Hence, if the differences on AAQ policy preferences between key 
players are too pronounced, implementation performance will suffer as actors will not be able 
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to agree on as many policy measures. Hence policy output will be lower. Where the policy 
preferences are aligned but not ambitious, it is unlikely that implementation performance will 
benefit from it.
 Therefore, we expect that higher implementation performance on AAQ policy is associated 
with more ambitious policy preferences than the EU policy calls for, and these policy preferences 
have to be approximately equally ambitious and shared among the key local players. 
Policy saliency
Although policy saliency is strongly associated with policy preferences, it is ‘conceptually and 
empirically distinct from actors’ policy positions’ (Thomson, 2011: 47). Policy saliency concerns 
the importance actors attach to a particular issue. It is possible that stakeholders attach a high 
level of importance to an issue on which they take a moderate position, and a low level of 
saliency to an issue on which they take an extreme position (Thomson et al., 2012: 613). 
 Given the enormous amount of national policy implementation tasks combined with 
limited resources, local actors pick and choose where to focus their attention (Lipsky, 1980). 
The level of attention and effort paid to implementation will depend on the importance local 
implementers attach to that specific policy (Spendzharova and Versluis, 2013; Thomann 2015; 
Treib, 2014). High relative importance of a policy issue positively impacts local implementers’ 
prioritisation and will be reflected in the implementation performance. However, where 
policy saliency is high but implementers do not support EU policy, policy saliency is unlikely 
to positively impact on the implementation performance.
 Therefore, we expect that higher implementation performance on AAQ policy is associated 
with higher levels of AAQ saliency among local implementers in case these implementers are (at 
least) supportive of EU AAQ policy goals. 
Interest group pressure
Interest groups may target a policy issue and advocate a specific set of measures, thus creating 
an incentive for policy implementers to act (see Binder and Neumayer, 2005; Cheon and 
Urpelainen, 2013; Henstra, 2010; Kingdon, 2014; Spendzharova and Versluis, 2013; Thomson 
et al. 2012; Warntjen, 2012). Several EU compliance studies looking at the national level of EU 
policy implementation, have shown that groups whose members profit from a particular EU 
policy will try to influence policy implementation by means of, for instance, lobbying or public 
shaming (see for an overview Treib, 2014). 
 In the same vein one could argue that local interest groups would try to exert influence 
on the AAQ local policy. At the municipal level such locally organised advocacy represents 
direct ties to local constituencies (Henstra, 2010). Spendzharova and Versluis (2013: 1504) 
show that ‘when an issue receives a lot of political and social attention, there is an extra effort 
to do things right’ and to take policy measures that reflect stakeholders’ preferences. Hence 
local interest groups, such as environmental organisations, health organisations or other 
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civil society organisations, may raise the stakes for local implementers to make an effort in 
implementing AAQ policy, while other interest groups would like to see a less strict AAQ 
policy (Lee and Koski, 2012). 
 The composition of interest group constellation at a local level plays an important role in 
determining how extensive AAQ policy will be. Local interest groups may differ in their position 
on how comprehensive the AAQ policy should be. Cheon and Urpeilanen (2015) point out 
that supporters of ambitious renewable electricity policy plans are decisive in the absence 
of opposition (see also Binder and Neumayer, 2005), but the positive effect diminishes with 
the strength of opposition. Hence if there is a balance of powers between the proponents 
and the opponents, implementation performance is likely to be less comprehensive when 
compared to a situation where supporters of AAQ policy dominate in the city. If opposition to 
AAQ measures is strong it is also likely to negatively impact on the AAQ policy output. In such 
case the AAQ policy would be quite minimal and symbolic in nature. 
 Therefore, we expect that higher implementation performance on AAQ policy is associated 
with environmental, health and civil society organisations who are predominantly supportive of EU 
AAQ policy goals.  
Policy entrepreneurship
The final political variable, policy entrepreneurship, is not bound to individuals within the local 
administration and can be found anywhere (Kingdon, 2014; Meijerink and Huitema, 2010). 
The main characteristic of policy entrepreneurs is their willingness “to invest their resources-
time, energy, reputation, and sometimes money in pushing their proposals or problems, [...] 
prompting important people to pay attention, coupling solutions to problems and coupling 
both problems and solutions to politics” (Kingdon, 2014: 122). Sabatier and Mazmanian (1980: 
553) pointed to the importance of “commitment of supportive implementing officials” in 
affecting policy outputs by going beyond “what could reasonably be expected in using the 
available resources”. These individuals are able to balance advocacy and brokerage strategies 
to achieve their goals and know exactly how to operate the administrative apparatus and 
mobilise group effort (Gabris et al., 2001; Meijerink and Huitema, 2010). Policy entrepreneurs 
are always on the lookout for new policy opportunities, are innovative and risk-taking (see 
Andrews et al., 2012; Meier et al., 2007; Walker et al., 2010). 
 Therefore, we expect that higher implementation performance on AAQ policy is positively 
associated with aldermen and policy officers exhibiting policy entrepreneur characteristics. 
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The management approach
The management approach is detailed in four specific explanations: internal coordination, 
external coordination, policy experience and knowledge, and personnel stability (see for 
overview Saetren, 2014: 100; Walker and Andrews, 2013; Bondarouk, 2017)10. 
Internal coordination 
As policy implementation typically involves various government departments, effective 
coordination between them enhances compliance (Toshkov, 2011; Treib, 2014) and 
implementation performance (see Andrews et al., 2012). Effective coordination enables the 
organisation to shepherd actions, processes and efforts towards one common policy goal 
(Andrews et al., 2012) and create a shared understanding of the policy vision throughout 
the organisation (Jordan and Lenschow, 2000; May and Winter, 2009; Saurugger, 2012; Walker 
and Andrews, 2013). The systematic literature review by Bondarouk (2017) also shows that 
the internal coordination could produce more integrated policy approaches, which would 
benefit comprehensive implementation performance. 
 This common policy vision can be achieved with either formal or informal coordination 
mechanisms. An example of formal mechanisms is project groups in which staff from different 
departments participates. These groups “have rules or operating procedures on how often 
to meet, who prepares meetings, problem solving, and so on” (Schout and Jordan, 2005: 
2010). Alternatively, a shared understanding of the policy direction can be achieved through 
frequent informal communication between departments (Schout and Jordan, 2005). 
 Therefore, we expect that higher implementation performance on AAQ policy is associated 
with frequent formal and/or informal interdepartmental coordination on this policy. 
External coordination 
A single municipality cannot assess all information on a given policy by itself, especially when 
it comes to as complicated a policy as air quality. An infrastructure for external (formal or 
informal) deliberation or networking facilitates high implementation performance (Betsill 
and Bulkeley, 2004; Jänicke, 2005; Walker and Andrews, 2013). Policy implementers may use 
their networks to support and enrich their policy initiatives (Mintrom and Norman, 2009). 
At the same time, by networking or deliberating, policy implementers may strengthen the 
legitimisation of their policy proposals (Meijerink and Huitema, 2010; Rousselin, 2016). 
 Therefore, we expect that higher implementation performance on AAQ policy is associated 
with frequent formal and/or informal coordination with external stakeholders on this policy. 
10   An additional management variable to explain high implementation performance is availability of financial resources (Treib, 
2014; Walker and Andrews, 2013). Yet, Dutch municipalities had equal access to financial funding for the air quality measures 
made available by the Dutch central government. Thus, this explanation was not taken aboard.
 75 
4
EXPLAINING DIFFERENCES
Policy experience and knowledge 
Municipalities’ human resources, i.e. their knowledge and policy experience, are also argued 
to contribute to comprehensive implementation performance (O’Toole and Meier, 2009, 
2010; Walker and Andrews, 2013: 106). Some municipalities may employ better schooled and 
experienced policy officers than others. Policy officers with relevant education and years of 
experience can effectively boost implementation performance (Gabris et al., 2001; O’Toole 
and Meier, 2010; Treib, 2014). 
 Therefore, we expect that higher implementation performance on AAQ policy is associated 
with higher levels of knowledge and policy experience. 
 
Personnel stability
Personnel stability is the final managerial variable alleged to affect implementation performance 
(Walker and Andrews, 2013; Meijerink and Huitema, 2010). High personnel turnover has been 
argued to disrupt established patterns of coordination and cooperation between different 
municipal organisational echelons, which can negatively affect implementation performance 
(Andrews et al., 2012: 80; Henstra, 2010: 244; Meier et al., 2007: 366). Changes in personnel 
can be harmful to implementation performance because of the loss of policy knowledge and 
skills and the costs of training new staff (Walker and Andrews, 2013: 115). 
 Therefore, we expect that higher implementation performance on AAQ policy is associated 
with higher levels of personnel stability. 
4.3 RESEARCH DESIGN 
The AAQ directive is a typical EU environmental directive containing both substantive 
and procedural provisions. It establishes air quality objectives, such as standards for the 
concentrations of specific air pollutants, and calls for the assessment, monitoring, improvement 
and sustainment of air quality through rigorous air quality plans. Agglomerations where air 
quality norms are expected to exceed are required to have a plan of action to improve air 
quality. 
 In the Netherlands, the AAQ directive has been transposed into the Environmental 
Protection Act (EPA), which lays the basis for the National Air Quality Cooperation Programme 
(NAQCP). The limit values are the same as in the EU directive. Although the directive and the 
transposition focus on other pollutants as well, NAQCP identified particulate matter ten and 
nitrogen dioxide, resulting from fossil fuel combustion processes, as the only pollutants being 
exceeded in the Netherlands. In urban outdoor air, the presence of both pollutants is mainly 
due to traffic. The Dutch national government is responsible for taxes on polluting cars and fuel, 
and traffic flows on national highways. The Dutch municipalities are responsible for limiting 
exposure to pollutants at urban level. For example, this can be achieved by setting higher 
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environmental standards for urban public transport vehicles through public procurement, 
rearranging traffic flow management, or encouragement of environment friendly ways of 
transportation (Bondarouk and Liefferink, 2017; Fransen, 2012; Van Oort and Van Oort, 2012; 
Van Rij and Brink, 2013). 
 The Netherlands present an interesting case for investigating whether differences in 
local AAQ policy implementation performance can be attributed to political or management 
explanations. Dutch municipalities form a very homogeneous group. First, almost all Dutch 
municipalities are faced with approximately the same geographical conditions that affect air 
quality (Busch et al., 2012; Busscher et al., 2014). Hence differences in geographical conditions 
among the municipalities cannot explain differences in policy output. Second, we selected 
medium-sized municipalities for the analysis, as they represent a large and homogeneous 
portion of Dutch society, making them an almost ideal sample for horizontal comparison11. 
Unlike bigger municipalities where there are harbors and airports, which tend to have a heavily 
negative effect on air quality, these medium-sized municipalities are also very similar when 
it comes to physical sources of pollution. Regional and urban traffic is the biggest source 
of pollution in these municipalities (Bondarouk and Liefferink, 2017; Fransen, 2012; Van Oort 
and Van Oort, 2012; Van Rij and Brink, 2013). Thus, they all hypothetically could take similar 
measures. Moreover, all municipalities had to take several measures at the same time, as it is 
the combination of different measures taken together that can make a difference (Fransen, 
2012; Van Oort and Van Oort, 2012; Van Rij and Brink, 2013). Taken separately, each measure 
does not contribute that much to the improvement of AAQ. For example, next to discouraging 
the car-use, it makes sense to encourage and facilitate other sorts of transportation at the 
same time. 
 Third, Wood et al. (2014: 534) identified that regulatory pressure from the national 
government can account for differences in local implementation. Having ample discretion 
in deciding on AAQ measures (Bondarouk and Liefferink, 2017), Dutch municipalities have 
experienced equal pressure from the national government. And finally, the medium-sized 
municipalities had very similar municipal budgets and drew comparatively similarly from 
the available national funds. Dutch municipalities had equal access to the national subsidies 
for AAQ measures (Bondarouk and Liefferink, 2017). Hence, differences in implementation 
performance in our sample cannot be attributed to geographical conditions, differential 
national steering or financial resources. 
 Despite eliminating these rival explanations for the differences in implementation 
performance through careful case selection, we needed to control for a strong alternative 
explanation. If municipalities start with different levels of air pollution, i.e. the AAQ pressure, 
then the severity of environmental problem might explain why some municipalities took 
more measures than others (see also Henstra, 2010; Wood et al., 2014; Zahran et al., 2008). We
11  Dutch medium-sized municipalities have between 150 thousand and 340 thousand inhabitants.
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control for this explanation by selecting municipalities from two groups: those that did and 
those that did not have an air pollution problem to start with. In 2008 the national government 
identified several municipalities that, despite national air quality measures, would still exceed 
the EU norms by 2015. Facing more persistent air pollution, these municipalities can be 
expected to take extra local measures next to national measures, compared to municipalities 
without the forecasted AAQ norms exceedance. 
 The measurement of implementation performance was based on the secondary database 
from Bondarouk and Liefferink’s (2017) study on local AAQ implementation performance. 
They provide a ranking of medium-sized municipalities based on their AAQ implementation 
performance along with an extensive codebook, detailing what measures were taken over the 
2005-2015 period. Hence they have mapped which municipalities were more comprehensive 
in their policy output than others. Bondarouk and Liefferink (2017) based their ranking on the 
measures that were actually taken, so not the measures that were only decided upon in the 
management plans but the measures that the local governments ended up implementing. 
They have identified six categories of all AAQ policy measures the local governments took in 
that period (see also Fransen, 2012; Van Oort and Van Oort, 2012; Van Rij and Brink, 2013). The six 
categories of air quality measures are (1) public transport, (2) prevention of cars in the city, (3) 
bicycle policy, (4) stimulating the demand for alternative transportation, (5) information to the 
public, and (6) sensitive destination measures. The measures in these categories were coded 
along five aspects: how comprehensive the measures were defined, the territorial and temporal 
scope of the measures, how broad the target group of AAQ measures was and whether there 
was any form of monitoring envisioned for the policy instruments. A policy measure received 
a higher score per aspect if more descriptions from the long-list of all possible policy practices 
could be ‘ticked’ for the city at stake. To come up with an aggregate score for one of the six 
categories of measures the scores on the individual measures of the same category were added 
up. Appendix C contains the full Bondarouk and Liefferink (2017) codebook. It also describes all 
AAQ measures that the medium-sized municipalities actually took.
 For the selection of municipalities, we employed the most diverse distribution-based 
case selection on the dependent variable method (Rohlfing, 2012) as it allows for explaining 
the variation in implementation performance. The selection on the dependent variable is 
warranted as this research is Y-centered (Gerring, 2001: 137; see also George and Bennett, 
2005: 218; Blatter and Haverland, 2012; Rohlfing, 2008; Rohlfing, 2012). The Y-centered 
research aims to analyse whether variance on the dependent variable can be associated with 
certain independent variables. “The starting point of the analysis is the dependent variable 
and within-case analysis moves backward to determine the relevant independent variables” 
(Rohlfing, 2008: 1505). This is different to X-centered research which tests whether and to 
what extent certain independent variables lead to certain levels of the dependent variable. 
In X-centered research, the independent variable is the starting point for the process tracing 
analysis (Rohlfing, 2008: 1505). 
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 We selected four municipalities from the Bondarouk and Liefferink (2017) database 
based on the scores on the implementation performance. It should be noted that the least-
performing municipalities are still compliant with EU directives, as they have an AAQ plan 
and met AAQ standards. Relative to their best-performing peers though, the least-performing 
municipalities took less extensive measures. The database was first divided into two groups: 
municipalities that did and those that did not have an air pollution problem to start with. 
From each group of municipalities, we selected two highest and two least-performing 
municipality. In this way we aimed to control for the severity of environmental problem that 
could potentially explain why some municipalities took more measures than others. In order 
to safeguard the anonymity that was promised to the respondents, the municipalities are 
labeled as A and B (the best performing municipalities), and C and D (the least performing). A 
and C have a high, B and D a low AAQ pressure.  
 Data on explanatory variables were gathered through document analysis and interviews 
with 37 respondents who were involved in AAQ policy in the period of 2005-2015. Even 
though the directive’s transposition deadline was in 2009, we analysed data in the time 
frame of 2005-2015. This broader time frame allowed for sounder process tracing as we 
could fully capture the AAQ measures, which some municipalities had taken prior to the 
formal transposition. In each municipality we interviewed policy officers from environment, 
traffic and transit departments; aldermen with environment, traffic and transit affairs in their 
portfolios; consultants involved in the implementation process, local environmental groups, 
local Community Health Services (GGDs), local industries or companies affected by local 
air quality policy, and local citizens’ associations. In order to obtain an overall impression of 
local implementation practices and trends, we also conducted interviews with a number 
of national actors: the Ministry of Infrastructure and the Environment, the Association of 
Community Health Services, the National Institute for Public Health and the Environment 
(RIVM), consultancies, and the national Court of Audit. A list of respondents is provided in 
Appendix D. 
 Based on these interviews the explanatory variables were coded as high, medium or 
low. Within the authors’ team, we have thoroughly discussed the data and the coding of the 
explanatory variables. Due to this extensive coordination we did not perform an inter-coder 
reliability test. As this was a comparative case study the coding represents relative values in 
the case studies. As we have gathered data over ten years, we had to comprise the data in 
order to be able to compare it. Table 4.1 presents the operationalisation and coding scheme 
for the explanatory variables12.  
 We used the following steps to analyse the data. First, this methodological design 
rests on the classic principle in logic that as long as the cases are similar in all other relevant 
aspects, differences in dependent variable are explained by differences in independent 
12  Saliency has been operationalised in line with Warntjen’s recommendations (2012:168).
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variables (Denk, 2010). Thus, the codes on the explanatory variables are to co-vary with the 
codes on the dependent variable in order for them to be considered as potential explanations 
for implementation performance. Hence, we first eliminated variables in our cross-case 
comparison that did not co-vary with the dependent variable. As implementation research 
is characterised by equifinality of explanatory variables (eg Toshkov, 2011; Treib, 2014; Winter, 
2012), we expected that several explanatory variables together would form a potential 
explanation for the variance in implementation performance. Therefore, several explanatory 
variables were expected to survive the elimination round.
 Second, we employed process tracing of individual cases to identify the sequence and 
interrelation of the variables that survived the elimination round (see Bennett and Checkel, 
2014). These variables served as theoretical clues to guide the process tracing of within-
case analysis (Bennett and Checkel, 2014: 7). The individual within-case analyses were then 
compared among each other in order to reach sounder conclusions on the causal mechanisms 
and interactions at play. 
 Additionally, following the conventional method of process tracing, we also kept an 
eye on potential alternative explanations that could emerge from the data (see Bennett and 
Checkel, 2014). Party politics is one of the explanations that has been identified to account 
for EU compliance (see for an overview Treib, 2014; Thomson, 2010: 582; Mastenbroek and 
Kaeding, 2006). Even though this explanation is very intuitive, especially if one examines 
political explanations, the literature does not offer consistent findings (see for an overview 
Treib, 2014: 22).  The partisan effect is difficult to operationalise in longitudinal studies and 
depends on a policy sector what effect could be hypothesised (Treib, 2014: 22). Yet, it is almost 
intuitively important to check for this explanation in our data. 
 In the next section we present the case descriptions, based on document analysis and 
interviews, before moving on to the analysis and the elimination rounds of variables. 
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Table 4.1: Operationalisation of explanatory variables
High Medium Low
Po
lic
y 
pr
ef
er
en
ce
s 1. Higher AAQ standards than EU 
standards AND
2. All key players share equally 
ambitious policy positions
1. Higher AAQ standards than 
EU standards OR
2. All key players share equally 
ambitious policy positions
1. AAQ standards are the same 
as EU standards AND
2. Key players do not share 
equally ambitious policy 
positions
In
te
re
st
 g
ro
up
 
pr
es
su
re
Many local interest groups 
systematically pressured 
implementing actors on a 
constant basis in the past 10 
years. If pressure came from 
predominantly supporters of AAQ 
policy it was marked as High+, if 
opponents then High-.
Local AAQ policy opponents 
(marked as Medium-) and/
or proponents (marked 
as Medium+) pressured 
implementing actors on a 
sporadic basis in the past 10 
years.
Only a single local AAQ policy 
opponent (marked as Low-) or 
proponent (marked as Low+) 
pressured implementing actors 
on a sporadic basis in the past 
10 years.
Po
lic
y 
sa
lie
nc
y
Local policy implementers, local environmental groups, consultancies, and municipal health services:
-  indicated that AAQ policy 
enjoyed priority at local 
administration in the past 10 
years.
- indicated that AAQ policy 
enjoyed various degrees of 
priority at local administration in 
the past 10 years.
- did not indicate that AAQ 
policy enjoyed priority at local 
administration in the past 10 
years.
Po
lic
y 
en
tr
ep
re
ne
ur
sh
ip
Policy officers and aldermen 
exhibited the following 
entrepreneurial characteristics: 
Policy officers or aldermen 
exhibited the following 
entrepreneurial characteristics: 
Policy officers and/or aldermen 
exhibited one or two of the 
entrepreneurial characteristics: 
- focused on seeking new policy opportunities,
- were relatively more proactive and risk taking than other municipalities’ policy actors,
- invested their time, energy and reputation to improve policy implementation,
- acted as connecting pins between different stakeholders,
- knew how to operate the administrative apparatus to find resources for policy implementation
(See Andrews et al., 2012: 81; Meier et al., 2007: 362; Meijerink and Huitema, 2010; Walker et al., 2010)
In
te
rn
al
 
co
or
di
na
ti
on
 Coordination was systematic and 
frequent among departments 
in form of project groups, 
committees, or informal channels 
of communication at the level of 
aldermen and policy officers.
Coordination occurred on a 
regular basis between two 
departments at the level of 
aldermen and/or policy officers.
Coordination was very sporadic, 
lasted for only a few years and 
occurred only at the level of 
aldermen or policy officers.
Ex
te
rn
al
 
co
or
di
na
ti
on
 Regular coordination with at least 
six of the following groups: 
Regular coordination with four or 
five of the following groups: 
Regular coordination with 
maximum three of the following 
groups:
~ ministry, regional government, other local governments, local businesses, universities or think-
tanks, environmental groups, health organisations, civil society organisations (See Meier et al., 
2007).
Po
lic
y 
ex
pe
ri
en
ce
  
an
d 
kn
ow
le
dg
e
Policy officers were busy 
with AAQ and integration of 
(environmental) issues within 
other policy domains for more 
than ten years, and had relevant 
educational background.
Policy officers were busy 
with AAQ and integration of 
(environmental) issues within 
other policy domains since 2009, 
and had relevant educational 
background.
Policy officers were busy 
with AAQ and integration of 
(environmental) issues within 
other policy domains only 
since recently, i.e. in the past 3 
years, and had no relevant 
educational background.
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Pe
rs
on
ne
l s
ta
bi
lit
y Policy officers of the first 
responsible department (i.e. 
environment) stayed in the same 
department for more than 10 
years.
Policy officers of the first 
responsible department (i.e. 
environment) were hired since 
2009.
The policy officers of the first 
responsible department (i.e. 
environment) were hired in the 
past 3 years.
4.4 CASE DESCRIPTIONS
Municipality A
This municipality scored high on implementation performance. This means that it took most 
measures, which were also generally more extensive, targeted larger parts of the population, 
had wider territorial scope and the AAQ measures had been in place for a longer time than in 
other municipalities. 
 Air pollution enjoyed high saliency in this municipality for health reasons. A report by the 
Community Health Service identified air pollution as a cause for the high number of cancer 
patients in one of the districts. This report spurred a long institutionalised discussion between 
the municipal administration, local industry representatives and the civil society organisations. 
A platform was established which brought these different stakeholders together twice a year 
to discuss, i.a. health impacts of various municipal infrastructural projects. The heavy industry 
in the city was cooperating with the municipality’s administration and was sympathetic to 
AAQ ambitious local policy13. Together they wanted to ensure that the city has a progressive 
environmental policy with green modes of transportation. In order to reassure the public that 
the municipality was doing all it could to safeguard the health of its citizens, the aldermen and 
policy officers from environment, and traffic and transit departments were highly committed 
to taking as many policy measures as possible to achieve higher air quality than the AAQ 
directive called for. 
 Additionally, many respondents characterised the aldermen and policy officers involved 
in AAQ policy as intrinsically and idealistically driven to improve AAQ. Both groups of actors 
were very knowledgeable on environmental issues. They were known for being open to 
new avenues of improving environment quality, even across municipal borders. They were 
involved in various national and inter-municipal projects. Political and administrative actors 
of the environmental department worked very closely with each other, as well as with the 
traffic and transit department’s political and administrative actors. This close cooperation 
even resulted into the restructuring of these administrative units into a single department. 
13  It is important to bear in mind that the AAQ directive does not target industry emissions. The only pollutant values that were 
still exceeded in the Netherlands are particulate matter ten and nitrogen dioxide in specific urban settings characterised by 
intensive traffic.
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Municipality B
This municipality also scored high on AAQ implementation performance. This means that 
it took a lot of AAQ measures, which were generally more extensive, targeted larger parts 
of population, had wider territorial scope and the measures had been at place already for a 
longer time than in other municipalities. 
 In municipality B, similar to municipality A, AAQ was framed in terms of health. As early 
as 2000, a local pulmonologist raised concerns about the high number of lung patients in 
the municipality. Policy officers from the environmental department picked up the issue and 
invited a consultancy firm to calculate the health benefits of establishing an environmental 
zone. These calculations were crucial to sway over the alderman of environmental issues, 
who hereafter became a fierce proponent of the environmental zone and strongly advocated 
extensive AAQ measures and going beyond existing EU norms.
 This alderman instructed his policy officers to ensure broad public and administrative 
support for the environmental zone, as this would enable adopting more extensive measures. 
If necessary, the alderman declared himself willing to push the issue through the council 
anyway. The environmental department hired a consultancy firm specialised in tackling multi-
faceted issues characterised by a large number of different stakeholders with very diverging 
interests to coordinate the policy internally and externally. This consultancy firm managed 
to create broad support within the municipality apparatus and among local and regional 
partners, and taught the environmental policy officers how to maintain this support. Local 
interest groups were not visible in these discussions, with the exception of representatives 
of city centre shop owners, that were hampered by the environmental zone arrangements. 
Yet, the municipality managed to cooperate with them and ensure that they also supported 
ambitious AAQ policy. The local city centre shop owners were facilitated in their management 
of goods supply. In this way the traffic within the city was minimised. The key to getting 
everyone on board (including city centre shop owners) was to focus on the benefits for the 
citizens’ well-being. In addition to this consultancy firm, a special policy officer responsible for 
the integration of municipal policies boosted close interdepartmental cooperation further. 
 Many respondents credited the environmental policy officers for their knowledge, their 
drive and their passion, viewing this as a cause for the municipality’s high implementation 
performance. Municipality B was selected by the national government as an example of how 
to organise an environmental zone, and environmental policy officers were asked to present 
their experience at different national meetings. 
Municipality C
This municipality scored low on implementation performance. It took fewer AAQ measures, 
which were also less extensive in terms of target group and territorial scope. The measures 
were also taken rather late, as compared to municipalities A and B. 
 83 
4
EXPLAINING DIFFERENCES
Unlike in municipalities A and B, AAQ was seen as a transit issue and not so much related 
to health. Currently, though, policy officers try to link air quality to sustainability and energy 
issues to make it more palatable to politicians. Over the years, local environmental policy 
officers did their best to push through more ambitious AAQ objectives. In contrast to the 
policy officers, the alderman first dealing with the issue was merely motivated to reach the EU 
norms by 2015. In 2010 a more committed and entrepreneurial alderman was installed. She 
was even nominated for the Greenest Politician award of the year. Although this alderman 
was just as committed to AAQ policy as her environmental policy officers, together they were 
not able to persuade the council to adopt more ambitious AAQ measures. The council simply 
did not see the need or urgency of going beyond EU norms or taking a lot of measures. Only 
by 2014 they managed to install an environmental zone. When it comes to interest group’s 
pressure, the local Cyclists’ Union and a local environmental group sporadically pushed 
for more extensive policy measures over the years. The representatives of city centre shop 
owners, which were negatively affected by the changes in traffic circulation, did not manage 
to voice their concerns in the council about the change in customers’ access to their shops. 
 The policy officers were very knowledgeable and experienced in air pollution 
prevention. They cooperated on a regular basis with the Community Health Service and 
were well connected nationally and internationally, participating in different associations and 
networks. The traffic and transit department cooperated informally with the environmental 
department. Over the years, the cooperation intensified and ebbed. When the alderman had 
both environment and transit in his dossier, the administrative units worked together more 
closely. 
Municipality D
This municipality also scored low on implementation performance. It also took fewer AAQ 
measures, which were less extensive, targeting not as a large group of population or a territorial 
scope. The measures were also taken rather late as compared to municipalities A and B. 
 AAQ did not enjoy full political or administrative attention, as financial mismanagement 
and internal reorganisations dominated the agenda. The policy officer and alderman merely 
aimed to reach the EU norms. Just like in municipality C, AAQ was associated with transit rather 
than health. Only recently a local civil society organisation actively raised health concerns 
starting to lobby for stricter standards and more policy measures. So far this has been the only 
interest group concerned about AAQ in municipality D. There was no interest group opposing 
the AAQ measures. 
 The city council demanded an ex-ante evaluation of the effect on AAQ of all measures 
that were considered for adoption. This process stalled the actual adoption of measures. As 
different respondents claimed, the need to justify all AAQ measures with calculations could 
be seen as a pretext not to take any measures at all, as calculations are time-consuming and 
often do not generate conclusive recommendations. This ‘policy hesitance’ laid bare the lack 
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of a policy entrepreneur who would have taken the risk of breaking the deadlock and rejecting 
the demands for further calculations on basis of a too tardy process, enough data available 
and the inconclusiveness of these calculations.
 In contrast to the other three municipalities, the internal coordination was very sporadic 
and only occurred when specific infrastructure projects called for cooperation between the 
departments. There was virtually no coordination on the political level. External coordination 
was limited as well, compared to the other three municipalities. The policy officers were 
knowledgeable and experienced in air pollution prevention.
4.5 ANALYSIS
This section presents the patterns, similarities and differences among the municipalities. 
Table 4.2 schematically presents the findings for all four municipalities. We first eliminate the 
explanatory variables that do not co-vary with the dependent variable. Table 4.2 assists in 
this first cross-case analysis. We then proceed with the comparative within-case analysis to 
go into more depth, to identify the interaction of variables and to isolate causal mechanisms. 
Following the conventional method of process tracing, we also reflect on potential alternative 
explanations (see Bennett and Checkel, 2014). 
 Table 4.2 shows that the political variables co-vary with the dependent variable of 
implementation performance more strongly than the management variables. Contrary to 
scores on the political variables, all municipalities scored very similarly on external coordination, 
policy knowledge and experience, and personnel stability. This lack of variation means that these 
management variables cannot explain the differences in implementation performance. Yet, 
it is important to note that as all municipalities formally complied with an obligation to have 
a plan, these variables may account for the fact that these municipalities complied with this 
procedural provision in the first place. Though interesting in itself, this finding is nevertheless 
of secondary importance in this study as we are interested in differences in implementation 
performance.
 Zooming in on the political variables in Table 4.2, two observations stand out. First, 
Table 4.2 shows that interest group pressure does not co-vary with the high scores on the 
implementation performance. Thus, it does not constitute a necessary condition for high 
implementation performance. Interestingly though the scores on interest group pressure 
seem to correlate with the level of AAQ pressure. This suggests that interest group pressure 
intensifies with the level of environmental problem pressure. What the empirics also 
showed is that there was almost no opposition from interest groups against AAQ measures. 
In municipality B, there was one interest group of city-centre shop owners that voiced its 
concerns about the reachability of their shops if the municipality were to ban vehicles from
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Table 4.2: Schematic representation of the findings in four municipalities
A B C D
Dependent variable
AAQ implementation performance High High Low Low
Control variable
AAQ pressure High Low High Low
Political approach
Policy preferences High High Medium Low 
Policy saliency High High Low Low 
Interest group pressure+/- High+ Low- Medium+ Low+ 
Policy entrepreneurship High High Medium Low 
Management approach
Internal coordination High High Medium Low
External coordination High High High Medium
Policy experience and knowledge High High High High
Personnel stability High High High High
Note: “+” signifies pro-strict AAQ measures interest group pressure, “-” signifies anti-strict AAQ measures interest group pressure. 
the city centre with the new environmental zone (Respondents: 17-19, 21). Yet, very quickly the 
policy officers managed to convince them that this would not be a problem (Respondents: 17-
19, 21). Hence the city-centre shop owners were swayed over to support the environmental 
zone. In other cities, there was no opposition of any significance at all. While more research is 
required to explain this phenomenon, a possible explanation emerged from the interviews. 
The car and transport industry that is affected by traffic-reducing AAQ measures operates in 
the Netherlands on a national level (Respondents: 1 and 4). Hence, they would try to represent 
their interest on a national rather than a local level. 
 A second observation based on Table 4.2 is that policy saliency seems to co-vary perfectly 
with the dependent variable. The difference in saliency can be linked to the type of framing of 
AAQ. In municipalities A and B, AAQ policy was framed as a health issue (Respondents: 5, 11, 
13-23), while C and D framed it as a transit issue (Respondents: 24-26, 32, 33, 35, 37). This could 
explain the high saliency of AAQ policy in A and B, as generally health issues are considered to 
be more urgent in local politics than transit issues. 
 In addition to policy saliency, policy preferences and policy entrepreneurship co-vary to 
some extent with implementation performance (Table 4.2). Comparative process tracing 
suggests that high saliency alone is not enough to result into high implementation 
performance. In case B the AAQ issue was salient to the policy officers, but in the beginning 
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of the process political actors were not yet as ambitious as policy officers (Respondents: 
5, 17-19, 22, 23). Highly entrepreneurial and committed policy officers were crucial in 
convincing the political actors of the necessity of extensive measures (Respondents: 5, 17-19, 
21-24). Case C illustrates that low saliency (Respondents: 24, 27, 29, 30) provided room for 
differences in policy preferences among political actors (Respondents: 24, 27, 30). As AAQ 
was not considered urgent by the city council, the ambitious preferences of entrepreneurial 
policy officers were not sufficient to convince the alderman first dealing with the issue and 
the city council, of the necessity of extensive AAQ policy (Respondents: 24-28, 30, 31). Only 
in 2010 with the new alderman, who was more entrepreneurial and committed to the AAQ 
policy, were the policy officers able to successfully advocate for more extensive measures. 
However, still the city council did not favour extensive measures, and thus municipality C 
could take fewer measures than municipalities A and B.  In Case A, AAQ enjoyed high saliency 
among policy officers and political actors. The ambitious policy preferences were necessary 
to signal their commitment to the far-reaching AAQ policy to the public (Respondents: 5-16). 
As political and administrative actors were highly entrepreneurial, this exacerbated their 
policy efforts (Respondents: 5-16). In case D, finally, there was no policy saliency to begin with 
(Respondents: 32-36). This coincided with less entrepreneurial policy officers and political 
actors (Respondents: 32-35, 37). The city council was highly critical of policy ambitions of the 
alderman and the policy officers, requesting detailed cost-benefit calculations of all AAQ policy 
measures (Respondents: 32-35). This resulted in a protracted process of approving budgets for 
the policy (Respondents: 5, 32, 33, 35). In sum, policy saliency, preferences and entrepreneurial 
activity of political actors and policy officers, if ambitiously aligned, can reinforce each other, 
resulting in higher implementation performance. 
 Next to these differences on political variables, there is one notable difference in how 
internal coordination, i.e. the management variable, was organised in the best and the least 
performing municipalities (Table 4.2). Municipalities A and B exhibited extensive coordination 
within the administration and with the political apparatus. Especially municipality B put a lot 
of effort into establishing effective forms of internal policy coordination (Respondents: 17-
22). Even so, this explanatory factor seems to co-vary less consistently with implementation 
performance than the policy saliency variable (see Table 4.2). Whereas it clearly facilitated 
the communication and exchange of ideas between the administrative stakeholders, 
which enabled more measures to be taken (Respondents: 16-22, 24, 25, 27, 35), it does not 
seem to be a sufficient condition on its own and needs to coincide with other explanatory 
variables like policy saliency, preferences and entrepreneurship to be able to positively impact 
implementation performance. 
 Finally, concerning potential alternative explanations, our empirical data over 10 years 
gives rise to an interesting observation regarding the impact of political party affiliation of 
aldermen and electoral change (Table 4.3). Electoral change seemed to matter in municipality 
C (Respondents: 24, 26, 27). A more committed, entrepreneurial alderman from the liberal 
 87 
4
EXPLAINING DIFFERENCES
party replaced a less committed one from the Christian-democrat party (Respondents: 24, 
26, 27). Even though, the Dutch liberal party is known for favouring car-friendly policies, 
this liberal alderman was in favour of far reaching traffic-limiting measures. Thus, more AAQ 
measures could be taken. 
Table 4.3: Alternative explanations
A B C D
Dependent variable
AAQ implementation performance High High Low Low
Control variable
AAQ pressure High Low High Low
Political party affiliation of alderman
First period Left green* Local party*
Christian- 
democrats
Left green 
Second period Left green* Labour* Liberal*
Liberal 
democrats
Note: * = ambitious AAQ policy preferences
At the same time, a change of aldermen did not seem to make a difference for the 
implementation performance in municipality B, where a labour alderman succeeded a local 
party alderman (Respondents: 17, 18, 20, 21). Here one could not expect a labour alderman to 
continue with an ambitious green policy of local party predecessor. Nevertheless, both were 
equally ambitious. Neither was implementation performance affected by an electoral change 
in municipality D. Here, a liberal-democrat alderman took over from a left green alderman 
(Respondents: 35, 36, 37). One could have expected that liberal democrat would have to deal 
with green legacy of his predecessor, but the policy preferences of both aldermen were similar 
and equally unambitious. Municipality A had the same left green alderman during the entire 
period of investigation. Thus, political party affiliation of aldermen and change of aldermen on 
its own cannot explain the differences in implementation performance in our sample. 
4.6 CONCLUSION 
We examined to what extent differences in local implementation performance can be 
attributed to the political and managerial variables derived from EU compliance and 
implementation research. Our analysis shows that differences in local implementation 
performance are better explained by the political approach than by the management 
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approach. Hence the national politicisation of EU policies continues at local level as well. This 
finding illustrates the necessity to look beyond national level to see how EU plays out on 
the ground. As EU often sets minimum targets or employs procedural policy instruments, 
we need to examine why some implementers do more than others to understand how do 
member states make EU policies work.  
 By conducting a theory-driven comparative within-case analysis, we complemented 
earlier research on policy saliency showing how saliency may interact with other variables. 
High policy saliency emerged as the driving force, which in combination with ambitious policy 
preferences and entrepreneurship of both policy officers and political actors determined high 
implementation performance. In addition to this, frequent internal coordination contributed 
to high implementation performance, by enabling and strengthening the preference 
alignment of policy officers and political actors. 
 While political variables explain the differences between municipalities in the Netherlands, 
the management variables might be conducive to another outcome. All municipalities 
comply with the procedural obligation to have an AAQ management plan in the first place. 
Hence while similar scores on management variables cannot explain the differences between 
municipalities, they could explain the same outcome on compliance. Thus, politicisation 
explains the differences in implementation performance, but management variables could 
explain the compliance record in our cases. Whether the latter is indeed the case, should be 
subjected to rigorous comparative research. 
 When it comes to the representativeness of our findings, we may reasonably expect 
that differences in environmental policy implementation performance in medium-sized 
municipalities of (at least) North-western EU member states will exhibit the same causal 
mechanism. These member states are characterised by relatively similar environmental 
awareness and economic development. At the same time, we expect that the observed 
causal mechanism, driven by policy saliency, will also be at play during implementation of 
other policies. However, whether this is the case should be examined in future research.
 This analysis identified two peculiarities, which call for further research on EU 
implementation. First, the framing of environmental issues as health issues was found to 
have played an important role in the implementation of the AAQ directive as it resulted into 
higher policy saliency when compared to cases where AAQ was framed as a transit issue. How 
the framing dynamic exactly impacts saliency and in turn policy implementation should be 
examined in more depth. Second, despite the observed politicisation of EU implementation 
at the local level, our analysis sketched a limited effect of local council elections on the 
implementation performance. Aldermen behaved differently from what one may have 
expected relying on their political party affiliation. More in-depth research is needed to 
understand how local political parties’ interests affect EU implementation.  
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5.
Making EU policies work 
at the local government level: 
a systematic literature review 
and research agenda
This chapter is under review in an international peer reviewed journal.
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ABSTRACT
EU compliance scholars have persistently called for looking beyond transposition, as ‘the law 
in books’ does not typically have to match ‘the law in practice’. At the same time, a separate 
stream of research on EU local implementation has produced a vast body of knowledge on 
EU practical implementation. These EU local implementation studies are scattered across 
many different policy-specific journals, and are characterised by descriptive research designs, 
making it difficult to draw theoretical lessons from each individual study. Surprisingly, these 
two streams of literature do not interact. As a result, knowledge accumulation is restricted. 
This article takes stock of EU local implementation research by conducting a systematic 
literature review of the field. A thorough analysis of 85 studies reveals evidence on local non-
compliance with EU policies, national and policy patterns of non-compliance, and provides 
a synthesis of explanations for policy implementation. Following, a seven-point research 
agenda is proposed.
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5.1 INTRODUCTION
European Union (EU) governance is characterised by coexistence and interaction of different 
tiers of government: supranational, national, and sub-national (regional and local authorities). 
Taken together, this ‘coexistence’ and ‘interaction’ form the essence of what has been called 
‘multilevel governance’ (Hooghe and Marks, 2001; Panara and Vairney, 2013). According to 
this idea, the different levels of government work together to overcome challenges the EU 
faces today: refugee crises, social and economic inequalities, and environmental and climate 
change challenges. There are many EU policies that address these different challenges. As 
the EU has little implementation capacity of its own, it relies on the member states and their 
constitutive levels of government to ensure that these policies are put into practice.
 The success of this multi-level endeavor lies in the implementation of EU policies (Hill 
and Hupe, 2014; Thomann 2015). It matters little if the EU has an ambitious policy agenda 
if the bodies charged with its implementation lack the ability or the willingness to do so (cf 
Smith and Larimer, 2009: 157). Therefore, EU compliance research has examined to what 
extent ‘member states make EU policies work’ (Haverland and Romeijn, 2007). It produced 
a fair amount of knowledge on EU directives’ transposition into domestic law (for literature 
reviews see Angelova et al., 2012; Mastenbroek, 2005; Toshkov, 2011; Treib, 2014). However, as 
Thomann and Sager (2017:1255) put it, “while undoubtedly relevant, several insights suggest 
that research on legal compliance gives us an incomplete picture of EU implementation”. 
Reviewing EU compliance research, Treib (2014: 29) argued that ‘we have as yet comparatively 
little evidence on the extent to which there is non-compliance beyond transposition and 
on the factors that are conducive to effective application and enforcement’. If we accept the 
notion that multi-level governance can only effectively tackle any policy challenge as long 
as lower levels of government commit to supranational policy goals (Hill and Hupe 2014; 
Thomann and Sager, 2017), this leaves us with unsatisfactory knowledge about to what extent 
‘member states make EU policies work’ (Haverland and Romeijn, 2007).
 Local governments hold a unique position in the EU’s multi-level implementation 
structure. While tasked with EU policy implementation, local governments have limited 
opportunities to directly shape EU policies in Brussels (Goldsmith, 2005: 240; Ladrech, 
2010; Panara, 2015; Van Bever et al., 2011:19). Consequently, they find themselves subject 
to directions from a somewhat remote level of government (Goldsmith, 2005: 240), while 
being held democratically accountable to local constituencies, whose local preferences do 
not always align with EU objectives (Bondarouk et al., 2019). Additionally, in contrast to policy 
specific implementing agencies (eg Versluis, 2007; Versluis and Tarr, 2013), local governments 
have to coherently implement a great variety of policies at the same time. In a recent public 
consultation organised by the EU Commission (2015), subnational governments indicated that 
while EU objectives on paper are often complementary, in practice many EU level initiatives 
are mutually incompatible and fragmented. As there is no EU guidance on how to deal with 
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these policy incompatibilities, local governments are presented with a challenge. They have 
to decide which policies take precedence while keeping an eye on possible infringement 
proceedings if one of the policies is not implemented correctly. 
 Despite local governments’  importance for EU compliance, the practical implementation 
stage where local bodies and other agencies carry out the transposed EU directives has not 
received much systematic academic attention (Angelova et al., 2012; Thomann and Sager, 
2017; Treib, 2014). Recent literature reviews of EU compliance research (Angelova et al., 
2012; Treib, 2014) identified only a few studies dealing with practical implementation. These 
few studies found that ‘the law in books’ does not necessarily match ‘the law in practice’ 
(Dimitrova and Steunenberg, 2013; Falkner and Treib, 2008; Versluis 2007; Versluis and Tarr, 
2013). Accordingly, EU compliance scholars have persistently called for more research into the 
practical implementation of EU legislation (see Thomann and Sager, 2017; Treib, 2014).
 Surprisingly, this call contrasts sharply with the existence of an abundance of policy-
specific studies describing the practices of implementing EU policies at the local level (cf 
Bondarouk and Mastenbroek, 2018; Dossi, 2012; Loefgren, 2015). These local studies have 
not reached the EU compliance scholarly community (Loefgren, 2015: 159), mostly because 
they are scattered across various policy-specific journals (Treib, 2014). Furthermore, most 
of these studies are descriptive and idiosyncratic, which precludes the development of 
a comprehensive understanding of how local actors make EU policies work (Dossi, 2012; 
Treib, 2014: 19)14. Hence, despite the overwhelming amount of research into the local 
implementation of EU directives, there seems to be little knowledge accumulation, which is 
necessary for advancing the research field (Dossi, 2012; Loefgren, 2015). 
 Therefore, in order to contribute to our understanding of how EU multi-level 
implementation structures work, this article offers a synthesis of the existing but scattered 
knowledge on EU local implementation, following the guidelines for systematic literature 
reviews (e.g. Booth et al., 2012, Denyer and Tranfield, 2006; Petticrew and Roberts, 2006). This 
article reviews 85 empirical studies on EU local implementation. In doing so, the objective of 
this article is three-fold. First of all, it takes stock of academic knowledge on five descriptive 
aspects of EU local implementation: the extent of local (non-)compliance with EU policies (1), 
the research methods employed (2), the member states covered (3), the policy fields (4) and 
the policy obligations (5) examined in EU local implementation research. Second, this article 
analyses how the explanations for EU local implementation, presented in these studies, relate 
to the explanations put forward in the few studies on practical implementation known to EU 
compliance researchers so far (Angelova et al., 2012; Treib, 2014). This theoretical juxtaposition 
of two streams of literature enables further knowledge accumulation. On this basis, thirdly, 
this article proposes a seven-point research agenda for EU local implementation research. 
14  The same criticism is also applicable to general implementation research (Hill and Hupe, 2014: 202; Hupe, 2014: 167; O’Toole, 
2017: 377; Saetren, 2005; Smith and Larimer, 2009: 16).
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 The next section first surveys the key six explanations for practical implementation of EU 
directives that have been identified in existing literature reviews of EU compliance research 
(Angelova et al., 2012; Treib, 2014). These explanations form the theoretical starting point for 
analysing EU local implementation studies. Next, the method and scope of this systematic 
literature review is discussed. The next section presents the descriptive and theoretical results 
of the review. The final section concludes on the state of the art and proposes a research 
agenda on EU local implementation.
5.2 THEORETICAL GUIDANCE FROM EU COMPLIANCE RESEARCH
In order to bridge EU local implementation research and EU compliance research, this section 
presents the key explanations for practical implementation of EU policies presented in the 
literature reviews on EU compliance (Angelova et al., 2012; Treib, 2014). While acknowledging 
the potential relevance of national implementation research, this article turns to EU compliance 
research for theoretical guidance for two reasons. 
 First of all, comparing to what extent the same explanations have been considered and 
whether other explanations for EU implementation have emerged in EU local implementation 
research, allows us to examine how these two related fields of research build on each other. 
Hence, it facilitates knowledge accumulation on EU practical implementation. And second, 
while EU implementation is comparable to national implementation processes, it suffers 
from ‘additional layers of complexity’ (Dörrenbächer, 2018; Sampson Thierry, 2019: 24-25; 
Treib, 2014:29). Sampson Thierry (2019: 24-25) argues that the practical implementation of EU 
policies entails a larger challenge to implementing actors. EU policies are defined at distant 
EU level and ‘may not enjoy political support in the Member State nor have they been subject 
to similar political debate in national parliament’ (Sampson Thierry, 2019: 24). Hence, local 
actors are less likely to exhibit political ownership of EU policies compared to national policies. 
Therefore, EU implementation is argued to pose more challenges for the local implementers 
compared to national policy implementation. 
 In his review on EU compliance research, Treib (2014) mentioned only a few studies on EU 
practical implementation and listed six explanatory variables for EU compliance at the practical 
level. Angelova et al. (2012) considered eleven studies on EU practical implementation in their 
meta-analysis of EU compliance studies. While none of the identified studies dealt with local 
government implementation, these findings on the practical implementation of EU policies 
seem relevant for local government implementation.
 First of all, both reviews mentioned the importance of administrative capacity and 
monitoring for effective implementation of EU policies (Treib, 2014: 30; Angelova et al., 2012: 
1276). Administrative capacity is then defined in terms of sufficient resources or expertise 
on the part of the implementers. The shortcomings in these parameters have been shown 
96                                   
CHAPTER 5
to explain the extent of implementation. This explanation corresponds with key insights 
from top-down implementation research (e.g. Pressman and Wildavsky, 1984; Bardach 1977; 
Sabatier and Mazmanian 1980). 
 Third explanation, coordination between implementers seems to positively affect the 
ease with which EU legislation is implemented on the ground (Treib, 2014: 30; Angelova 
et al., 2012: 1276). Such coordination can be vertical, i.e. between the hierarchical levels of 
government, and horizontal, i.e. between the peer levels of government and stakeholders. This 
‘interorganisational coordination’ explanation is also put forward in national implementation 
research (e.g. O’Toole and Montjoy, 1984; Winter, 2012: 259). Intensive coordination can 
stimulate agreement on basic understandings of the policy, increase commitment and build 
a common interest, which would benefit implementation (Winter, 2012: 260). 
 Fourth, Treib (2014: 30) highlighted research done by Versluis (2003, 2007) on the 
monitoring of compliance with chemical safety rules. She identified the policy or issue 
salience as a crucial indicator for the extent to which an EU policy is implemented. In national 
implementation research Lipsky (1980) argued in a similar way that given the amount of 
implementation tasks combined with limited resources, actors responsible for implementation 
pick and choose where to focus their attention. Hence, they are likely to prioritise some policy 
issues over others. The issues that are more prominent to the actors will be picked up earlier 
(see also Kingdon, 2014). Therefore, the level of effort paid to implementation will depend on 
the importance local implementers attach to an issue. 
 Fifth, the degree of policy and institutional fit between a piece of EU legislation and 
existing domestic practices has been argued to influence the extent of implementation 
(Treib, 2014: 30; Angelova et al., 2012: 1276). This explanation corresponds with Sabatier and 
Mazmanian (1980) argument that policies requiring a vast change of behaviour on the part 
of implementers are harder to implement in practice than policies that only require gradual 
changes of behaviour (see also Van Meter and Van Horn, 1975: 458). 
 Finally, based on the research by Dimitrova and Steunenberg (2013) on the 
implementation of EU rules on movable cultural heritage in Bulgaria, Treib (2014: 30) and 
Angelova et al. (2012: 1274) argued that EU practical implementation depends on the 
preference alignment between key actors in the implementation. Local actors are likely to differ 
in their policy preferences among themselves (Bondarouk et al., 2019). Before implementing 
any measures, these actors will have to deliberate and build consensus on what policy goals 
and measures are acceptable to everyone. As this consensus building is likely to be time-
consuming, they will be able to agree on fewer measures in the case of stark policy preference 
differences than in the case where policy preferences are aligned. This explanation is also in 
line with national implementation research (cf Andrews et al., 2012: 81; May and Winter, 2009; 
Van Meter and Van Horn, 1975: 458-459; Walker and Andrews, 2013; Winter, 2012:259-261). 
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 Our theoretical analysis of EU local implementation studies examines to what extent 
these six explanations have been considered and whether other explanations have been 
suggested. 
5.3 REVIEW METHOD AND SCOPE
A systematic literature review is an explicit and reproducible method for identifying, evaluating, 
and synthesising an existing body of research on a particular topic (Booth et al., 2012). The 
systematic and transparent nature of identifying relevant publications, distilling data from 
eligible studies and synthesising the findings distinguishes systematic literature review from a 
general literature review (Booth et al., 2012; Denyer and Tranfield, 2006; Petticrew and Roberts, 
2006). It also communicates the strength of the available evidence, thereby indicating how 
much confidence policy makers and researchers should have in certain phenomena (Booth et 
al., 2016: 11). For this reason, systematic reviews have increasingly gained popularity for public 
administration research (e.g. De Vries et al., 2016; Tummers et al., 2015).
 In order to identify as many relevant studies as possible, the search terms were selected 
carefully. First of all, a list of synonyms for ‘local government’ was established. We included the 
following synonyms for local government in our search: “local government” OR municipal* OR 
urban OR subnational OR “local level” OR “local policy” OR “urban policy”.  Second, the search 
keywords had to contain an ‘EU’ element in order to distil studies of EU policy implementation. 
Therefore, the keywords “EU” OR “European” were added to the search keywords. Third, next 
to key concepts of “multilevel governance” OR “multi-level governance” OR implementation 
OR compliance, ‘Europeani$ation’15 was added to the list. These considerations resulted in the 
string of keywords that was used to perform a Boolean search. Web of Science (Thomson), 
one of the largest scientific databases for the social research was used to collect data. The 
initial search at Web of Science yielded 1010 documents with these keywords in either the 
title and/or the abstract and/or the keywords of a publication. 
 The relevant studies were further selected in three steps in March 2017. First, the analysis 
was limited to journal articles, because these enjoy peer review and therefore the quality of 
research is safeguarded. Second, the sample was restricted to articles written in English. This 
selection resulted in 934 articles. Third, the articles were excluded if they covered engineering, 
mathematics, chemistry or any other natural science fields. This was done in order to ensure 
that the articles really dealt with the implementation of EU policies at the local government 
level. This selection yielded 562 articles. In the final selection step, the abstracts were read 
closely. Articles were excluded if they focused on regions, or normative discussions which 
15  ‘Europeanisation’ refers to the adaptation of member states to European integration (Bulmer, 2007; Dossi, 2012; Treib, 2014). 
As the implementation of EU legislation usually entails certain policy or institutional adaptations, the studies dealing with 
Europeanisation at local level were considered for the selection as well.
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EU policy objectives and instruments would have been better, or which lobbying strategies 
were used in Brussels. This led to the final identification of relevant 85 articles. To validate this 
sample, it was checked for inclusion of a number of well-cited articles on local governments 
(eg. Blom-Hansen, 2005; Goldsmith, 1993; Marshall, 2005), and whether the articles on local 
government identified in Bondarouk and Mastenbroek’s (2018) literature review on practical 
EU environmental policy implementation were also included. This was indeed the case.
 For the descriptive analysis, as outlined previously, the studies were examined on five 
aspects: (1) the extent of local (non-)compliance with EU policies as evidenced in these 
studies, (2) the research methods employed, (3) the member states covered, (4) the policy 
fields and (5) the policy obligations examined in EU local implementation research. While it 
is common to review literature on the research methods, countries and policy field covered 
in the sample (see Saetren, 2005, 2014), additional attention was paid to evidence of (non-)
compliance with EU policies and policy obligations for the following two reasons. 
 First, Treib (2014: 29) argued that “we have comparatively little evidence on the extent 
to which there is non-compliance beyond transposition”. Hence, the studies were examined 
to what extent there is evidence of non-compliance at EU local implementation, i.e. to 
what extent there is evidence of local governments failing to implement a certain EU policy 
obligation. Second, Bondarouk and Mastenbroek (2018) demonstrated the need to identify 
the specific ‘policy obligations’ studied in EU implementation research. While EU transposition 
research has focused primarily on substantive provisions, research on practical implementation 
of EU environmental policy has also paid attention to procedural provisions (Bondarouk and 
Mastenbroek, 2018). In contrast to substantive obligations, which are used to directly affect 
the production, distribution and consumption of goods and services through norms and 
standards, procedural obligations are designed to indirectly affect the desired policy outcome 
through the manipulation of policy processes (Howlett, 2000, 2011; Howlett et al., 2009). 
Hence, as these are two different policy instruments, the implementation of it is likely to differ 
as well.  Thus, it is important to review our knowledge on EU local implementation on both 
types of obligations. 
 For the theoretical analysis, we examined whether the articles contained any of the six 
explanations suggested earlier: ‘administrative capacity’, ‘monitoring’, ‘coordination between 
implementers’, ‘salience’, ‘policy and institutional fit’, and ‘preferences alignment’. As we do not 
have the confidence that this list is exhaustive, we examined whether any other explanations 
emerged from the literature. 
 In order to analyse the evidence for the theoretical explanations derived in EU local 
implementation research, we proceeded as follows. If diverse studies – in terms of methods, 
country, policy fields and obligations- all point to the same explanations, the stronger 
the evidence that these explanations travel across policy sectors, country contexts and 
methodological techniques (Baumeister and Leary, 1997; Booth et al., 2012; Denyer and 
Tranfield, 2006). These explanations can be deemed more promising in explaining EU local 
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implementation. At the same time, if certain explanations are observed in a limited variety of 
research designs, further examination is warranted (Baumeister and Leary, 1997: 315; Denyer 
and Tranfield, 2006). If several studies failed to support a given hypothesis, then the probability 
is higher that the hypothesis is incorrect (Baumeister and Leary, 1997: 315). 
5.4 DESCRIPTIVE ANALYSIS
Figure 5.1 illustrates the growing interest in EU implementation by local governments. At the 
same the sample also shows that this interest is quite dispersed as 85 studies are published in 
54 different journals. Environmental journals (eg. Environmental Science & Policy, Land Use Policy, 
Environment and Planning C, Journal of Environmental Planning and Management) take the lead, 
having published 67 per cent of all studies. Public administration and political science journals 
(eg. Journal of European Public Policy, European Urban and Regional Studies, Journal of European 
Integration, Journal of Common Market Studies) published only 19 per cent of all studies. This 
relatively low level of publication is remarkable when considering the persistent call for more 
research into practical implementation of EU policies (Treib, 2014; Versluis, 2007). 
 
Evidence of non-compliance
The selected studies documented relatively low levels of local non-compliance. 26 per cent of 
all studies found evidence of non-compliance. Yet, this evidence should be interpreted with 
caution. While EU compliance research seeks to explain compliance versus non-compliance 
(see also Bondarouk and Mastenbroek, 2018; Thomann and Sager, 2017; Zhelyazkova, 2013), 
many of these studies approached implementation from another angle: local variation 
in EU implementation practices. The majority of studies were interested in documenting 
best practices or explaining differences among compliant cases. Examples of the research 
questions are how a certain policy was implemented, how differences in implementation 
approaches could be explained, and how EU policy changed local policies. Consequently, 
the evidence of non-compliance does not necessarily reflect empirical reality, but is affected 
by prominent research questions in the field. More research into local implementation of EU 
policies is therefore required before jumping to conclusions on the level of non-compliance 
at the local level.
 While examining to what extent local governments implement EU policies, none of the 
studies examined the congruence between local implementation and national transposition 
of those policies. Hence, the multi-level character of EU policy implementation is somehow 
lost in these studies. Thus, there is no systematic knowledge on the relationship or interaction 
between national and local EU implementation. 
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Figure 5.1: Number of publications on EU local implementation per year
Member states
Turning to the member states examined in local implementation of EU policies, the sample 
shows 21 diff erent countries. Italy, France, Germany, Greece, Poland, the Netherlands, Spain, 
Sweden and the United Kingdom received the most attention in these studies. The following 
seven countries did not feature in the sample: Croatia, Cyprus, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Malta 
and Slovenia. Nevertheless, the variety of examined countries is greater than in EU compliance 
research (for an overview see Angelova et al., 2012: 1281). Thus, our knowledge of local 
implementation of EU policies seems to cover the variety of member states relatively well. 
 When examining whether some countries exhibited evidence of non-compliance more 
often than others, our sample shows some proof for the ‘worlds of compliance’ argument 
by Falkner and Treib (2008), although their argument was refuted multiple times in the 
last decade (Treib, 2014). They argued that practical implementation of EU directives will 
run smoother in the countries of the ‘world of law observance’ and the ‘world of domestic 
politics’ than in countries of the ‘world of dead letters’ and the ‘world of transposition neglect’. 
Thus, more non-compliance is to be expected in the latter two worlds. Table 5.1 shows how 
many studies examined local governments in countries belonging to diff erent worlds of 
compliance, and the percentage of studies that found non-compliance evidence. The sample 
shows that studies looking at the ‘worlds’ where practical implementation is hypothesised to 
be problematic found indeed more evidence of non-compliance (37 per cent) compared with 
evidence for non-compliance in the ‘worlds’, where practical implementation is hypothesised 
to be smoother (24 per cent). Yet, our systematic review also shows that the notion of non-
compliance at the local level is not exclusively reserved for the countries of the world of  ‘dead 
letters’ and ‘transposition neglect’. 
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Table 5.1: Worlds of compliance in the sample
Worlds of compliance Number of studies   Non-compliance %
World of law observance,
World of domestic politics
33 24 %
World of dead letters,
World of transposition neglect
30 37 %
Countries not in the typology 22 14 %
Total 85 26 %
Table 5.2: Policy fields in the sample
Policy field in the sample Number of studies
Water policy 17
Air quality policy 15
Climate adaptation policy 9
Biodiversity policy 7
Obligations stemming from the funds 6
Energy policy 5
Multiple directives 5
Waste policy 4
Land use policy 4
Urban policy 4
Employment policy 3
Transportation policy 2
Cohesion policy 2
Strategic Environmental Assessment 1
Subsidiarity principle 1
Total 85
Policy fields
The analysis of policy fields examined in EU local implementation research reveals a great 
diversity (see Table 5.2). A lot of attention has been paid to environmental policy (67 per cent). 
This focus on environmental policy is similar to that of EU compliance research (Angelova 
et al., 2012). A potential explanation for this focus relates to the competences that most EU 
municipalities enjoy in the field of environmental policy (CEMR, 2016). At the same time, other 
competences are also quite common among EU local governments. A lot of municipalities 
are tasked with the provision of social security and employment, are responsible for public 
procurement, subsidies and state aids in their jurisdictions (CEMR, 2016; Kaiser, 2005). Yet, 
these fields have received much less attention. 
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Policy obligations
Table 5.3 illustrates which policy obligations have been examined and how many articles evidenced 
non-compliance with these specific obligations. Hence it shows which policy obligations 
are particularly difficult to comply with. Table 5.3 reveals that 73 per cent of the studies paid 
attention to procedural policy obligations. This interest in procedural obligations is noteworthy, 
considering that EU compliance research has paid relatively less attention to them (cf Bondarouk 
and Mastenbroek, 2018). Table 5.3 summarises six types of different procedural obligations in the 
sample. Most attention (60 per cent) was paid to an obligation to develop an action plan, while 
other types of procedural obligations received less attention. While all other procedural obligations 
deserve better scholarly scrutiny, two obligations stand out in particular due to their empirical and 
theoretical relevance: local policy integration and stakeholder participation. 
Table 5.3: Policy obligations in the sample
Policy obligation Number of studies  Non-compliance %
Substantive obligations
Norms and standards 23 44 %
Procedural obligations
List of measures or action plans 37 14 %
Participation of stakeholders 17 24 %
Integration of policies 3 67 %
Organisational adaptation 2 -
Monitoring 2 -
Information provision to the citizens 1 100 %
Total 85 26 %
 First, only three studies analysed how different EU policies are integrated at the local 
level. EU directives often contain clauses with reference to other directives, obliging the 
implementers to coordinate the implementation in accordance with other legislation. For 
example, local governments may wish to provide some assistance to companies, which wish 
to make their business more sustainable. While such assistance will be in line with the EU 
sustainability agenda, local governments also have to ensure compliance with EU state aid and 
public procurement rules. A recent public consultation by the European Commission (2015) 
identified the coherence and integration of EU policies at the local level as one of the most 
pressing challenges of EU implementation. Hence, there is an empirical need to examine policy 
integration in more detail. It will shed light on whether and how the complex intertwined nature 
of EU policies’ design is reflected in local implementation. This knowledge will generate a deeper 
understanding of how multi-sector and multi-level governance works in reality.
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 Second, 14 studies examined the participation of stakeholders at the local level. EU 
legislation often contains this procedural obligation (Knill and Lenschow, 2004; Newig and 
Koontz, 2014), the main aim of which is to increase the legitimacy of EU policies and ultimately 
EU compliance (Loefgren, 2015; Newig and Koontz, 2014; Koutalakis, 2008; Rottman and 
Lenschow, 2008). The sample shows that 29 per cent of studies on stakeholder participation 
demonstrated that local government do not live up to EU obligations to consult stakeholders. 
Considering the vested hope in this policy instrument to remedy EU legitimacy and improve 
EU compliance (Loefgren, 2015; Newig and Koontz, 2014), its regulatory effectiveness still 
needs to be examined in more detail. 
Methods
Table 5.4 illustrates which research methods were employed in EU local implementation 
studies. The sample shows that 72 per cent of all studies employed a qualitative design, 23 
per cent a quantitative design, and 5 per cent a mixed design. Table 5.4 specifies further the 
different methods used. 69 per cent of all studies employed a form of a case study research 
design. 38 per cent of all studies employed a comparative case study design. This is slightly 
surprising as the expectation was that a majority of EU local implementation studies would be 
idiosyncratic, i.e. based on a single case design (Dossi, 2012; Loefgren, 2015). The systematic 
literature review shows that ‘only’ 22 per cent of all studies had such an N=1 character. 
Remarkably, most of the case study research does not explain case selection or external validity, 
instead deriving it from a case’s empirical significance. This impedes the generalisation of the 
findings of such research designs (see also Hill and Hupe, 2014: 202; Hupe, 2014: 167; Saetren, 
2005; Smith and Larimer, 2009: 16). Moreover, it is worrisome with an eye on knowledge 
accumulation and strengthening implementation theory (Saetren, 2014). 
Table 5.4: Research methods in the sample
Research methods Frequency  %
Comparative case studies 38 %
Single case study 22 %
Dataset 18 %
Longitudinal comparative case studies 7 %
Survey 6 %
Mixed 5 %
Longitudinal single case study 2 %
Action research 1 %
Qualitative Comparative Analysis 1 %
Total 85 (100%)
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5.5 THEORETICAL ANALYSIS
This section presents a theoretical analysis of the local implementation studies found. 
Compared to the comprehensive theoretical testing research designs in EU transposition 
studies (Angelova et al. 2012, Mastenbroek, 2005; Toshkov, 2011; Treib, 2014), EU local 
government implementation studies use fewer theory-testing research designs. EU local 
implementation studies typically describe how EU policy was implemented, and then 
elaborate inductively on possible explanations. 
 As shown in Table 5.5, nine different explanations emerge from the systematic literature 
review, six of which have been already proposed in EU practical implementation studies of 
EU compliance research. The explanations differ in the frequency of consideration and the 
availability of evidence. 
 Table 5.5 lists the explanations and denotes the nature of relation between the 
independent variables and the dependent variable, i.e. a specific explanation and the level 
of policy implementation. Additionally, per explanation the table also shows the number of 
different research methods (see Table 5.4 for an overview), the number of different policy 
fields (see Table 5.2 for an overview), the number of different policy obligations (see Table 5.3 
for an overview) and the number of different national contexts that provided evidence for the 
same explanation. The higher the numbers the safer it is to assume that a certain explanation 
has consistently been evidenced in studies employing different research methods, and that 
the explanation holds across member states and policy sectors (Baumeister and Leary, 1997; 
Booth et al., 2012; Denyer and Tranfield, 2006). Table 5.5 presents explanations from most to 
least frequently evidenced in local implementation studies.  
 The remainder of the section presents the explanations according to the extent of support 
they received across different studies. First, three types of explanations that are consistent 
across studies are reviewed: ‘policy and institutional fit’, ‘coordination between implementers’ 
and ‘preference alignment’. Consecutively, we delve into ‘administrative capacity’ explanations 
as these presented some conflicting results across studies. And finally, we provide an overview 
of explanations that have rarely been explored. 
Consistent findings across studies
First, the studies have consistently identified the ‘policy and institutional fit’ between existing 
local and EU requirements to positively affect local implementation (e.g. Kołsut, 2016; Tortola, 
2016; Filčák, 2016; Dörry and Decoville, 2016; Johannessen and Granit, 2015; Pflieger, 2014; 
Annunziata et al., 2014; Manos et al., 2014; Blok, 2012; Andersson et al., 2012; Oliveira and 
Breda-Vazquez, 2011; Grodzinska-Jurczak and Cent, 2011; López-Santana, 2009; Halpern, 
2005). If existing local implementation practices are aligned with EU policy objectives and 
instruments, implementation of EU policy is likely to follow smoothly. This explanation is in 
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line with a few studies on EU practical implementation research (e.g. Börzel, 2003; Knill, 2001; 
Knill and Lenschow, 1998, 2000). 
 The variable ‘coordination between implementers’ also received support across 
very different studies. This explanation is also in line with a few studies on EU practical 
implementation (e.g Hartlapp, 2013; Jensen, 2007). EU local implementation studies specify 
this explanation by distinguishing between ‘vertical coordination’, ‘horizontal coordination’, 
and  ‘sectoral coordination’.  We will briefly consider these arguments. 
 
Table 5.5: Theoretical analysis
Number of different ~
Explanations derived for the 
extent of implementationw
Nature of 
relation
Number 
of studies
(N=85)
~Methods
(N=9)
~Countries
(N=21)
~Policy 
fields
(N=15)
~Policy 
obligations
(N=7)
1. Policy and institutional fit + 17 7 12 10 6
2. Coordination between 
implementers
Horizontal coordination + 18 6 12 11 4
Vertical coordination + 17 5 11 11 4
Sectoral coordination + 14 5 9 7 5
3. Preferences alignment + 13 6 7 9 2
4. Administrative capacity
Financial resources  * 12 6 7 7 4
Expertise + 6 4 5 6 4
Time constraints - 5 4 5 5 3
Size * 4 2 4 4 3
5. Saliency  + 7 3 3 3 3
6. Monitoring + 3 2 3 3 2
7. Framing + 8 5 6 5 2
8.  Leadership/ policy 
entrepreneurship  
+ 3 3 3 3 2
9. Electoral change  + 2 1 2 2 2
Legend: + positive relationship; - negative relationship; * conflicting evidence on the nature of causal relationship; 
Note: w Most studies have listed different explanations at the same time.
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 The studies found consistent evidence that a high degree of ‘vertical coordination’ 
between different levels of government can facilitate implementation (Hurtado, 2017; Gray et 
al., 2017; Dovlén, 2016; Giardullo et al., 2016; Guderjan and Miles, 2016; Baldinelli et al., 2015; 
Root et al., 2015; Pietrzyk-Kaszyńska and Grodzińska-Jurczak, 2015; Flannery, 2015; Shiers et 
al., 2014; Entwistle et al., 2014; Galiana et al., 2013; Minoia et al., 2009; Armstrong and Wells, 
2006; Blom-Hansen, 2005). As local implementers might have different ideas about policy 
implementation than their national principals, vertical coordination between government 
levels becomes important to effectively reach policy objectives (e.g. Artmann, 2016; Pietrzyk-
Kaszyńska and Grodzińska-Jurczak, 2015; Root et al., 2015). This way, the local governments 
feel supported by higher-level government (e.g. Root et al., 2015). Vice versa, an unclear 
division of labour between different levels of government was shown to hamper the local 
implementation of EU policy (e.g. Baldinelli et al., 2015; Galiana et al., 2013; Shiers et al, 2014). 
Additionally, eight studies even listed improving vertical coordination between government 
levels as a recommendation for practitioners wishing to improve EU implementation (e.g. 
Artmann, 2016; Baldinelli et al., 2015; Pietrzyk-Kaszyńska and Grodzińska-Jurczak, 2015; 
Flannery et al., 2015; Shiers et al., 2014; Galiana et al., 2013; Laspidou et al., 2011; Monni and 
Raes, 2008). However, as these recommendations specify, the creation of more bureaucracy 
stemming from coordination should be avoided. Instead the actors should strive for an 
agreement about the policy goals and how to interpret them (Root et al., 2015).
 The studies also found positive effects of ‘horizontal coordination’ or stakeholder 
involvement, on policy implementation (e.g. Dovlén, 2016; Filčák, 2016; Dörry and Decoville, 
2016; Trapani and Minozzi, 2015; Armstrong and Wells, 2006). These studies contribute high 
levels of implementation to early involvement of stakeholders in local policy implementation 
(Filčák, 2016; Hlepas, 2016; Baldinelli et al., 2015; Grodzinska-Jurczak and Cent, 2011). 
Johannessen and Granit (2015) noted that it is important to include not only policy experts 
but also other local stakeholders in order to create broad support among policy addressees 
(Johannessen and Granit, 2015; Manos et al., 2014). Vivash et al. (1998) added that for 
coordination to run smoothly it is important to have one actor responsible for the whole 
coordination and initiation process. Striving for horizontal coordination can be problematic 
and risky, as stepping into someone else’s jurisdiction can create conflicts (Dovlén, 2016) and 
local governments are not always open to stakeholder involvement (Trapani and Minozzi, 
2015). In the border regions, municipalities found it especially challenging to coordinate with 
their peer municipalities on the other side of the border, due to differences in national policy 
traditions (Dörry and Decoville, 2016). Yet, once these municipalities managed to coordinate 
their policies, they acknowledged the added value of this coordination (Dörry and Decoville, 
2016). Twelve studies also recommended investing efforts to improve horizontal coordination 
among stakeholders in order to enhance implementation performance (e.g. Grodzinska-
Jurczak and Cent, 2011; Scheinberg and Mol, 2010; Ledoux et al., 2000). Scheinberg and Mol 
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(2010) even showed that ideational differences among stakeholders can be overcome through 
regular horizontal coordination which would lead to better implementation performance.  
 The last aspect of ‘coordination between implementers’, is ‘sectoral coordination’. It 
specifies coordination to integrate different policy sectors within local government level. 
This coordination ranges from non-existent to an integrated approach. In order to produce 
integrated policy implementation different departments of a local government have to be in 
close contact with each other to recognize opportunities for close cooperation and thus also 
enhance policy efforts (e.g. Trapani and Minozzi, 2015; Gullstrand et al., 2003). When there is 
no integration of sectors, the policy is approached from separate policy sectors angles. The 
studies consistently support the finding that integrated sectoral coordination of local policy 
implementation produces better policy implementation than less integrated approaches (e.g. 
Artmann, 2016; Hartmann and Spit, 2015; Trapani and Minozzi, 2015; Shiers et al., 2014; Galiana 
et al., 2013; Alphandéry and Fortier, 2010). For example, the limited sectoral coordination in 
local governance hampered integrative innovative solutions in urban regeneration strategies 
(Hurtado, 2017), landscape development policies (Dovlén, 2016), flood risk management 
(Johannessen and Granit, 2015), and Natura 2000 (Vikolainen, 2013). There is evidence that 
municipalities that approach sustainability policy or water policy only from an environmental 
policy angle – instead of taking a more holistic approach, manage to take fewer measures 
than municipalities with a more integrated approach (e.g. Vikolainen, 2013; Gullstrand et al., 
2003). Four studies also encouraged practitioners to invest in policy integration at the local 
level (e.g. Ledoux et al., 2000). 
 The last explanation that received consistent support throughout different studies is the 
alignment of ‘preferences’ of key actors in the implementation (Gray et al., 2017; Zimmermann, 
2016; Miranda et al., 2016; Świerczewska-Pietras, 2015; Root et al., 2015; Hartmann and Spit, 
2015; Pflieger, 2014; Dąbrowski, 2012; Vivash et al., 1998). Hartmann and Spit (2015) found 
evidence that policy preference congruence between politicians and administrative staff 
positively affected implementation performance. Similarly, Vikolainen (2013) showed that it 
is important to achieve an alignment of policy preferences among local stakeholders and 
local administration for implementation to be comprehensive. Scheinberg and Mol (2010) 
suggested that through stakeholder involvement, differences in preferences can be overcome. 
Administrative capacity explanations 
The ‘administrative capacity’ explanation did not always receive consistent support across the 
studies. EU local implementation studies specify this explanation by distinguishing between 
‘financial resources’, ‘municipal size’, ‘expertise’ and ‘time constraints’. There is conflicting 
evidence on whether ‘financial resources’ and ‘size of municipality’ have an effect on local 
implementation. While some studies identified financial resources as a necessary condition 
for policy implementation (eg. Root et al., 2015; Benito et al., 2015; Salvalai et al., 2015; Shiers 
et al., 2014; Van der Hoek, 2014; Dąbrowski, 2012; Laspidou et al, 2011; Spaan et al., 2010), 
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other studies demonstrated that financial limitations were overcome by willing implementers 
and were not crucial for policy implementation (Zimmermann, 2016; Miranda et al., 2016; 
Annunziata et al., 2014; Gullstrand et al., 2003). The bigger the size of the municipality in 
terms of population, the more non-compliance was evidenced with local government 
debt obligation (Benito et al., 2015). Yet other studies found no evidence that the size of city 
population impacted implementation performance (Annunziata et al., 2014; Kołsut, 2016; 
Gullstrand et al., 2003). Evidence for a positive association of expertise and time constraints 
explanations with implementation performance was more consistent. A lack of ‘expertise’ and 
know-how lead to problems in local implementation of EU policy (Hurtado, 2017; Shiers et 
al., 2014; Spaan et al., 2010; Gullstrand et al., 2003). Annunziata et al. (2014) demonstrated that 
capacity building through training positively affected policy implementation. A lack of ‘time’ 
to implement a policy was attributed to lower levels of policy implementation (Hurtado, 2017; 
Scheinberg and Mol, 2010; Monni and Raes, 2008; Gullstrand et al., 2003; Halpern, 2005). 
 Considering the evidence for the administrative capacity explanations, the number 
of studies presenting this as an explanation for local implementation and the number of 
different countries and policy sectors this explanation has been observed, there needs to 
be more research into how administrative capacity affects local implementation. It is crucial 
to understand whether this explanation holds at the local level, as it has a direct bearing 
on strategies to improve local implementation (cf Bondarouk et al., 2019; Tallberg, 2002). 
If administrative capacity indeed does not always improve local policy implementation, 
investments in administrative capacity would miss their target. 
Rarely explored explanations
Five explanations have rarely been explored. Two of those were derived from the existing EU 
compliance literature, while three more emerged inductively from the sample. 
 First, seven studies acknowledged the role of ‘saliency’ in local implementation. If 
a EU policy problem was salient at the local level it tended to be implemented more 
comprehensively (Gray et al., 2017; Zimmermann, 2016; Root et al., 2015; Hartmann and 
Spit, 2015; Van der Hoek, 2014; Conte et al., 2012). Salvalai et al. (2015) showed that it was 
a challenge for local administration to make local public and political institutions aware of 
certain EU technocratic issues such as energy performance of buildings and convince them 
of the urgency to take action. We need to understand better how local governments make 
EU policies work under different saliency conditions. For example, what strategies they could 
use to attract attention to the policies to ensure policy implementation. A recent study of air 
quality implementation at local level (Bondarouk et al., 2019) demonstrated that saliency was 
the driving mechanism of comprehensive policy implementation. 
 Second, only three studies examined the role of ‘monitoring’ in local policy 
implementation. There is evidence that a lack of ‘monitoring’ hampered local policy delivery 
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(Filčák, 2016; Shiers et al., 2014; Spaan et al., 2010). These studies advised for strong monitoring 
systems in order ensure policy compliance. Yet, we need more research on this explanation. 
 Additional explanations that emerged in systematic literature review are ‘framing’, 
‘leadership and policy entrepreneurship’ and ‘electoral change’. Yet, only a few studies 
considered these explanations. Thus, more research is necessary to examine these explanations. 
Eight studies attributed differences in implementation at the local level to different ways of 
‘framing’ EU policy at the local level (eg. Dovlén, 2016; Root et al., 2015; Hartmann and Spit, 
2015; Pietrzyk-Kaszyńska and Grodzińska-Jurczak, 2015; Dąbrowski, 2012). Some municipalities 
associated EU policies with opportunities or with bottom-up creation of local policy, while 
others associated it with constraints or top-down EU interference (Barbehön, 2016; Skandrani 
and Prévot, 2015; Alphandéry and Fortier, 2010). In the latter cases, implementation was less 
comprehensive and support for EU policies was lower. The question remains whether and 
how negative framing can be rendered more positive and under which conditions that may 
occur. 
 Finally, very little attention has been paid to the role of political explanations, such as 
‘leadership and policy entrepreneurship’ (Hlepas, 2016; Root et al., 2015; Vivash et al., 1998) 
and ‘electoral change’ (Benito et al., 2015; Fałkowski, 2013) in EU local implementation. This is 
surprising given the fact that local governments are considered to be political arenas were 
political parties strive for re-election.
5.6 CONCLUDING REMARKS AND RESEARCH AGENDA
Local governments play a crucial role in the EU’s multi-level implementation structure. 
While EU compliance research has persistently called for more research into practical 
implementation, a separate stream of research on EU local implementation has produced a 
vast stock of knowledge on the topic. The objective of this article was to take stock of existing 
academic knowledge on EU local complementation, review how these studies relate to EU 
compliance research, and develop a research agenda. A thorough review of 85 studies on 
EU local implementation revealed what topics are addressed and what explanations are 
put forward in the EU local implementation studies. Based on a descriptive and theoretical 
analysis of these studies, we draw seven important conclusions on EU local implementation 
research and propose corresponding recommendations for future research. 
 The descriptive analysis reported in this paper reveals four important recommendations 
for future research. First of all, the majority of studies was interested in documenting best 
practices or explaining differences among compliant cases. The majority of these studies 
focused on best practices in order to draw lessons on how to implement a certain EU policy. In 
doing so, most of local EU implementation studies examined environmental policies. Recent 
research showed that overall non-compliance with EU environmental policies is decreasing 
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over time (Börzel and Buzogány, 2019). Hence, more research is necessary to determine 
whether compliance at the local level is indeed an empirical reality or is it just bound to a 
specific policy field. Local governments are also responsible for the implementation of other 
policies, which might be more problematic to comply with. Notwithstanding the importance 
of environmental policy or learning from best practice cases, such case selection is likely to 
bias our knowledge on multi-level governance effectiveness. 
 Second, we have pointed out that more research is warranted for the examination of 
compliance with two special procedural obligations of EU policies: local policy integration and 
stakeholder participation. With regard to the former, a public consultation by the European 
Commission (2015) identified the integration of EU policies at the local level as one of the 
most pressing challenges of EU implementation. Yet, there are only a few studies examining 
this procedural obligation. With regard to the latter, the EU Commission has put high hopes 
on the use of stakeholder participation in EU legislation as it is hypothesised to increase 
legitimacy of EU policies and thus improve implementation of EU policies. The review shows 
that there is a high percentage of studies documenting local government inability to live up 
to EU obligations to consult stakeholders. Therefore, whether the EU Commission’s hopes are 
justified remains to be seen.  
 Third, none of the studies in the sample examined whether implementation at the 
local level is congruent with national transposition of EU legislation. The common practice 
is to compare local implementation with EU policy, without reflecting on how local 
implementation relates to national transposition. This way, the multi-level character of EU 
policy implementation somehow disappears from these studies. Without the knowledge 
on how different government levels relate to each other, it becomes difficult to fully assess 
the effectiveness of EU multi-level implementation. Therefore, more attention to this aspect 
seems warranted. 
 Fourth, just as EU compliance studies, EU local implementation research has paid 
disproportional attention to environmental policies. As this policy field is distinctively one of 
the most Europeanised ones (Börzel and Buzogány, 2019), it is important to examine other 
policy fields in order to examine the generalisability of these findings to other policy fields. 
Comparing implementation of environmental policy to newer EU policy fields, e.g. social 
policy, migration and asylum policies, or internal market policy, will ultimately strengthen our 
knowledge on the explanatory power of explanations derived in EU local implementation 
research.
 The theoretical analysis reported on in this paper leads to three important 
recommendations for future research. First of all, while individual EU local implementation 
studies are highly descriptive and explorative, several studies have consistently shown a 
number of explanations as the most promising ones. These are policy and institutional fit 
between local and EU policy requirements, coordination between implementers, and 
preference alignment among implementers. Several studies have even recommended 
 111 
5
SYSTEMATIC REVIEW & RESEARCH AGENDA
improving vertical and horizontal coordination as factors that could positively affect local 
implementation It is time to subject these explanations to rigorous explanatory research 
designs. While a quantitative design seems to be too ambitious for the field where data 
collection is quite cumbersome, other research designs could fit the purpose equally well. For 
example, the research field would benefit from a more purposeful case selection for theory 
testing (see Blatter and Haverland, 2012; Rohlfing, 2012). Qualitative comparative analysis 
could also offer ways how to design an explanatory research designs (see Thomann and 
Maggetti, 2017). 
 Second, the theoretical analysis revealed that at least six out of nine explanations 
that emerged in the review are in need of more systematic examination. Studies that have 
considered administrative capacity explanations revealed inconsistent results on their impact 
on local implementation. As we have argued, more understanding of these explanations is 
urgent in light of the direct consequences of how one can remedy poor implementation. If 
we intend to invest in administrative capacity building to improve implementation, we need 
to know when it is effective. 
 Finally, while most attention has been paid to institutional, preference-based and 
capacity explanations, very little attention has been paid to the role of political explanations, 
such as leadership and policy entrepreneurship, electoral change and saliency in EU local 
implementation. This is surprising given the fact that local governments are political 
arenas were political parties pursue re-election. Hence, more research on politics of local 
implementation is recommended.

6.
Conclusion
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6.1 INTRODUCTION 
EU compliance research that has looked at how EU member states implement EU policies 
has been flourishing for years (Angelova et al., 2012; Mastenbroek, 2005; Thomann and Sager, 
2017; Treib, 2014). Yet some puzzles remained unaddressed, as becomes evident by a set of 
national court cases on the implementation of the EU Ambient Air Quality directive, as set 
out in the introduction to this thesis. In particular, the following three puzzles were identified, 
which form the groundwork for this thesis. 
 First, these national court cases revealed the struggle to identify what constitutes 
comprehensive local EU policy implementation. The national courts repeatedly ruled that 
local implementation measures were not comprehensive enough. Yet, what constitutes 
the comprehensiveness of implementation remained ambiguous. The EU directive leaves it 
up to the implementers’ discretion to decide what measures should be included in an AAQ 
management plan (Article 23). EU compliance research has so far provided little guidance on 
how to assess what constitutes compliance with such discretionary clauses (Bondarouk and 
Mastenbroek, 2018; Zhelyazkova, 2013; Zhelyazkova and Torenvlied, 2011).
  Secondly, the national court cases showed that local governments to a large extent 
were responsible for ensuring compliance with EU AAQ directive. While local governments 
emerged as political arenas where EU policies are being shaped on the ground, the scholarly 
community of EU compliance research has paid little attention to these local actors 
(Bondarouk, 2017; Goldsmith, 2005; Ladrech, 2010; Panara, 2015; Van Bever et al, 2011). At the 
same time, EU compliance research acknowledges that the need to look beyond transposition 
of EU directives in order to determine to what extent member states make EU policies work 
(cf Thomann and Sager, 2017; Versluis 2007). Hence, the question arose what do we actually 
know of local policy efforts to make EU policy work? 
 And finally, the court cases revealed great intra-state implementation variety, i.e. different 
practices at the local level. Some local governments managed to comply with the limits, while 
others were taken to court. Those who complied displayed a considerable difference in efforts 
as well. Thus, the question arises how we can understand these puzzling local differences in 
EU policy implementation. 
 These three puzzles resulted into the following research question: How can we explain 
why Dutch municipalities differ in their implementation performance of the EU Ambient Air Quality 
directive? To address this question and the puzzles, four studies were carried out. The first study 
(Chapter 2) analysed how we can conceptualise implementation performance. The second 
study (Chapter 3) mapped the differences in EU AAQ local implementation in 13 Dutch cities 
over 10 years by using the conceptual framework proposed in Chapter 2. The third study 
(Chapter 4) continued the empirical analysis and examined how the differences in local 
implementation can be explained. The final study (Chapter 5) conducted a systematic review 
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of EU local implementation studies to put the findings of the third study in perspective and 
develop a research agenda for EU local implementation. 
 This concluding chapter summarizes and reflects upon the key findings and limitations 
of the four studies. Subsequently, the contribution to EU compliance research is discussed. 
The chapter ends with implications for practice.
6.2 THE FIRST STUDY: CONCEPTUALIZING EU COMPLIANCE
The first study (Chapter 2) dealt with the following sub-question: how can implementation 
performance be conceptualised in order to go beyond the dichotomous understanding of correct 
compliance and to capture variation in policy implementation? Taking guidance from national 
policy implementation, policy analysis, policy design, policy evaluation and policy change 
research, it proposed to define implementation performance as the intensity of policy outputs 
undertaken by implementers in response to EU policy instruments. Given the importance of 
open norms and procedural requirements in EU directives, the concept of implementation 
performance does not only have a vertical focus, i.e. aimed at comparing implementation 
with EU rules, but also a horizontal focus, i.e. aimed at comparing implementation practices 
between various implementing actors within the member states. 
 The proposed concept of implementation performance examines the intensity of policy 
outputs along the three dimensions of substance, scope and effort. The substance dimension, 
relates to the central issue that is to be regulated. The second dimension concerns the scope 
of implementation: where, when and to whom does the policy task apply. The final dimension 
focuses on the effort implementers put into accomplishing a policy’s goals. These dimensions 
are further refined with the help of ten aspects. As practical implementation can differ on 
these aspects, implementation performance can thus be assessed considerably more 
comprehensively than by employing the traditional compliance/non-compliance dichotomy 
and be meaningfully compared among implementers.
 This study also assessed whether the conceptual framework is complete, and whether 
the dimensions are mutually exclusive. It did so by examining how well the conceptual 
framework can subsume empirical findings on the practical implementation of EU 
environmental policies under the dimensions and aspects of the conceptual framework. An 
intercoder reliability test was performed in order to examine whether other scholars would 
subsume the same information under the same dimensions. In this way, the study also aimed 
to assess the usability and reliability of the framework.
 While this examination demonstrated that the conceptual framework was able to 
capture consistently the rich practices of EU practical implementation, it also revealed that 
our knowledge of practical implementation of EU environmental directives is fragmented and 
incomplete. This is despite the claims that environmental policy is one of the most researched 
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policy fields among different EU policies (Angelova et al., 2012; Börzel and Buzogány, 2019; 
Treib, 2014). While the ‘substance’ dimension has received most attention in the literature, 
hardly any attention has been paid to the ‘scope’ and ‘effort’ dimensions. Hence, in order to 
understand to what extent the member states really make EU policies work, the second chapter 
argued that there is a need for a systematic approach to study implementation performance. 
We need a much more granular understanding of where, how and what is lacking in policy 
implementation. This conceptual framework can facilitate such an understanding by offering 
a fully-fledged conceptualisation of implementation performance.
 While embarking on a quest to come up with a framework that can conceptualise 
implementation performance beyond the dichotomous understanding of correct 
compliance and capture variation in policy implementation, this thesis applied the framework 
only to environmental policy. Hence, to what extent this framework is applicable beyond 
environmental policy remains to be seen in future research. At the same time, the framework 
was primarily derived from general literature on national policy implementation, policy 
analysis, policy design, policy evaluation and policy change research. Therefore, it is potentially 
suitable for other policies as well.
6.3 THE SECOND STUDY: EU COMPLIANCE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENTS
The second study (Chapter 3) dealt with the following sub-question: What are the differences 
between Dutch municipalities in the implementation of the key procedural Article 23 of the 
EU Ambient Air Quality directive 2008/50/EC? It applied the earlier constructed conceptual 
framework of implementation performance to the local implementation of EU AAQ plans 
(Article 23 of the AAQ directive) in 13 Dutch medium-sized municipalities. Eighteen interviews 
and 237 policy documents over the period of 2000-2015 informed the analysis. The analysis 
demonstrated that all local governments formally complied with the Article 23 obligation of 
having an AAQ plan. Crucially, the study revealed a more nuanced picture on (over-)compliance 
and local variation in implementation. In addition, this study also demonstrated important 
similarities between local AAQ plans. This section shortly outlines these findings. 
 The second study demonstrated over-compliance relative to the EU directive and over-
compliance relative to its national transposition. First, over-compliance relative to the AAQ 
directive was observed, as 6 municipalities aimed for stricter AAQ standards than required by 
the EU directive and its Dutch transposition. Second, over-compliance relative to the national 
transposition of the directive was observed, as 5 municipalities established their own AAQ 
monitoring and public information system. The national authorities were formally responsible 
for both monitoring and public information. This finding shows that local governments may 
be willing and capable of going beyond the regulatory minimum, indicating that national 
expectations are not always ‘dashed locally’ (Pressman and Wildavsky, 1984). 
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 While there was a lot of variation at local level, the second study also demonstrated 
similarities among local AAQ policy plans. As the procedural obligation of designing an AAQ 
plan allowed for local discretion on which measures to be taken, it introduced an element 
of uncertainty about which measures should be taken and which measures were effective. 
Therefore, local governments sought out best practices and information platforms to reduce 
this uncertainty and ended up taking the same type of measures. This information exchange 
was facilitated by the national air quality coordination strategy. In this case, more discretion did 
not result into more differences but ignited the need to cooperate between different levels of 
government, which effectively contributed to meeting the EU AAQ requirements. However, 
while in the Netherlands this discretion seems to have turned out well, it remains to be seen 
what effect it has in other member states. Hence, the findings of the second study need to be 
complemented by comparative research in order to see whether it has any external validity. 
 The second study also illustrated the value of the conceptual framework proposed in 
the first study (Chapter 2). As traditional conceptualisations of implementation would have 
focused on only one of the dimensions of the framework, i.e. the ‘substance’ dimension (see 
Bondarouk and Mastenbroek, 2018), it would have yielded very different conclusions on 
implementation performance results. For instance, instead of branding an implementer as the 
best performer based merely on the fact that it took most measures, the present framework 
took into account how these measures were defined as well as where, to whom and since 
when they applied. This resulted in a considerably more detailed picture of implementation, 
which enriched our understanding of the extent to which local governments make EU policies 
work. 
 Summing up, this study illustrated how local governments make EU policies work. In 
contrast to top-down implementation research (e.g. Pressman and Wildavsky, 1984; Sabatier 
and Mazmanian 1980), it showed a more optimistic picture of local implementation. However, 
this optimism should be interpreted with caution. First, this research did not aim at establishing 
a link between scores on the implementation performance and actual air quality improvement. 
It hence did not relate policy outputs to policy outcomes (see Knill et al., 2012). Which policy 
measures work best to improve air quality is an entirely different question, which should be 
analysed differently. This remains a highly pertinent question, especially since research has 
shown that EU air quality standards are in fact too low to adequately protect human health 
(Brunekreef et al., 2012). Therefore, even in cities where implementation performance was 
high, air quality might, after all, be insufficient. 
 Second, whether Dutch AAQ local implementation is representative of other member 
states’ implementation is up to further research. The introductory chapter of this thesis started 
with court cases in three different member states, and pointed out that the EU Commission 
has taken at least six member states to court because of their negligence to comply with 
AAQ directive. Hence, the apparent success story of Dutch implementation might not be as 
representative of the rest of the EU as one could have hoped. At the same time, this study does 
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offer valuable suggestions for those member states seeking to improve AAQ. The national air 
quality coordination programme has been credited by many interviewees as a crucial part 
of the implementation success in the Netherlands. Many respondents on the national and 
local level have endorsed this form of collective action by different levels of government as 
the key to getting the AAQ implementation out of its initial deadlock. This finding is also 
backed by the systematic literature review conducted in the final study (Chapter 5), which 
showed evidence from other studies on different member states and policies that EU local 
implementation benefits from coordination between different levels of government. 
6.4 THE THIRD STUDY: EXPLAINING DIFFERENCES IN EU LOCAL 
IMPLEMENTATION PERFORMANCE
The third study (Chapter 4) addressed the following sub-question: To what extent can differences 
in Dutch local implementation of the EU Ambient Air Quality directive 2008/50/EC be attributed to 
political or managerial considerations? It built upon the analysis of AAQ local implementation 
in the second study and zoomed in on four municipalities that formally complied with the 
AAQ directive but scored differently on implementation performance. The four municipalities 
that scored the highest/lowest were selected for an in-depth examination of the conditions 
for comprehensive EU implementation. Data were gathered through document analysis and 
interviews with 37 respondents involved in AAQ implementation in the period of 2005-2015. 
 This study showed that the observed differences in local implementation performance 
were better explained by the political approach than by the management approach. These 
two approaches have two different points of departure. The political approach stresses the 
importance of political will to implement policies. This approach was disentangled into four 
specific explanations: policy preferences, policy saliency, interest group pressure, and policy 
entrepreneurship. The management approach, by contrast, assumes that implementation is 
not a matter of calculated willingness, but of implementers’ capacity to do so. The management 
approach was also disentangled into four specific explanations: internal coordination, external 
coordination, policy experience and knowledge, and personnel stability
 By conducting a theory-driven, comparative within-case analysis, this study 
complemented earlier research on policy saliency (Versluis 2007) showing how saliency 
may interact with other variables. High policy saliency emerged as the main driving force 
behind local differences in EU implementation, which in combination with ambitious policy 
preferences and entrepreneurship of both policy officers and political actors determined 
high implementation performance. In addition, frequent internal coordination between 
different policy departments within local government contributed to high implementation 
performance, by enabling and strengthening the preference alignment of policy officers and 
political actors. 
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 When it comes to the representativeness of this causal mechanism, the final study of this 
thesis (Chapter 5) offers a reflection on external validity. Chapter 5 systematically reviewed 
a large number of EU local implementation studies. It revealed that the explanations of 
policy preference alignment and an integrated approach to policy implementation with 
high internal coordination between different departments of local government also found 
support in other EU local implementation studies. Therefore, one may reasonably expect that 
differences in EU local implementation performance of (at least) North-Western EU member 
states will exhibit the same causal mechanism. These member states are characterised by 
relatively similar environmental awareness and economic development. 
 Nevertheless, one should be cautious about the extent to which political variables 
can explain local compliance with AAQ directive. All four municipalities complied with 
the procedural obligation to have an AAQ management plan in the first place. Thus, 
similar scores on management variables could not explain differences in implementation 
performance between municipalities. At the same time, all municipalities took similar type 
of measures and were compliant as they all had a management plan. Hence, similar scores 
on management variables could potentially explain the similarities between municipalities. 
In other words, politicisation explained the differences in local implementation performance, 
but management variables could potentially explain the compliance record in Dutch cases. 
Whether the latter is indeed the case, should be subjected to rigorous comparative research. 
 This question is especially pertinent to find out because the final study of this thesis 
(Chapter 5) demonstrated that EU local implementation studies revealed inconsistent results 
on administrative capacity explanations, such as municipal size and financial resources, and 
their impact on local implementation. More understanding of these explanations is urgent in 
light of the direct consequences of how one can remedy poor implementation. If we intend 
to invest in administrative capacity building to improve implementation, we need to know 
when and whether it is effective. 
6.5 THE FOURTH STUDY: THE SYSTEMATIC REVIEW AND RESEARCH 
AGENDA
The final study of this thesis (Chapter 5) reviewed 85 studies on EU local implementation. 
While EU compliance scholars have persistently called for looking beyond transposition, 
a separate stream of research on EU local implementation has produced a vast body of 
knowledge on EU practical implementation. These EU local implementation studies are 
scattered across many different policy-specific journals, and are characterized by descriptive 
research designs, making it difficult to draw theoretical lessons from each individual study. As 
a result, knowledge accumulation has been restricted. Therefore, the fourth study took stock 
of the existing academic knowledge on EU local implementation, reviewed how these studies 
 121 
6
CONCLUSION
relate to EU compliance research and to the previous chapters of this thesis, and developed 
a research agenda. 
 First, the systematic literature review revealed that the majority of EU local implementation 
studies aimed at documenting best practices or explaining differences among compliant 
cases. In doing so, most of the local EU implementation studies examined environmental 
policies. This thesis is also in line with this practice, as the second and third studies of this 
thesis also reported on compliant cases with an environmental directive. Thus, more research 
is necessary to determine whether compliance at the local level is indeed an empirical reality 
or if it is just bound to a specific field of environmental policy. Local governments are also 
responsible for the implementation of other policies, which might be more problematic to 
comply with. Notwithstanding the importance of environmental policy or learning from best 
practice cases, such case selection is likely to bias our knowledge on the state of compliance 
at local level. 
 Second, the final study pointed out that more research is required for the examination of 
compliance with two special procedural obligations of EU policies: local policy integration and 
stakeholder participation. With regard to the former, a public consultation by the European 
Commission (2015) identified the integration of EU policies at the local level as one of the 
most pressing challenges of EU implementation. With regard to the latter, the EU Commission 
has put high hopes on the involvement of stakeholders to increase legitimacy of EU policies 
and thus improve implementation. The review shows that so far, many local governments 
are unable to live up to the EU obligation to consult stakeholders. Therefore, whether these 
procedural obligations function according to their design remains to be seen.  
 Third, the final study showed that the reviewed studies did not analyse the congruence 
of local policies with national transposition of EU legislation, but only with EU policy. Without 
this knowledge on how different government levels relate to each other, it becomes difficult 
to fully assess to what extent the different levels of government implement EU policies and 
reflect on the policy design choices of each level of government and their interrelation. 
Chapter 3 of this thesis showed that by systematically reviewing how local implementation 
relates to the EU directive and to its national transposition, one can establish if, where and in 
which form local ‘toppings’ of AAQ legislation exist. Therefore, more attention to this aspect 
seems warranted. 
 Finally, the systematic review revealed that most existing studies on EU local 
implementation are highly descriptive and exploratory. A few explanations emerged as the 
most promising ones. The policy and institutional fit between local and EU policy requirements, 
coordination between implementers, and preference alignment among implementers 
positively impacted local implementation of EU policies. Several studies have recommended 
improving vertical and horizontal coordination as factors that could positively affect local 
implementation. These explanations could now be subjected to rigorous explanatory 
research designs. While a quantitative design seems to be too ambitious for the field where 
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data collection is quite cumbersome, other research designs could fit the purpose equally 
well. For example, this thesis demonstrated that a more purposeful case selection for theory 
testing as employed in chapter 4 offers a fruitful way for designing a more deductive research 
approach.  
6.6 CONTRIBUTION TO EU COMPLIANCE RESEARCH
In sum, this thesis offers five important contributions to EU compliance research. First of all, it 
offers a new systematised concept of implementation performance to facilitate a systematic 
analysis of differences in practical implementation across implementers. It thus enables 
researchers to move beyond a dichotomous conceptualisation of compliance in order to 
unmask the rich variance in implementation of EU policies. This is especially relevant in the 
analysis of procedural obligations, which allow for highly different, while fully compliant 
policy responses. This thesis demonstrated that even among compliant cases, we can discern 
crucial differences that need to be assessed in order to understand the extent to which local 
governments make EU policies work. 
 Second, this thesis added to the discussion on compliance with EU directives by 
demonstrating a great intra-state implementation variety, i.e. different practices at the local 
level. While all local governments complied with the procedural obligation of producing 
a policy plan under the EU AAQ directive, some took their implementation tasks more 
seriously than others. This reveals a leader and laggard dynamic at the local level. Some local 
governments even showed clear signs of over-compliance. Hence, it would be a mistake to 
see local governments as the only implementers of supra-national policy decisions. This thesis 
shows that local governments actively shape how EU policies are delivered to EU citizens. 
 Third, this thesis bolstered our confidence in theoretical explanations offered in EU 
compliance research. Most EU compliance research looks at one point in time to assess EU 
implementation. This thesis gathered data over 10 years of local policy implementation and 
demonstrated that the same explanations are still relevant. Additionally, the explanations 
derived from EU compliance research refer to the timeliness of transposition data. This thesis, 
demonstrated that the content of practical implementation could also be assessed using the 
same explanations. 
 Fourth, while most existing EU local implementation studies are very explorative in 
nature, this thesis offers a way for a deductive theory-driven research design. While giving due 
attention to the depth of qualitative research design, this thesis has merged comparative cross-
case analysis with comparative within-case analysis in order to isolate causal mechanisms. 
Implementation research is infamous for suggesting more than 100 explanatory variables that 
could explain implementation. By showing how cross-case analysis could be complemented 
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by within-case analysis, this thesis offers a way of disentangling and assessing the complexity 
of implementation. 
 Finally, this thesis offers a systematic literature review of EU local implementation 
studies. EU compliance research has so far claimed that not much is known on the practical 
implementation of EU policies. Yet, EU local studies have produced a vast amount of knowledge 
on what happens to EU policies at local level. The systematic literature review shows how 
these studies relate to EU compliance research and assesses the gaps in our knowledge on EU 
local implementation. 
6.7 IMPLICATIONS FOR PRACTICE
In addition to the theoretical advances set out above, this thesis provides several tangible 
implications for practitioners. In the following section, lessons for local governments, national 
governments and EU policy-makers are discussed.
 First of all, local governments are advised to invest in internal coordination for the 
implementation of complex EU policies. While all Dutch municipalities have shown to 
be very well organised externally, i.e. they were well-connected in different networks and 
participated in different policy platforms, one of the key differences between leaders and 
laggards flowed from their ability to coordinate between the different departments within 
the local government itself. Most EU policies are multi-disciplinary and touch upon different 
policy fields at the same time. Hence, by pulling human and financial resources from different 
departments, the implementation process could be smoothened. This also has a positive effect 
on aligning the policy preferences of different actors and committing them to addressing EU 
policy challenges. 
 Second, national governments are advised to invest in coordination with local 
governments. In the beginning the implementation of the AAQ directive caused a lot of 
problems. Local governments expressed myriad concerns about their inability to conduct 
spatial planning projects as environmental assessments revealed that these projects would 
negatively impact AAQ. Hence, local governments found themselves restricted in their 
economic growth plans due to very strict EU AAQ standards. The national government took 
these concerns very seriously, which resulted in a national air quality coordination program. 
Accordingly, all levels of government committed themselves to specific AAQ responsibilities. 
Local governments even received financial assistance from the national government. 
Such coordinated collective action enabled to break the impasse and facilitate better EU 
implementation. 
 Third, EU policy makers are advised to be aware of discretion inherited in EU legislation 
which affects local implementation. Local governments actively shape how EU policies are 
delivered to EU citizens. As EU procedural obligations allow for different compliant policy 
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responses, strict enforcement of policies might not be as effective in stimulating uniform 
implementation as the EU Commission might hope for. Local governments faced uncertainty 
which measures were effective. They sought out best practices to reduce this uncertainty and 
ended up taking the same type of measures. Therefore a timely practical guidance from the 
EU Commission to local implementers on best practice policy measures, would allow the EU 
Commission to steer uniform local implementation more. 
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APPENDIX B:
Operationalisation and scoring of the local air quality plans
The data on the air quality plans were elaborated according to the seven aspects of the 
conceptual framework. 
Objectives
First, the aspect of ‘objectives’ was operationalised in terms of the strictness of the pollutant 
standards that were set in the plan, as well as possible additional air quality pollutants specified 
in the plan. The plan would score a maximum of 3 points for calibrating stricter norms than 
national norms and adding at least one extra pollutant chemical to the list. The plan would 
score 2 points if only the norms were higher than the national norms, and 1 point was given 
to a plan in which air quality standards were similar to the national norms. 
Definitional details
The second aspect, ‘definitional details’, was operationalised in terms of what source of 
pollution, e.g. car traffic, were specified in the policy. The more sources of pollution were 
specified the more points were given. As all municipalities in the sample of 13 medium-
sized Dutch cities identified ‘road traffic’ as the source of pollution, there were no horizontal 
differences on this aspect16. Therefore, all municipalities received 1 point. 
Territory
The fourth aspect, ‘territory’, was operationalised in terms of the territory to which the air 
quality plan applied. A plan was assigned 3 points for a regional territorial scope17, 2 points for 
a municipal territorial coverage, and 1 point if a policy plan only applied to a small territorial 
section in the municipality. As all municipal plans in our sample concerned the territory of the 
municipality, there were no horizontal differences on this aspect. All municipalities received 
2 points. 
16  Only Nijmegen has identified water transport also as an important source of pollution. However, most of the cities in the 
sample do not have a water body with a busy traffic. Therefore, such comparison becomes problematic because of the 
differences in geographical conditions. 
17 Municipalities can have an air quality plan in cooperation with other municipalities. 
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Addressees
The fifth aspect, ‘addressees’ was operationalised in terms of the size and composition of the 
group the plan was applicable to. ‘Addressees’ were scored 3 points if a measure was relevant 
to all citizens, 2 points for a smaller group, 1 point for the smallest18 group. As all municipal 
plans concerned the whole population, there were no horizontal differences on this aspect. 
All municipalities received 3 points. 
Expertise
The sixth aspect, ‘expertise’, was interpreted in terms of practical rather than scientific 
knowledge and operationalised in terms of stakeholders involved in the development of 
the air quality plan. ‘Expertise’ was scored on the basis of a thematic long list of all possible 
types of stakeholders (for example business organisations, environmental groups, civil 
society organisations or municipal health organisations), which was created inductively. If 6 
(maximum) or 5 types of stakeholders were involved in the plan development, then the plan 
would be scored the maximum 3 points, if only 3 or 4 types then the plan would be scored 2 
points, and if 1 or 2 types of stakeholders then the plan would score 1 point. 
Prioritisation
The seventh aspect, ‘prioritisation’, was operationalised in terms of measures19 that were 
prioritised within the plan. The more measures were identified as the focus of the policy, the 
more points were given. As all municipalities identified the same type of measure, which was 
the circulation of traffic in the city, which is a measure under ‘prevention of cars in the city’ 
category, as their ‘priority’, there were no horizontal differences on this aspect. Therefore, all 
municipalities received 1 point. 
Monitoring
The third aspect, ‘monitoring’, denoted monitoring of the air quality policy. The plan would 
score the maximum 3 points for annual reports on air quality and having its own municipal 
air pollution measurement system, 2 points for only annual reports, 1 point for applying the 
national monitoring tool that is available on the national air quality website and 0 points for 
not specifying any enforcement mechanism at all. 
The scores for all aspects were added up to form a score per municipality. The maximum score 
for a municipal air quality plan was 16 points. 
18   A more detailed operationalisation of different degrees of size of population was not necessary as all municipal plans referred 
to the whole population of the municipality.
19  Not to be confused with sources of pollution. Those were coded as definitional details. 
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APPENDIX C:
Operationalisation and scoring of the individual air quality policy measures
The codebook 
The legend:
Bold letters & numbers = category of air quality measures (There are 6 categories)
Roman numbers (I,II, etc.)= measures within the category
Arabic numbers (1,2, etc.) = definitional details
Italic letters= instructions for scoring
pt = points
1. Public transport: 
On objectives: score Public Transport category: 0 pt if 0 measures are taken; score 1 pt if 1-3 
measures are taken; score 2 pt if 4-5 measures are taken, score 3 pt if all 6 measures are taken. 
I.  High quality public transport: ( a separate ‘highway’ for busses where they always enjoy 
priority)
1. connection between economic hubs 
On definitional: details score High quality public transport: 0 pt if no definition is given, or 3 pt if this 
definition is given.
II. Public transport comfort:
1. accessibility of the bus stops and busses 
2. dynamic travel information; 
3. public order observers in the bus;
4. frequent travel opportunities; 
5. many bus stops (a bus stop within 500m)
On definitional details score Public transport comfort: 0 pt à no comfort, 1 pt à 1definition, 2 pt 
à 2-3 definitions, 3 pt à 4-5 definitions. 
III. Sustainable public transport: 
1. Green / natural gas
2. Electric busses
3. Diesel with filters (Euro V and higher)
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On definitional details score Sustainable public transport: 1 pt à diesel, 2 pt à Green/natural gas, 
3 pt à electric. 
IV. Sustainable taxi:
1. subsidy for maintenance costs of ‘green cars’
2. a local subsidy on top of national subsidy for the purchase of the cars. 
3. Municipality initiates the talks with taxi companies to explain the advantages of greener 
cars. 
On definitional details score Sustainable taxi: 0 pt à no sustainable taxi, and 1 pt à “initiate the 
talks…”, 2 pt for “subsidy for the maintenance costs”, 3 pt for “a local subsidy on top of the national 
subsidy” 
V. Stimulate public transport usage:
1. Only non-financial stimulation
2. discounts
3. totally free 
On definitional details score Stimulate public transport usage: 0 pt à no mentioning, and 1 pt à 
Only non-financial stimulation, 2 pt à discounts, 3 pt à totally free.
VI. Priority public transport at intersection:
1. priority to the public transport 
On definitional details score Priority public transport at intersection: 0 pt à no definition is given, or 
3 pt à this definition is given.
Territory: score 1 pt à a single measure is relevant for a particular district/sections of the city, 2 pt 
à within the municipality, 3 pt à the whole region. 
Addressees (only applicable to “Stimulate public transport usage”): score 1 pt à a single 
measure is only relevant for elderly or youngsters, 2 pt à it concerns several districts, 3 pt à the 
whole municipality.
Duration: score 0 pt à a single measure only relevant since 2014, 1 pt à a single measure is only 
relevant since 2010, 2 pt à since 2005, 3 pt à already in place earlier than 2005. 
Monitoring: not applicable for this category of measures (ie. Not applicable for Public transport).
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Table C.1: Maximum scores on Public Transport
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High quality public transport 3 3 - 3 - 9
Public transport comfort 3 3 - 3 - 9
Sustainable public transport 3 3 - 3 - 9
Stimulate public transport usage 3 3 3 3 - 12
Sustainable taxi 3 3 - 3 - 3
Priority public transport at intersection 3 3 - 3 - 9
 Total 3 18 18 3 18 - 60
Note: ‘-‘ = not applicable
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2. Prevention of cars in the city (center): 
On objectives: score Prevention of cars category (if there are established AQ bottle necks by NAQCP): 
1 pt à 1-2 measures is taken; 2 pt à 3-4 measures are taken, 3 pt à 5 measures are taken. 
On objectives: score Prevention of cars category (if there are no established AQ bottle necks by 
NAQCP): score 1 pt à 1 measure is taken; 2 pt à 2-3 measures are taken, score 3 pt à 4 measures 
are taken. 
I. City center distribution
1. Few exemptions
2. Many exemptions 
3. Subsidy available
4. Special arrangement for the waste collection
5. Only facilitating role for the companies to initiate something
On definitional details score City center distribution: 0 pt à there are only certain periods of time 
without any distribution plan and/or many exemptions are possible; 1 pt à municipality fulfills 
only a facilitating role; score 2 pt à there is a distribution system at place but there are a lot of 
exceptions, score 3 pt à only few exceptions are at place and/or there is a underground waste-
system/subsidy available. 
II. Transferia/P&R
1. P&R connected to public transport facilities
2. P&R connected to bicycle facilities
3. P&R signs are well visible coming from the highways
4. Extra busses on holidays
On definitional details score Transferia/P&R: 0 pt à no P&R is available, 1 pt à for having a bicycle 
facilities, 2 pt à for P&R to be connected to other sorts of transport, 3 pt à if the signs are there (the 
visitors are well aware of the P&R possibilities) and/or there are extra busses coming during holiday
III. Environmental Zone*
1. Dynamic traffic management boards that regulate when the zone is functional
2. Traffic signs indicating that you have entered the zone
3. Few/many exemptions possible 
On definitional details score environmental zone: score 1 pt à many exceptions, 2 pt à traffic signs 
+ few exceptions, 3 pt à dynamic traffic management boards
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(*One can only have an environmental zone in the city if there are established AQ bottle necks 
following the national guidelines. So if a city already complies with AQ according to national 
standards, it is not allowed to have an environmental zone) 
IV. Parking policy
1. Dynamic parking information systems show where to park
2. Increase the parking fee 
3. Decrease the number of parking lots
4. Parking spot fee gets exponentially larger if to have a second car
On definitional details score parking policy: 1 pt à 1 definition, 2 pt à 2-3 definitions, 3 pt à all 4 
definitions. 
V. Circulation measures
1. Dynamic route installation
2. Green waves
3.  Depending on the type of road and whether there are bottlenecks a priority at traffic 
lights is given to the trucks/cars/public transport/or bicycles
4.  Physical alteration of infrastructure (eg ‘pockets’ for busses, bridge to divert the flow 
of traffic from the city center, physical alteration of the roads to slow down the traffic , 
widening of the road at the intersections, adoption of one-way traffic)
On definitional details score Circulation measures: 1 pt à 1 definition, 2 pt à 2-3 definitions, 3 pt 
à all 4 definitions. 
Territory ( not applicable to City center distribution): 1 pt à a single measure is relevant for a 
particular district/sections of the city, 2 pt à if within the municipality. 
Addressees (only applicable to environmental zone & parking policy): 1 pt à a single measure 
is only relevant for a few businesses (eg. trucks) if applicable, 2 pt à if it also concerns a smaller pick-
up trucks/visitors, 3 pt à the whole municipality (so also the citizens).
Duration: score 0 pt à a single measure only relevant since 2014, 1 pt à a single measure is only 
relevant since 2010, 2 pt à since 2005, 3 pt à already in place earlier than 2005. 
Monitoring: only applicable to environment zones + circulation: 1 pt à having the fines at place 
or just mentioning that there is monitoring, 2 pt à irregular controls/monitoring, 3 pt à camera 
control/or other form of regular/systematic control/monitoring.
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Note (if environmental zone is not allowed): on Prevention of cars in the city category the max 
number of points are: 3 (for objectives) + 12 (for definitional details on 4 measures) + 3 (for 
enforcem. Mechanism on 1 measure) + 6 (for Territory on 3 measures) + 3 (for Addressees) + 
12 (for Duration on 4 measures) = 39 points. 
Note (if environmental zone is allowed): on Prevention of cars in the city category the max 
number of points are: 3 (for objectives) + 15 (for definitional details on 5 measures) + 6 (for 
enforcem. Mechanism on 2 measures) +8 (for Territory on 4 measures) + 6 (for Addressees on 
2 measures) + 15 (for Duration on 5 measures) = 53 points. 
Table C.2: Maximum scores on Prevention of cars in the city (centre)
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City center distribution 3 - - 3 - 6
Transferia/P&R 3 2 - 3 - 8
Environmental zone 3 2 3 3 3 14
Parking policy 3 2 3 3 - 11
Circulation measures 3 2 - 3 3 11
 Total 3 15 8 6 15 6 53
Note: ‘-‘ = not applicable
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3. Bicycle policy:
On objectives: score Bicycle Policy category: 0 pt à 0 measures are taken; 1 pt à 1 measure is 
taken; 2 pt à 2-3 measures are taken, 3 pt à 4-5 measures are taken. 
I. Bicycle parking 
1. Free
2. Indoor
3.  New buildings (business and leisure) all have enough room reserved for the bicycle 
parking lots
4.  Bicycle parking facilities at public transport hubs (bus stops, train stations)
5. Road sign to indicate the next big parking lot for bicycles
On definitional details score Parking lots for bicycles: 1 pt à 1 definitions, 2 pt à 2-3 definitions, 3 
pt à 4-5 definitions
II. Comfort bicycle roads
1. Separation bicycle road from the main roads
2. Waiting time system on busy intersections
3. Mopeds are prohibited at the bicycle roads 
4. Asphalt bicycle roads
On definitional details score Bicycle comfort: 1 pt à 1 definition, 2 pt à 2-3 definitions, 3 pt à 4 
definitions
III. Bicycle highways
1. There are Bicycle highways (wide bicycle-highways)
On definitional details score Bicycle highways: 0 pt à no definition is given, or 3 pt à this definition 
is given
IV. Priority bicycle at intersections
1. priority to the bicycle at intersections 
On definitional details score Priority bicycle at intersections: 0 pt à no definition is given, or 3 pt à 
this definition is given.
V. Stimulation bicycle usage
1. There is a campaign
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On definitional details score Stimulation bicycle usage: 0 pt à no definition is given, or 3 pt à this 
definition is given
Territory: score 1 pt à a single measure is relevant for a particular district/sections of the city, 2 pt 
à if within the municipality, [3 pt à the whole region – only applicable for II, III, V]. 
Duration: score 0 pt à a single measure only relevant since 2014, 1 pt à a single measure is only 
relevant since 2010, 2 pt à since 2005, 3 pt à already in place earlier than 2005. 
Addressees & Monitoring: not applicable to Bicycle policy
Table C.3: Maximum scores Bicycle policy
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Bicycle parking 3 2 - 3 - 8
Comfort bicycle roads 3 3 - 3 - 9
Bicycle highways 3 3 - 3 - 12
Priority bicycle at intersection 3 2 - 3 - 8
Stimulation bicycle usage 3 3 - 3 - 9
 Total 3 15 13 - 15 - 46
Note: ‘-‘ = not applicable
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4. Stimulating the demand for alternative transportation
On objectives: score “Stimulating..” category: 0 pt à 0 measures are taken; 1 pt à 1 measure is 
taken; 2 pt à 2-3 measures are taken, 3 pt à 4 measures are taken. 
I. Stimulation of alternative fuels consumption
1. Subsidies for the greengas fuel stations
On definitional details score alternative fuel stations: 3 pt for having these fuel stations at place
II. Electronic transport
1. Subsidies for the recharging stations
2. Subsidies for the e-cars
3. Subsidies for the e-bicycle/e-scooters
4. Free parking during the recharge 
On definitional details score electronic transport: 0 pt à only facilitating non-financially, 1 pt à 
only up to 1 definition, 2 pt à up to 2-3 definitions, 3 pt à 4 definitions.
III. Organisation of car usage at third parties
1.  Subsidy for the companies for the calculation of whether switching over to sustainable 
forms of fuel will be efficient (role of municipality – sponsor and executor)
2.  Mobility management for the company (role of municipality – thinking along)
3.  Financial benefits for the main employers of the municipality if their employees choose 
bicycle over car as means of transportation. 
4.  Special procurement conditions for construction work (the companies that win the 
procurement should have clean cars at their disposal)
5.  Facilitate parking place for Green Wheels or other car sharing services
On definitional details score Organisation of car usage at third parties: 1 pt à only up to 1 definition, 
2 pt à up to 2-3 definitions, 3 pt à 4-5 definitions.
IV. Municipality’s stock of cars
1. Filters on diesel cars
2. e-cars/greengas-cars
3. stimulate bicycle usage/discourage car usage
4. rocurement rules for new cars
On definitional details score special attention to employers: 1 pt à only up to 1 definition, 2 pt à 
up to 2-3 definitions, 3 pt à 4 definitions.
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Territory (except of ‘municipality’s stock of cars’): score 1 pt à a single measure is relevant for a 
particular district/sections of the city, 2 pt à if within the municipality.
Addressees (except of ‘Alternative fuel’): 1 pt à a single measure is only relevant for a few 
businesses, trucks if applicable, 2 pt à if it also concerns a wide variety of businesses, 3 pt à the 
whole municipality (so also the citizens).
Addressees (‘municipality’s stock of cars): 1 pt à a single measure is only relevant for a higher 
politicians, 2 pt à if it also concerns civil servants, 3 pt à also concerns waste collecting companies 
and/or street cleaners 
Duration: 0 pt à if a single measure only relevant since 2014, 1 pt à a single measure is only 
relevant since 2010, 2 pt à since 2005, 3 pt à already in place earlier than 2005. 
Monitoring: not applicable to this category.
Table C.4: Maximum scores on Stimulating the demand for alternative transportation
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Stimulation of alternative fuels consumption 3 2 - 3 - 8
E-transport 3 2 3 3 - 11
Organisation of car usage at third parties 3 2 3 3 - 11
Municipality’s stock of cars 3 - 3 3 - 9
 Total 3 12 6 9 12 - 42
Note: ‘-‘ = not applicable
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5. Information to the public
On objectives: score “Information to the public” category: 0 pt à 0 measures are taken; 1 pt à 1 
measure is taken; 2 pt à 2-3 measures are taken, 3 pt à 4 measures are taken. 
I. School material 
Definitional details: 3 pt à there are definitional details (if there is such a policy, there are common 
standards)
II. Air quality policy information
1. Tips on environment friendly behaviour 
2. Desk of complaint
3. AQ policy
4. AQ monitoring (links to national reporting/information)
5. AQ monitoring (local if applicable/could also be reports)
6. Information on car sharing
7. Information on the subsidies
On definitional details score information on the website: 0 pt à there is only description of 
environmental zone and recharging stations for electric cars, 1 pt à only up to 1-3 definitions, 2 pt 
à 4-6 definitions, 3 pt à more definitions.
III. Active engagement of stakeholders
1. Workshops for the public 
2. Support to the interest groups that organize activities
3. Yearly awards for the cleanest company
On definitional details score 1 pt per definition. 
IV. Information on wood burning policy:
1. Environmental tips
2. What you should do in case of annoyance
3. Where you can go to if you need assistance
4. Environmental issues explained
5. Health issues explained
6. Size specifications of wood
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On definitional details score information provision: 1 pt à only up to 1-2 definitions, 2 pt à 3-4 
definitions, 3 pt à more definitions.
Territory & Addressees: not applicable as all are affected. 
Duration: score 0 pt à a single measure only relevant since 2014, 1 pt à a single measure is 
only relevant since 2010, 2 pt à since 2005, 3 pt à already in place earlier than 2005. (If there is 
information on the website about earlier reports/monitoring results/etc)
Monitoring: not applicable.
Table C.5: Maximum scores on Information to the public
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School material 3 - - 3 - 6
Air quality policy information 3 - - 3 - 6
Active engagement 3 - - 3 - 6
Wood burning information 3 - - 3 - 6
 Total 3 12 - - 12 - 27
Note: ‘-‘ = not applicable
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6. Sensitive destination measures
On objectives score: 3 pt à there is such a policy
Definitional details: 3 pt à there are definitional details (if there is such a policy, there are common 
standards)
Addressees: 1 pt à this policy is only relevant for new buildings, 2 pt à new and old buildings 
which are mentioned in the national guidelines, 3 pt à if extra destinations are mentioned that are 
not in the national guidelines.
Duration: 1 pt à a single measure is only relevant since 2012, 2 pt à since 2005, 3 pt à already in 
place earlier than 2005. 
Territory & Monitoring: not applicable. 
Table C.6: Maximum scores on Sensitive destination measures
Individual policy measure
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6. Sensitive destination measures 3 3 - 3 3 - 12
Note: ‘-‘ = not applicable
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Table C.7: Maximum scores on all categories
Categories of
Air quality policy measures
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1. Public transport 3 18 18 3 18 - 60
2. Prevention of cars in the city (centre) 3 15 8 6 15 6 53
3. Bicycle policy 3 15 13 - 15 - 46
4.  Stimulating the demand for alternative 
transportation 3 12 6 9 12 - 42
5. Information to the public 3 12 - - 12 - 27
6. Sensitive destination measures 3 3 - 3 3 - 12
18 75 45 21 75 6 240
Note: ‘-‘ = not applicable
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APPENDIX D:
List of respondents
1. Ministry of Infrastructure and Environment
2. Association of Community Health Services
3. National Institute for the Public Health and the Environment
4. National Court of Audit
5. Consultancy firm on air quality policies and measures
6. Municipality A, policy officer 1
7. Municipality A, policy officer 2
8. Municipality A, policy officer 3
9. Municipality A, Community Health Service
10. Municipality A, provincial environmental organisation
11. Municipality A, local environmental group
12. Municipality A, local civil society organisation
13. Municipality A, local industrial company 1
14. Municipality A, local industrial company 2
15. Municipality A, alderman 1
16. Municipality A, alderman 2
17. Municipality B, policy officer 1
18. Municipality B, policy officer 2
19. Municipality B, policy officer 3
20. Municipality B, alderman 
21. Municipality B, consultancy firm 
22. Municipality B, consultancy firm
23. Municipality B, Community Health Service
24. Municipality C, policy officer 1
25. Municipality C, policy officer 2
26. Municipality C, alderman 1
27. Municipality C, alderman 2
28. Municipality C, Community Health Service
29. Municipality C, provincial environmental organisation
30. Municipality C, local environmental group
31. Municipality C, local civil society organisation
32. Municipality D, policy officer 1
33. Municipality D, policy officer 2
34. Municipality D, alderman 1
35. Municipality D, alderman 2
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36. Municipality D, Community Health Service
37. Municipality D, local civil society organisation
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This thesis aims to address some of the persisting puzzles of EU compliance research. In particular, 
the three puzzles that emerged from a set of national court cases on the implementation of 
the EU Ambient Air Quality (AAQ) directive laid down the groundwork for this thesis. First, the 
national court cases revealed the struggle to identify what constitutes comprehensive local 
EU policy implementation. EU compliance research has so far provided little guidance on how 
to assess what constitutes compliance with discretionary clauses such as procedural policy 
instruments. Secondly, the national court cases illustrated that local governments are political 
arenas where EU policies are being shaped on the ground. Nevertheless, EU compliance 
research has so far paid little attention to these local actors, focusing more on the national 
ones. Yet, it is also the accumulation of local actions that contributes to what extent member 
states make EU policies work. Hence, this local perspective is paramount to our understanding 
of EU compliance. And finally, the court cases revealed great intra-state implementation 
variety, i.e. different practices at the local level. This intra-state implementation variety has so 
far received little systematic attention in EU compliance research. These three puzzles resulted 
into the following research question: How can we explain why Dutch municipalities differ in their 
implementation performance of the EU Ambient Air Quality directive? 
 Chapter 2 deals with the first puzzle and analyses how implementation performance can 
be conceptualised in order to go beyond the dichotomous understanding of correct compliance 
and to capture variation in policy implementation. Taking guidance from national policy 
implementation, policy analysis, policy design, policy evaluation and policy change research, it 
proposes to define implementation performance as the intensity of policy outputs undertaken 
by implementers in response to EU policy instruments. Given the importance of open norms 
and procedural requirements in EU directives, the concept of implementation performance 
does not only have a vertical focus, i.e. aimed at comparing implementation with EU rules, but 
also a horizontal focus, i.e. aimed at comparing implementation practices between various 
implementing actors within the member states. Chapter 2 suggests to examine the intensity 
of policy outputs along the three dimensions of substance, scope and effort. The substance 
dimension relates to the central issue that is to be regulated. The second dimension concerns 
the scope of implementation: where, when and to whom does the policy task apply. The final 
dimension focuses on the effort implementers put into accomplishing a policy’s goals. These 
dimensions are further refined with the help of ten aspects. As practical implementation can 
differ on these aspects, implementation performance can thus be assessed considerably more 
comprehensively than by employing the traditional compliance/non-compliance dichotomy 
and be meaningfully compared among implementers.
 Based on this conceptualisation of implementation performance, Chapter 2 analyses 
existing research into practical implementation and reveals that current knowledge of 
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practical implementation of EU environmental directives is fragmented and incomplete. While 
the ‘substance’ dimension received the most attention in the literature, hardly any attention 
was paid to the ‘scope’ and ‘effort’ dimensions. Hence, in order to understand to what extent 
member states really make EU policies work, a much more granular understanding of where, 
how, and what is lacking in policy implementation is needed. Chapter 2 offers a conceptual 
framework that can facilitate such an understanding.
 Chapter 3 deals with the second puzzle and analyses the differences between Dutch 
municipalities in the implementation of the key procedural Article 23 of the EU AAQ directive. It 
maps local implementation of EU AAQ directive in 13 Dutch cities over 10 years by using 
the conceptual framework proposed in Chapter 2. The analysis demonstrates that all local 
governments formally complied with the Article 23 obligation of having an AAQ plan. At the 
same time, it reveals various notions of variation and over-compliance at local level, where some 
local governments went beyond the regulatory minimum. Six municipalities adopted stricter 
norms than the EU directive, and while the national government was formally responsible 
for air quality monitoring and information to the public, five municipalities put their own 
monitoring at place and were directly communicating with citizens on the AAQ plans. 
Next to these differences, Chapter 3 also demonstrates similarities among local AAQ policy 
plans. Local governments sought out best practices and information platforms to reduce 
the uncertainty inherent to discretional obligation of designing an AAQ plan, and ended up 
taking the same type of measures. This information exchange was facilitated by the national 
air quality coordination strategy. In this case, more discretion did not result in more differences 
but ignited the need to cooperate between different levels of government, which effectively 
contributed to meeting the EU AAQ requirements. Neither the size of municipality, nor its 
environmental problem pressure are found to be a necessary condition for comprehensive 
policy measures. 
 Chapter 4 deals with the third puzzle and analyses to what extent differences in Dutch local 
implementation of the EU AAQ directive can be attributed to political or managerial considerations. 
It builds upon the analysis of AAQ local implementation in Chapter 3 and zooms in on four 
municipalities that formally complied with the AAQ directive but scored differently on 
implementation performance. The four municipalities that scored the highest/lowest were 
selected for an in-depth examination of the conditions for comprehensive EU implementation. 
The political approach is disentangled into four specific explanations: policy preferences, policy 
saliency, interest group pressure, and policy entrepreneurship. The management approach is 
also disentangled into four specific explanations: internal coordination, external coordination, 
policy experience and knowledge, and personnel stability. By conducting a theory-driven, 
comparative within-case analysis, this chapter demonstrates how observed differences in 
local implementation performance are better explained by the political approach than by the 
management approach. In particular, high policy saliency emerged as the main driving force 
behind local differences in EU implementation, which in combination with ambitious policy 
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preferences and entrepreneurship of both policy officers and political actors determined 
high implementation performance. In addition, frequent internal coordination between 
different policy departments within local governments contributed to high implementation 
performance, by enabling and strengthening the preference alignment of policy officers 
and political actors. Nevertheless, this chapter cautions about the extent to which political 
variables can explain local compliance with the AAQ directive. All four municipalities complied 
with the procedural obligation to have an AAQ management plan in the first place. Hence, 
similar scores on management variables could potentially explain the similarities between 
municipalities in terms of compliance of having an AAQ plan and meeting the limit values. 
 Chapter 5 also deals with the third puzzle and puts the findings of Chapter 4 
in perspective. This chapter offers a reflection on the representativeness of the causal 
mechanism illustrated in Chapter 4. Chapter 5 systematically reviews a large number of EU 
local implementation studies. It reveals that the explanations of policy preference alignment 
and high internal coordination between different departments of local governments also 
found support in other EU local implementation studies, which focused on other member states 
and other EU directives. At the same time, the variables saliency and policy entrepreneurship, 
which were important for the causal mechanism in Chapter 4, were examined less often in 
these studies. Hence, more research is necessary to see whether and how these explanations 
play a role in other member states and implementation of other EU directives. While Chapter 
4 cautions for overemphasizing the importance of political explanations for EU compliance, 
as all local governments were compliant, and suggests that management variables could 
explain the overall compliance with the directive, the literature review of Chapter 5 shows 
mixed findings on the explanatory power of management variables. Chapter 5 demonstrates 
that EU local implementation studies revealed inconsistent results on administrative capacity 
explanations, such as municipal size and financial resources, and their impact on local 
implementation. More understanding of these explanations is urgent in light of the direct 
consequences of how one can remedy poor implementation. 
 This chapter also offers new avenues for future research into EU local implementation. 
First, it reveals that the majority of EU local implementation studies aimed at documenting best 
practices. In doing so, most of the local EU implementation studies examined environmental 
policies. Notwithstanding the importance of environmental policy or learning from best 
practice cases, this chapter calls for more diversity in policies that are examined at local level, 
and for more attention to less performing municipalities. Second, this chapter points out that 
more research is required for the examination of compliance with two special procedural 
obligations of EU policies: local policy integration and stakeholder participation. Third, it 
shows that the reviewed studies did not analyse the congruence of local policies with national 
transposition of EU legislation, but only with EU policy. Without knowledge on how different 
government levels relate to each other, it becomes difficult to fully assess to what extent 
the different levels of government implement EU policies. Hence, Chapter 5 recommends 
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more attention to the multi-level character of EU implementation. Finally, this chapter reveals 
that most existing studies on EU local implementation are highly descriptive and exploratory. 
The field of EU local implementation could benefit from more explicit explanatory research 
designs.  
The main conclusion of this thesis is that local governments differ in their implementation of 
EU policies. This thesis elaborates that this variety is observed within one member state and 
even among compliant cases. This makes the analysis of procedural obligations, which allow 
for highly different, while fully compliant policy responses, pertinent to our understanding 
on how local governments make EU policies work. This thesis reveals a leader and laggard 
dynamic at the local level. Some local governments even showed clear signs of over-
compliance. Hence, it would be a mistake to see local governments as only the implementers 
of supra-national policy decisions. This thesis shows that local governments are political 
arenas where EU policies are subjected to another round of political and institutional filter. 
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Dit proefschrift beoogt bij te dragen aan een beter begrip van een aantal kernvraagstukken 
in EU-nalevingsonderzoek. Met name drie vraagstukken die uit een reeks internationale 
rechtszaken over de uitvoering van de EU-richtlijn Luchtkwaliteit naar voren kwamen, 
vormden de basis voor dit proefschrift. Ten eerste blijkt uit deze rechtszaken dat het 
moeilijk is om vast te stellen wat een alomvattende lokale EU-beleidsuitvoering is. Het EU-
nalevingsonderzoek heeft tot nu toe weinig richtlijnen opgeleverd voor de beoordeling van 
de naleving van discretionaire clausules zoals procedurele beleidsinstrumenten. Ten tweede 
blijkt uit deze rechtszaken dat lokale overheden politieke arena’s zijn waar het EU-beleid 
in de praktijk wordt vormgegeven. Echter, EU-nalevingsonderzoek heeft tot nu toe weinig 
aandacht besteed aan deze lokale actoren en heeft zich meer gericht op de nationale actoren. 
Maar uit de internationale rechtszaken blijkt dat het ook de opeenstapeling van lokale acties 
is die bijdraagt aan de mate waarin de lidstaten ervoor zorgen dat het EU-beleid werkt. Dit 
lokale perspectief is dan ook van het grootste belang voor ons begrip van de naleving van 
de EU-regels. Tot slot blijkt uit de rechtszaken dat er een grote verscheidenheid bestaat in 
de uitvoering binnen de lidstaten, d.w.z. verschillende praktijken op lokaal niveau. Deze 
verscheidenheid aan intra-statelijke implementatie heeft tot nu toe weinig systematische 
aandacht gekregen in het EU-nalevingsonderzoek. Deze drie vraagstukken hebben geleid 
tot de volgende onderzoeksvraag: Hoe kunnen we verklaren waarom Nederlandse gemeenten 
verschillen in hun implementatieprestaties van de EU-richtlijn Luchtkwaliteit? 
 Hoofdstuk 2 gaat in op het eerste vraagstuk en analyseert hoe implementatieprestaties 
kunnen worden geconceptualiseerd om verder te gaan dan het tweeledige begrip van correcte 
naleving en om de variatie in de beleidsuitvoering vast te leggen. Op basis van nationale 
beleidsimplementatie, beleidsanalyse, beleidsontwikkeling, en beleidsevaluatie onderzoeken 
stelt hoofdstuk 2 voor om de prestaties van de uitvoering te definiëren als de intensiteit van 
de beleidsoutput die de uitvoerders in reactie op de beleidsinstrumenten van de EU hebben 
geleverd. Gezien het belang van open normen en procedurele vereisten in EU-richtlijnen, heeft 
het concept van implementatieprestaties niet alleen een verticale focus, d.w.z. gericht op het 
vergelijken van de implementatie op lokaal niveau met de nationale regels en EU-regels, maar 
ook een horizontale focus, d.w.z. gericht op het vergelijken van de implementatiepraktijken 
tussen de verschillende uitvoerende actoren binnen de lidstaten. In hoofdstuk 2 wordt 
voorgesteld de intensiteit van de beleidsoutput te onderzoeken aan de hand van de drie 
dimensies van inhoud, reikwijdte en inspanning. De inhoudelijke dimensie heeft betrekking 
op de centrale kwestie die moet worden geregeld. De tweede dimensie betreft de reikwijdte 
van de uitvoering: waar, wanneer en voor wie geldt de beleidstaak. De laatste dimensie is 
gericht op de inspanningen die de uitvoerders leveren om de beleidsdoelstellingen te 
verwezenlijken. Deze dimensies worden verder verfijnd met behulp van tien aspecten. 
Aangezien de praktische uitvoering op deze aspecten kan verschillen, kunnen de prestaties 
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van de uitvoering dus aanzienlijk uitgebreider worden beoordeeld dan door gebruik te maken 
van de traditionele tweedeling tussen naleving en niet-naleving en kunnen ze op zinvolle 
wijze worden vergeleken tussen de uitvoerders.
 Op basis van deze conceptualisering van de implementatieprestaties wordt in hoofdstuk 
2 een analyse gemaakt van het bestaande onderzoek naar de praktische implementatie 
en wordt aangetoond dat de huidige kennis van de praktische implementatie van de EU-
milieurichtlijnen versnipperd en onvolledig is. Hoewel de “inhoudelijke” dimensie de meeste 
aandacht krijgt in de literatuur, wordt er nauwelijks aandacht besteed aan de “reikwijdte” 
en “inspanning”. Om te begrijpen in welke mate de lidstaten het EU-beleid daadwerkelijk 
uitvoeren, is dus een veel beter inzicht nodig in waar en hoe de beleidsuitvoering tekortschiet. 
Hoofdstuk 2 biedt een conceptueel kader dat een dergelijk begrip kan vergemakkelijken.
 Hoofdstuk 3 gaat in op het tweede vraagstuk en analyseert de verschillen tussen 
Nederlandse gemeenten in de uitvoering van de belangrijkste procedurele artikel 23 van de EU-
richtlijn Luchtkwaliteit. Het brengt de lokale implementatie van deze richtlijn in 13 Nederlandse 
steden over een periode van 10 jaar in kaart aan de hand van het in hoofdstuk 2 voorgestelde 
conceptuele kader. Uit de analyse blijkt dat alle lokale overheden formeel hebben voldaan aan 
de verplichting van artikel 23 om een luchtkwaliteitsplan op te stellen. Tegelijkertijd blijkt uit 
de analyse dat er op lokaal niveau veel verschillen zijn, maar ook is er een duidelijke vorm van 
verder gaan dan de regels het eigenlijk voorschrijven, de zogeheten overcompliance, waarbij 
sommige lokale overheden verder zijn gegaan dan het wettelijke minimum. Zes gemeenten 
hebben strengere normen vastgesteld dan de EU-richtlijn, en terwijl de nationale overheid 
formeel verantwoordelijk was voor de monitoring van de luchtkwaliteit en de voorlichting 
aan het publiek, hebben vijf gemeenten hun eigen monitoring ingesteld en communiceren 
zij rechtstreeks met de burgers over de luchtkwaliteitsplannen. Naast deze verschillen 
vertoont hoofdstuk 3 ook de overeenkomsten tussen de lokale luchtkwaliteitsplannen. 
Lokale overheden zochten naar best practices en informatie platforms om de onzekerheid te 
verminderen die inherent is aan de discretionaire verplichting om een luchtkwaliteitsplan op 
te stellen, en namen uiteindelijk hetzelfde soort maatregelen. Deze informatie-uitwisseling 
werd vergemakkelijkt door het Nationaal Samenwerkingsprogramma Luchtkwaliteit. In dit 
geval leidde meer discretie niet tot meer verschillen, maar tot de noodzaak om samen te 
werken tussen de verschillende overheidsniveaus, wat er effectief toe heeft bijgedragen dat 
aan de EU eisen werd voldaan. Noch de omvang van de gemeente, noch de druk van haar 
milieuproblematiek komt naar voren als een noodzakelijke voorwaarde voor alomvattende 
beleidsmaatregelen. 
 Hoofdstuk 4 gaat in op het derde vraagstuk en analyseert in hoeverre verschillen 
in de Nederlandse lokale implementatie van de EU-richtlijn Luchtkwaliteit te wijten zijn aan 
politieke of management overwegingen. Het bouwt voort op de analyse van de lokale 
implementatie in hoofdstuk 3 en zoomt in op vier gemeenten die formeel voldeden aan 
de richtlijn Luchtkwaliteit, maar verschillend scoorden op de implementatieprestaties. De 
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vier gemeenten met de hoogste/laagste scores werden geselecteerd voor een diepgaand 
onderzoek naar de voorwaarden voor een alomvattende EU-implementatie. De politieke 
benadering is opgesplitst in vier specifieke verklaringen: beleidsvoorkeuren, beleid 
saliency, belangengroepsdruk en beleidsondernemerschap. De managementaanpak is 
ook onderverdeeld in vier specifieke verklaringen: interne coördinatie, externe coördinatie, 
beleidservaring en -kennis, en personeelsstabiliteit. Een theorie gedreven, vergelijkende 
analyse laat zien hoe de waargenomen verschillen in lokale implementatieprestaties beter 
verklaard kunnen worden door de politieke benadering dan door de managementaanpak. 
Met name blijkt dat een hoge mate van beleid saliency de belangrijkste drijvende kracht 
is achter de lokale verschillen in EU-implementatie, die in combinatie met ambitieuze 
beleidsvoorkeuren en beleidsondernemerschap van zowel beleidsmedewerkers als politieke 
actoren bepalend zijn voor de hoge implementatieprestaties. Bovendien heeft de frequente 
interne coördinatie tussen de verschillende beleidsafdelingen binnen de lokale overheden 
bijgedragen tot goede implementatie prestaties, doordat zij het mogelijk heeft gemaakt dat 
beleidsmedewerkers en politieke actoren hun voorkeuren beter op elkaar afstemden. Toch 
wordt in dit hoofdstuk gewaarschuwd voor de mate waarin politieke variabelen de lokale 
naleving van de richtlijn Luchtkwaliteit kunnen verklaren. Alle vier de gemeenten voldeden 
aan de procedurele verplichting om in de eerste plaats een luchtkwaliteitsplan op te stellen. 
Gelijksoortige scores op managementvariabelen zouden dus mogelijk de overeenkomsten 
tussen de gemeenten kunnen verklaren wat betreft de naleving van het opstellen van een 
luchtkwaliteitsplan en het voldoen aan de grenswaarden.
 Hoofdstuk 5 gaat ook in op het derde vraagstuk en plaatst de bevindingen van 
hoofdstuk 4 in perspectief. Het biedt een reflectie op de representativiteit van het in hoofdstuk 
4 geïllustreerde causale mechanisme. In hoofdstuk 5 wordt systematisch een groot aantal EU 
lokale implementatiestudies onderzocht. Hieruit blijkt dat de verklaringen voor de afstemming 
van de beleidsvoorkeuren en de hoge interne coördinatie tussen de verschillende departementen 
van lokale overheden ook steun vinden in andere EU lokale implementatiestudies, die zich 
richtten op andere lidstaten en andere EU-richtlijnen. Tegelijkertijd zijn de variabelen saliency 
en beleidsondernemerschap, die belangrijk zijn voor het causale mechanisme in hoofdstuk 
4, minder vaak onderzocht in deze studies. Daarom is meer onderzoek nodig om na te gaan 
of en hoe deze verklaringen een rol spelen in andere lidstaten en de uitvoering van andere 
EU-richtlijnen. Terwijl hoofdstuk 4 waarschuwt voor het te veel gewicht geven aan het belang 
van politieke verklaringen voor de naleving van de EU, aangezien alle lokale overheden zich 
aan de richtlijn hielden, en suggereert dat de managementvariabelen de algemene naleving 
van de richtlijn zouden kunnen verklaren, blijkt uit het systematisch literatuuroverzicht van 
hoofdstuk 5 dat de bevindingen over de managementvariabelen niet eenduidig zijn. In 
hoofdstuk 5 wordt uiteengezet dat uit EU lokale implementatiestudies blijkt dat de resultaten 
van deze studies over de bestuurlijke capaciteit, zoals de omvang van de gemeenten en de 
financiële middelen, en het effect daarvan op de lokale uitvoering, inconsistent zijn. Meer 
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inzicht in deze verklaringen is noodzakelijk gezien de directe gevolgen van de manier waarop 
een slechte uitvoering kan worden verholpen. 
 Dit hoofdstuk signaleert ook nieuwe paden voor toekomstig onderzoek naar de 
lokale implementatie van EU-beleid. Ten eerste blijkt dat het merendeel van de EU lokale 
implementatiestudies gericht is op het documenteren van best practices. Daarbij is in de 
meeste studies gekeken naar het milieubeleid. Niettegenstaande het belang van milieubeleid 
of het leren van best practices, roept dit hoofdstuk op tot meer diversiteit in beleid dat op lokaal 
niveau wordt onderzocht, en tot meer aandacht voor minder goed presterende gemeenten. 
Ten tweede wordt er in dit hoofdstuk op gewezen dat meer onderzoek nodig is om na te 
gaan of aan twee bijzondere procedurele verplichtingen van het EU-beleid wordt voldaan: de 
integratie van EU-beleid op lokaal niveau en de participatie van belanghebbenden op lokaal 
niveau. Ten derde toont het aan dat in de huidige studies niet is geanalyseerd of het lokale 
beleid van de lidstaten in overeenstemming is met de omzetting van EU-wetgeving, maar 
alleen met het beleid van de EU. Zonder kennis over hoe de verschillende overheidsniveaus 
zich tot elkaar verhouden, wordt het moeilijk om volledig in te schatten in welke mate de 
verschillende bestuursniveaus het EU-beleid uitvoeren. Daarom wordt in hoofdstuk 5 
aanbevolen meer aandacht te besteden aan het multi-level karakter van de EU-uitvoering. Ten 
slotte blijkt uit dit hoofdstuk dat de meeste bestaande EU lokale implementatiestudies zeer 
beschrijvend en verkennend zijn. Het onderzoeksgebied van de EU lokale uitvoering zou baat 
kunnen hebben bij meer expliciete verklarende onderzoeksopzetten.
De belangrijkste conclusie van dit proefschrift is dat lokale overheden belangrijke verschillen 
vertonen in de uitvoering van EU-beleid. Dit proefschrift maakt inzichtelijk dat deze verschillen 
worden waargenomen binnen één lidstaat en zelfs tussen de gemeenten die aan de eisen 
voldoen. Dit maakt de analyse van de procedurele verplichtingen, die het mogelijk maken om 
zeer uiteenlopende, maar volledig conforme beleidsuitvoering te formuleren, relevant voor 
ons begrip van de manier waarop lokale overheden het EU-beleid vormgeven in de praktijk. 
Dit proefschrift toont tevens aan dat sommige gemeenten meer doen dan het absolute 
wettelijke minimum, en dus hun rol in het oplossen van grensoverschrijdende problemen 
zeer proactief en serieus nemen. Het zou dan ook een vergissing zijn om de lokale overheden 
alleen te zien als de uitvoerders van supranationale beleidsbeslissingen. Dit proefschrift 
illustreert dat lokale overheden politieke arena’s zijn waar het EU-beleid opnieuw aan een 
politieke en institutionele filtering wordt onderworpen.
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